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INTRODUCTION 
The stock market ought to be efficient.1 At least, the Supreme 
Court,2 the Congress, 3 and the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) think so,4 and most academics agree.s It is a fundamental 
premise of modem securities policy that efficient stock markets (de-
fined as markets in which stock prices fully reflect all available infor-
1. Capital markets are described as "efficient" when stock prices fully reflect all available 
information relevant to their values. See infra note 22; see generally Fama, Efficient Capital 
Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383 (1970); Gilson & K.raakman, 
The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549 (1984); Gordon & Kornhauser, Effi-
cient Markets, Costly Information and Securities Research, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 761 (1985). 
2. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 108 S. Ct. 978, 988-91 (1988) (efficient market prices accurately 
reflect value; "fraud-on-the-market" theory of investor reliance, allowing plaintiffs to sue when-, 
ever fraud causes stock price to depart from value, furthers regulatory goal of accurate prices); 
Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 658 n.17 (1983) (declining to extend insider trading liability where to 
do so would chill efficiency-enhancing activities of market analysts). 
3. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 108 S. Ct. at 990-92 (congressional policy to protect efficient 
market prices as indices of value); see Definition of Insider Trading: Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on Securities of the Comm. on Banking, Housing, & Urban Affairs, U.S. Senate, 100th 
Cong., 1st Sess. pt. I, at 6 (1987) [hereinafter 1987 Hearings] (statement of Senator Bond) (overly 
broad definition of insider trading could impair market efficiency); HOUSE COMM. ON ENERGY & 
COMMERCE, INSIDER TRADING SANCTIONS ACT OF 1983, H.R. REP. No. 355, 98th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 2, 22 (1983) [hereinafter REPORT ON ITSA] (noting and adopting SEC's view that U.S. 
securities markets are "the best ... the world has ever known" because they are "efficient" and 
"[t]he prices of the vast majority of actively traded securities reflect available information about 
companies and the economy"); SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING & URBAN AFFAIRS, 
NATIONAL SECURITIES MARKET SYSTEM ACT OF 1974, s. REP. No. 865, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 
(1974) (securities markets must be fair and efficient). 
4. Anderson, The Disclosure Process in Federal Securities Regulation: A Brief Review, 25 
HASTINGS L.J. 311, 353 (1974) (SEC policy to administer disclosure provisions to promote effi-
cient market); Kerr, A Walk Through the Circuits: The Duty To Disclose Soft Information, 46 
Mo. L. REV. 1071, 1110 (1987) (SEC policy to promote efficient markets); see 1987 Hearings, 
supra note 3, pt. II, at 13 (statement of Charles Cox, acting chairman, SEC: SEC believes that 
insider trading discourages investment in legitimate information gathering, "essential to market 
efficiency"); HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE & FOREIGN COMMERCE, 95TH CONG., 1sr SESS., 
REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITIEE ON CORPORATE DISCLOSURE TO THE SECURITIES & 
EXCHANGE COMMISSION 16 (Comm. Print 1977) (benefits of mandatory disclosure system in-
clude efficient resource pricing); Preliminary Response to the Advisory Committee on Corporate 
Disclosure, Securities Act Release No. 5906 [1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 
81,505, at 80,048 (Feb. 15, 1978) (basic objective of disclosure requirements is "to make the 
securities markets more efficient"). 
5. See, e.g., Barry, The Economics of Outside Information and Rule lOb-5, 129 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1307, 1315 (1981) (value in promoting efficient capital markets); Carlton & Fischel, The 
Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 STAN. L. REV. 857, 866 (1983) (social gains from efficient 
markets are "well known"); Coffee, Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory 
Disclosure System, 70 VA. L. REV. 717, 737 (1984) (social interest in ensuring efficient market); 
Dennis, Materiality and the Efficient Capital Markets Model: A Recipe for the Total Mix, 25 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 373, 375 (1984) (efficient stock markets economically desirable); Fox, 
Shelf Registration, Integrated Disclosure, and Underwriter Due Diligence: An Economic Analysis, 
70 VA. L. REV. 1005, 1015 (1984) (benefits from accurate prices in efficient market); Gordon & 
Kornhauser, supra note 1, at 781 (efficient markets are "highly desirable from a policy perspec-
tive"). But see Coffee, supra, at 734 (one can view efficient securities prices as socially unimpor-
tant); Fox, supra, at 1010-12, 1023 (noting and rejecting view that efficient markets which 
correctly price securities are socially unimportant). 
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mation) should be promoted.6 Judges decline to broaden the scope of 
insider trading liability for fear that such expansion will harm market 
efficiency.7 The SEC defends program trading in stock index futures 
on the assumption that program trading improves the stock market's 
efficiency.8 Commentators cite efficiency as a reason to require 
mandatory disclosure of merger negotiations.9 In each case, legal 
rules that favor efficient stock markets do so by sacrificing other regu-
latory goals. 10 
Two key assumptions are necessary to the view that improving 
market efficiency is an important goal of securities regulation. The 
first is that stock prices in an efficient market accurately reflect our 
best estimates of the financial prospects of the issuing corporation. 11 
The second assumption is that accurate stock prices are desirable be-
cause stock market prices influence the production, distribution, and 
consumption of goods and services in the economy. For this reason, 
6. A preoccupation with market efficiency is reflected throughout the securities culture. Not 
only does the Supreme Court view efficient markets as an objective, see supra note 3, but lower 
courts also recognize the importance of efficient stock markets. See Freeman v. Decio, 584 F.2d 
186, 190, 196 (7th Cir. 1978) (declining to recognize derivative action under Indiana law for 
profits of insider trading and noting that insider trading helps assure efficient capital markets that 
reflect the best information available); Chris-Craft Indus. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 
357 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973) (securities laws seek to prevent restrictions on 
information which distort stock market pricing and hamper market efficiency). Concern for 
maintaining efficient markets is expressed by agencies other than the SEC as well. See U.S. FED. 
RESERVE Bo., U.S. COMMODITIES FUTURES TRADING COMMN. & U.S. SEC. & EXCH. 
COMMN., A STUDY OF THE EFFECTS ON THE EcONOMY OF TRADING IN OPTIONS at I-11 to I-12 
(1984) [hereinafter JOINT STUDY OF TRADING IN FUTURES] (defending arbitrage activity in 
stock futures as enhancing stock efficiency); U.S. DEPT. OF THE TREASURY, PUBLIC POLICY FOR 
AMERICAN CAPITAL MARKETS 3 (1974) (efficiency in pricing is objective of securities policy). 
Even securities practitioners recognize the importance of efficient markets. See ABA Committee 
on Federal Regulation of Securities, Report of the Task Force on Regulation of Insider Trading, 
41 Bus. LAW. 223, 225, 228-29 (1985) [hereinafter ABA Report] (insider trading liability rules 
should serve market's informational efficiency). 
7. See infra notes 50-68 and accompanying text. 
8. See infra notes 71-90 and accompanying text. 
9. See infra notes 106-27 and accompanying text. 
10. Allowing insiders to trade on the basis of information unavailable to public investors 
violates notions of fairness. See infra note 458 and accompanying text. Program trading erodes 
investor confidence by adding undesirable volatility to the stock market. See infra notes 79-85 
and accompanying text. Requiring disclosure of preliminary merger negotiations is believed to 
interfere with the negotiation process or even discourage potential suitors from making offers. 
See infra notes 106-07 and accompanying text. 
11. Efficient market prices which reflect all available information relevant to the value of the 
stock are thought to measure rationally the "worth" of stocks as financial instruments in terms of 
the present value of their expected future earnings, discounted for nondiversifiable risk. See infra 
text at notes 280-92. Therefore, we can rely on market price as a measure of "true worth" or 
"intrinsic value." See infra notes 408-19 and accompanying text; see also Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 
108 S. Ct. 978, 991 (1988) (in efficient market where prices quickly incorporate all available 
relevant information, market price is best estimate of actual worth, and we can rely on market 
prices as accurate "indices of real value"). This assumption is crucial to the purported benefits of 
efficiency. See infra notes 408-09 and accompanying text. 
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stock market efficiency is regarded as essential to allocative efficiency 
in the distribution of investment capital and other scarce resources to 
their most productive uses. 12 
Given the importance which the securities culture attaches to cul-
tivating stock market efficiency, both assumptions have long war-
ranted careful evaluation. But while numerous commentators have 
examined whether an efficie~t stock market sets accurate prices, 13 the 
consensus· that stock prices influence the allocation of real resources 
among competing uses has remained largely unguestioned.14 A reex-
amination of that orthodoxy seems especially appropriate in the wake 
of October 19, 1987. On that date, the Dow Jones average of thirty 
leading industrial stocks dropped 508 points, losing 22.6% of its value 
in a single day's trading. 15 The abrupt extinction of more than one 
trillion dollars in stock value would be catastrophic were it to produce 
a contraction of similar magnitude in the economy.16 A year later, 
however, the macroeconomic impact of the October crash seems to 
have been negligible.17 
12. See, e.g., SEC. & EXCH. COMMN., POLICY STATEMENT ON THE STRUCTURE OF A CEN-
TRAL MARKET SYSTEM 196 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) D-1 (Apr. 4, 1973) [hereinafter SEC 
POLICY STATEMENT] (to allocate capital effectively, securities markets must be efficient); JOINT 
STUDY OF TRADING IN FUTURES, supra note 6, at 1-11to1-12 (speculation in futures helps to 
keep stock prices accurate which "promote[s] efficiency in the production, distribution, and con-
sumption of goods and services"); Barry, supra note 5, at 1316-19. (more accurate securities 
prices lead to more efficient resource allocation); Fox, supra note 5, at 1025 (accuracy in securi-
ties prices "enhances the efficient allocation of resources"); Levmore, Securities and Secrets: In-
sider Trading and the Law of Contracts, 68 VA. L. REV. 1i7, 145-47 (1982) (describing 
misallocations of resources resulting from inefficient stock prices); Sc;ligman, The Reformulation 
of Federal Securities Law Concerning Nonpublic. Information, 73 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1119 (1985) 
(faster dissemination of information improves market's allocative efficiency by channelling soci-
ety's resources into investments promising best return); Wu, An Economist Looks at Section 16 of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 260, 264 (1968) (accurate price determi-
nation in the stock market is "essential" to efficient allocation). 
13. See sources cited infra notes 410-16 (some suggest stock prices may be function of irra-
tional investor preferences); Wang, Some Arguments that the Stock Market Is Not Efficient, 19 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 341, 344-49 (1986) (describing arguments that efficient market prices may 
not reflect stocks' "fundamental" values). · 
14. See sources cited supra note 12, infra notes 152, 156.- But see H. KRIPKE, THE SEC AND 
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE 135-39 (1979) (SEC's influence on resource allocation may be confined 
to new stock issues, which are "a very small portion of the total process of resource allocation."); 
Berle, Modern Functions of the Corporate System, 62 CoLUM. L. REV. 433, 445-47 (1962) 
("[T]he stock market is an allocator, ncit of capital, but of wealth."). 
15. PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE ON MARKET MECHANISMS, REPORT OF THE PRESIDEN-
TIAL TASK FORCE ON MARKET MECHANISMS I (1988) [4ereinafter BRADY REPORT]. 
16. See id. at v (U.S. stocks lost approximately one trillion dollars in value between October 
13 and 19.). 
17. See Farhi, Dire Forecasts Never Came To Pass, Wash. Post, Oct. 19, 1988, at Fl, col. 3 
(crash had little effect on economy); Laderman & Pennar, Did the Crash Make a Dent?, Bus. 
WK., Oct. 17, 1988, at p. 88 (same); Pennar, It's Almost as if It Never Happened-Almost, Bus. 
WK., Apr. 18, 1988, at 56 (six months after October 19, 1987, market crash has shown little 
effect on macroeconomy). 
Even if the 1987 market cra5h were followed by economic recession or depression, this would 
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This article tests the assumption that stock market prices control 
the distribution of capital and other resources. It finds that assump-
tion wanting. Careful analysis indicates that the connection between 
prices in the public trading markets for stocks and the allocation of 
real resources is a weak one, and that stock markets may have far less 
allocative importance than has generally been assumed. 18 That finding 
in turn suggests a need to reexamine the existing consensus that we 
should spend resources and sacrifice other goals of securities regula-
tion (such as investor protection or fair and honest markets) to further 
market efficiency. 
Part I of this article describes how perceptions that market effi-
ciency is an important regulatory objective have influenced the devel-
opment of securities law.19 For illustration, Part I examines the role 
of market efficiency goals in recent debates on the scope of insider 
trading liability, on trading in stock index futures, and on mandatory 
disclosure of merger negotiations. Part II then evaluates the notion 
that more efficient stock markets necessarily produce more optimal 
resource allocation. 20 A closer look at the economic consequences of 
stock prices suggests that the principal function of stock prices is not 
resource allocation but rather the redistribution of wealth among in-
vestors. Consequently, more efficient public stock markets may con-
tribute little to allocative efficiency., Part III presents reasons why 
legal rules designed to improve market efficiency may, on the whole, 
produce social losses. 21 It concludes that enhancing market efficiency 
should not be a goal of securities regulation and describes significant 
policy changes that would follow from the abandonment of efficiency 
as a goal. 
not necessarily indicate that stock prices affect business - the reverse may be true. Stock prices 
are likely "the thermometer and not the fever." R. KARMEL, REGULATION DY PROSECUTION 44 
(1982) (quoting Bernard Baruch); see also J. LORIE & M. HAMILTON, THE STOCK MARKET: 
THEORIES AND EVIDENCE 10-25 (1973) (role of stock prices as indicator of impending 
macroeconomic change). 
18. Commentators speaking of an efficient "stock market" generally are referring to public 
stock trading on registered exchanges such as the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) or in the 
over-the-counter (OTC) market of stocks quoted on the National Association of Securities Deal-
ers Automatic Quotation system (NASDAQ). See generally Seligman, The Future of the Na-
tional Market System, 10 J. CORP. L. 79, 82-101 (1984) (describing exchange and OTC markets). 
There are other markets for stock; corporations may sell new issues by private placement with an 
institutional investor or by issuing warrants to key employees or existing shareholders, and inves-
tors may arrange private sales of outstanding shares including large blocks that carry with them 
voting control. But as questions of informational efficiency are almost invariably raised in the 
context of public trading on the exchanges or in the OTC market, see infra note 206, this discus-
sion is similarly limited. 
19. See infra notes 36-151 and accompanying text. 
20. See infra notes 152-405 and accompanying text. 
21. See infra notes 406-62 and accompanying text. 
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I. THE INFLUENCE OF EFFICIENCY OBJECTIVES ON THE 
REGULATION OF SECURITIES MARKETS 
619 
Commentators who speak of "making the stock market more effi-
cient" are almost invariably referring to a specialized concept of effi-
ciency developed from the doctrine known as the Efficient Capital 
Markets Hypothesis (ECMH).22 The ECMH is the offspring of a se-
ries of studies during the 1950s and 1960s by economists and statisti-
cians who examined the patterns of stock prices hoping to predict 
future movements in price.23 If their efforts were motivated by any-
thing other than professional curiosity, they were surely disappointed, 
for they concluded that stock price changes were random and could 
not be successfully foreseen. 24 
The ECMH answers the riddle of random price changes.25 It as-
serts that stock traders hoping for arbitrage profits gather and analyze 
all available information that might help them to identify mispriced 
securities.26 When new information indicates that a particular stock is 
mispriced, traders promptly adjust the price to reflect the new infor-
mation. 27 The result is an "informationally efficient" (or, as it is some-
22. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 1, at 554 (common definition of market efficiency is 
that prices fuJly reflect available information); Friend, The Economic Consequences of the Stock 
Market, 62 AM. EcoN. REv. 212 (May 1972) (The "most common conception of an efficient 
market .•• is one in which every price fuJly reflects all available information."); Note, Disclosure 
of Future-Oriented Information Under the Securities Laws, 88 YALE L.J. 338, 339 n.10 (1978) 
(efficient market "generally understood" to mean one in which prices reflect all information). 
See generally sources cited supra note 1; R. BREALEY & s. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE 
FINANCE 266-81 (2d ed. 1984); J. LoRIE & M. HAMILTON, supra note 17, at 70-97. 
23. See generally R. BREALEY & S. MYERS, supra note 22, at 266-67. 
24. See R. BREALEY & S. MYERS, supra note 22, at 268 (research results showed stock price 
changes were random). Of course, the researchers did at least gain a rejoinder to the inquiry: "If 
you're so smart, why ain't you rich?" 
25. The observation that stock prices move unpredictably was contrary to prevailing views 
that stock market prices tended to foJlow certain waves or patterns, and that the investor who 
accurately identified these could regularly profit from the certain knowledge that price would rise 
or faJI at a particular time on the chart. See w. BAUMOL, THE STOCK MARKET AND EcONOMIC 
EFFICIENCY 40 (1965) (random walk findings "a remarkable result"); R. BREALEY & s. MYERS, 
supra note 22, at 267 (idea that stock price changes were random startled many economists). 
26. Suppose a stock trader receives information indicating a stock is "undervalued" in the 
sense that its price will rise from $20 today to $25 tomorrow. Assuming that there is no cost to 
storing the security, the trader can profit by simply buying the security and holding it until the 
price rises. If short sales are permitted, speculators can also profit from overvalued securities. A 
speculator sells stock "short" by accepting the payment price now but promising to deliver the 
stock at some time in the future. If stock price declines before the delivery date, the speculator 
can purchase the stock for delivery at a lower price than he or she received in payment. Selling 
stock short is one of the few legal ways to sell something you don't own. 
27. The mechanism of price changes in an efficient market has not been clearly established. 
See generally M. Fox, FINANCE AND INDUSTRIAL PERFORMANCE IN A DYNAMIC EcONOMY 
34-36, 55-57 (1987); Gilson & Kraakman, supra note l, at 565-92. Widely disseminated new 
information may cause traders to alter their bid and ask prices in accordance with their new 
estimates of the stock's value, so that prices change without any actual trading. See Carney, 
Signalling and Causation in Insider Trading, 36 CATH. U. L. REV. 863, 880, 885 (1987); Gilson 
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times known, "pricing efficient") market which rapidly incorporates 
all available data into stock prices.28 
It is only logical that price changes will be random in an informa-
tionally efficient market. If prices continuously reflect all available in-
formation, a necessary corollary is that a change in price must be due 
to previously unavailable information. Because no one can predict 
such new information, no one can successfully predict the direction or 
magnitude of future changes in stock prices. Thus the adage: you 
& Kraakman, supra note 1, at 568-69 (describing "universally informed" trading). It is also 
possible that small groups of informed speculators buying or selling large quantities on the basis 
of new information unavailable to the general public may exert "price pressure" through their 
transactions: if the quantity they demand outstrips the supply at present market prices, the bids 
of informed speculators will raise prices to a level that more closely approximates the actual 
value of the stock in light of the new information. In this fashion informed trading can drive 
price toward the correct value even if the remainder of the market remains uninformed. See 
Seligman, Reappraising the Appraisal Remedy. 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 829, 837 (1984) (large 
trades upset supply and demand and drive security's price up); Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 
1, at 570 n.67 ("professionally informed" trading may lead to price changes through price pres-
sure). 
The idea that large stock transactions can exert price pressure is contrary to theories that 
assert that, since securities are perfect substitutes for each other, demand for them should 
demonstrate almost infinite price elasticity. See infra notes 212, 309-12, and 372-82. 
28. The statement that efficient stock prices "fully reflect all available information" means 
little unless we define what we mean by "reflect" and "available." Markets are described as 
efficiently reflecting a particular class of information if it is so quickly incorporated into price 
that no one can expect to make consistent profits trading on the basis of that information. Gilson 
& Kraakman, supra note 1, at 554-55. Random walk findings support the view that the market is 
efficient in "weak" form, in the sense that stock prices fully reflect all information concerning 
past stock movements, and that "technical" analysis of past changes or cycles does not allow us 
to predict successfully what stock prices will do in the future. R. BREALEY & S. MYERS, supra 
note 22, at 271. "Semi-strong" efficiency requires that prices incorporate other publicly available 
information as well, such as newspapi:r reports, investment advice sheets, and SEC filings. Evi-
dence that the initial dissemination of information concerning significant corporate events leads 
to price changes so quickly that no investor can consistently profit by trading on "fundamental" 
analysis of public information lends empirical support for a semi-strong market in which prices 
reflect all publicly available information. See id. at 270. The third form of efficiency, "strong" 
form efficiency, exists if prices incorporate all relevant information, whether public or nonpublic. 
(The descriptive accuracy of strong form efficiency is a touchy matter, as it implies possible 
improper conduct by corporate management. State law fiduciary duties preclude the unauthor-
ized disclosure of nonpublic corporate information and federal law prohibits insider trading on 
the basis of such information. But if market prices incorporate such news prior to public an-
nouncement, then the market already knows the information, or someone with access to it has 
been trading. See infra notes 39-47 and accompanying text.) Tests of strong form efficiency that 
examine the returns made by corporate management who trade in their own stock suggest that 
these are positive, indicating that stock prices may not successfully incorporate all nonpublic 
information. See R. BREALEY & S. MYERS, supra note 22, at 270. On the other hand, evidence 
that public announcements of merger agreements and takeover bids are usually preceded by 
dramatic run-ups in the prices of the target corporations may indicate that a certain amount of 
nonpublic information is, albeit imperfectly, incorporated into price. See Brown, Corporate Se-
crecy, the Federal Securities Laws, and the Disclosure of Ongoing Negotiations, 36 CATH. U. L. 
REV. 93, 146 (1986) (citing studies). · 
Because more accurate stock prices are believed to lead to more optimal resource allocation, 
"strong form" efficiency is more desirable, from a policy perspective, than "weak" or "semi-
strong" efficiency. See infra notes 47, 152-58. 
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can't beat the market. 29 
The ECMH addresses only how quickly stock market prices react 
to new information. 30 One could imagine other forms of efficiency 
that could be desired in securities markets.31 But no other vision of 
efficiency has captured the hearts and minds of the securities culture to 
the degree that informational efficiency has. 32 In the words of Profes-
sors Gilson and Kraakman, "the ECMH is now the context in which 
serious discussion of the regulation of financial markets takes place. " 33 
Initial debate on the ECMH focused on whether it accurately de-
scribed modem securities markets. 34 Researchers marshalled consid-
erable empirical evidence that supported (or at least did not discredit) 
the view that many stocks' prices rapidly adjust to reflect all relevant 
public information. 35 But policymakers are no longer content to de-
bate whether the stock market is informationally efficient to any partic-
ular degree; they now debate how i( might be made more so. 
Improving efficiency has become a goal of securities policy on a par 
with more traditional goals such as investor protection or fair and 
29. Of course, if the market is perfectly efficient no stock will ever be under- or over-valued, 
and there will be no incentive for the analyst to seek out new information. See Grossman & 
Stiglitz, On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets, 70 AM. EcoN. REv. 393 
(1980) (efficient market operat~ at "equilibrium amount of disequilibrium"). 
30. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 1, at 560 (critical question in determining market 
efficiency is how fast prices adjust to new information). Strong form efficient markets that em-
body nonpublic corporate information into stock prices can be said to reflect such information 
more "quickly" than semi-strong markets that will not incorporate such information until it has 
been announced. See supra note 28. Strong form efficiency markets that reflect nonpublic infor-
mation that would never be disclosed can also be described as incorporating "more" information 
into price. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note l, at 558-60 (strength of claim that market is 
efficient in incorporating available information depends in part on the threshold of distribution 
required to make information "available"). 
31. See Friend, The SEC and the Economic Performance of Securities Markets, in EcoNOMIC 
POLICY AND THE REGULATION OF CoRPORATE SECURITIES 185, 189-90 (H. Manne ed. 1969) 
(describing operational efficiency of market as minimizing costs of providing financial services); 
Langevoort, Information Technology and the Structure of Securities Regulation, 98 HARV. L. 
REV. 747, 748, 803 (1985) (referring to efficiency of investment process in minimizing informa-
tion-gathering and trading costs). 
32. Levmore, Efficient Markets and Puzzling Intermediaries, 70 VA. L. REv. 645 n.2 (1984) 
(implications of ECMH are "a preoccupation" of the corporate finance literature; "it is curious 
that so little attention has been paid to [other] forms of efficiency"); Gilson & Kraakman, supra 
note 1, at 549-50 (of all recent developments in financial economics, ECMH "has achieved the 
widest acceptance by the legal culture" and now "structures [the] deJ>ate over the future of secur-
ities regulation"); Hazen, Rumor Control and Disclosure of Merger Negotiations or Other Contro/-
Re/ated Transactions: Full Disclosure or "No Comment" - The Only Safe Harbors, 46 MD. L. 
REV. 954, 973 (1987) (referring to ECMH as currently "in vogue"). 
33. Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 1, at 550 (emphasis in original). 
34. See, e.g., J. LoRIE & M. HAMILTON, supra note 17, at 75-79 (discussing empirical sup-
port for ECMH); Fama, supra note 1, at 388-91 (same). 
35. See supra note 28 (weak, strong, and semi-strong tests). But see Carney, supra note 27, at 
878 n.72 (describing contradictory evidence); Wang, supra note 13, at 363-75 (same). 
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honest markets. 36 Some commentators even suggest that it is the prin-
cipal goal.37 With remarkable unanimity, authorities assert that more 
efficient stock pricing is desirable and work to demonstrate that their 
suggested approach will make the market more efficient. 38 
A. Insider Trading 
The need to enhance efficient stock pricing is most commonly 
raised in connection with insider trading. 39 Corporate insiders learn of 
changes in their corporation's fortunes long before such news is an-
36. See supra notes 2-10 and accompanying text (consensus that market should be efficient); 
Anderson, supra note 4, at 323, 329-30, 353 (two purposes of securities statutes are furthering 
market efficiency and protecting investors; SEC's emphasis in administering disclosure provisions 
has shifted from investor protection to promoting efficient markets); Knauss, Disclosure Require-
ments - Changing Concepts of Liability, 24 Bus. LAW. 43 (1968) ("initial justification" for 
securities Jaws was investor protection; second justification is public interest in an "efficient se-
curities market which channels capital toward the most efficient companies"); Sargent, State 
Disclosure Regulation and the A/location of Regulatory Responsibilities, 46 Mo. L. REV. 1027, 
1062 (1987) (securities scholarship is now in "post-revisionist" phase characterized by "a preoc-
cupation with the effects of a mandatory disclosure system on the (pricing] efficiency of the mar-
ket, rather than the traditional considerations of investor protection, fraud deterrence, and 
investor confidence"); Schoenbaum, The Relationship Between Corporate Disclosure and Corpo-
rate Responsibility, 40 FORDHAM L. REv. 565, 575-77 (1972) (principal objective of securities 
acts was investor protection; a second objective is "free and open" market in which price equals 
value so that allocative efficiency is improved; market efficiency is "bound to increase in impor-
tance as a purpose of disclosure and of securities regulation"). 
37. See Stigler, Public Regulation of the Securities Markets, 31 J. Bus. 117, 124 (1964) (effi-
cient capital markets more important than investor protection for efficiency and growth of Amer-
ican economy); Note, Rule JOb-5 and the Duty To Disclose Merger Negotiations in Corporate 
Statements, 96 YALE L.J. 547, 567 (1987) (securities laws "best viewed as pursuing primarily 
economic goals") (emphasis in original); infra notes 146-51 and accompanying text ("revisionist" 
view). 
38. Commentators who hold opposite views concerning particular securities policies never-
theless seem agreed that improved market efficiency is desirable. Compare infra notes 39-48 and 
accompanying text (insider trading desirable because it benefits market efficiency) with infra note 
131 and accompanying text (insider trading harms efficiency); compare Banoff, Regulatory Subsi-
dies, Efficient Markets, and Shelf Registration: An Analysis of Rule 415, 10 VA. L. REV. 135, 184 
(1984) (shelf registration desirable because it aids market efficiency), with Fox, supra note 5, at 
1032 (shelf registration under 415 undesirable because it harms market efficiency); compare Jonas 
& Farrell, Program Trading: Let the Little Guy In, Bus. WK., Sept. 29, 1986, at 100 (quoting 
Professor Burton Malkiel that program trading in stock index futures makes the market more 
efficient), with Hazen, Volatility and Market Inefficiency: A Commentary 011 the Effects of Op-
tions, Futures. and Risk Arbitrage on the Stock Market, 44 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 789 (1987) 
(index futures trading may increase market inefficiencies); compare Note, Mandatory Disclosure 
of Corporate Projections and the Goals of Securities Regulation, 81 CO LUM. L. REV. 1525, 1534 
(1981) (mandatory disclosure of earnings projections undesirable as it impairs efficiency), with 
Note, supra note 22, at 338, 353, 362 (efficiency enhanced by making disclosure of projections 
mandatory). 
39. The argument that insider trading benefits efficiency is usually credited to Professor 
Henry Manne. See H. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET 80-90 (1966) 
(insider trading "smoothes" price adjustment); Manne, Insider Trading and the Law Professors, 
23 VAND. L. REV. 547, 565 (1970) [hereinafter Manne, Law Professors] ("(l]nsider trading makes 
the stock market function more efficiently."). Other scholars have adopted this view as well. 
See, e.g., Carlton & Fischel, supra note 5, at 866-68 (insider trading helps market efficiently 
incorporate nonpublic information); Lorie, Insider Trading: Rule JOb-5, Disclosure, and Corpo-
rate Privacy: A Comment, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 819 (1980) (insider trading produces social benefit 
December 1988] Unimportance of Efficiency 623 
nounced to the public. Federal law prohibits insiders from trading on 
the basis of nonpublic information not disclosed to the person with 
whom· they are trading.40 This "disclose or abstain" rule41 is de-
nounced by those who believe that it leads to mispriced securities and, 
therefore, to misallocated resources.42 
The dilemma is well illustrated by the classic case of SEC v. Texas 
Gulf Sulphur Co. 43 Texas Gulf explorations found evidence of a 
fabulously rich mineral lode in Ontario. Because Texas Gulf had not 
yet acquired the mining rights to the land, public disclosure of the 
strike was out of the question. In the absence of insider trading, the 
market price for Texas Gulf stock would necessarily fail to reflect the 
news of the strike and would remain "incorrect" until the news was 
released. 
Federal law prohibiting insider trading did not deter Texas Gulf 
employees from beating a path to their stockbrokers' doors. Texas 
Gulf stock rose from $17 before test drilling began to $30 just before 
news of the strike was announced. 44 In this fashion, insider trading 
accelerated the market's adjustment of Texas Gulf stock to the "cor-
rect'' price in light of the unannounced mineral discovery. While the 
mechanism of such price shifts is not entirely clear, price changes may 
have resulted from both insider buying and other investors' extracting 
information from the insiders' trades through trade- and price-
decoding. 45 
by enhancing efficiency); Wu, supra note 12, at 265-69 (insider trading is economically 
beneficial). 
40. See In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961) (liability under antifraud provisions 
for insider trading); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert denied, 
394 U.S. 976 (1969). 
41. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. at 911 (insider must disclose nonpublic information 
to person with whom trading or abstain from trading). 
42. See, e.g., authorities cited supra note 39; Fischel, Insider Trading and Investment Ana-
lysts: An Economic Analysis of Dirks v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 13 HOFSTRA L. 
REV. 127, 133 (1984) (courts should not prohibit insider trading because stock prices are more 
efficient when insider trading is allowed); Levmore, supra note 12, at 147 ("the disclose-or-ab-
stain [rule] causes misallocations because of the poor information that pervades ... the securities 
market"); Macey, From Fairness to Contract: The New Direction of the Rules Against Insider 
Trading, 13 HOFSTRA L. REV. 9, 31 n.110 (1984) (some recommend legalizing insider trading to 
make market more efficient). 
43. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). 
44. 401 F.2d at 847. In recent years, similar patterns have been observed in many cases 
where target firms' prices have been increased dramatically just before the announcement of a 
merger or takeover bid. See supra note 28. 
45. Even assuming that large transactions lead to price pressure, see infra notes 212, 372-82, 
price changes will not persist if insider buying produces only a temporary increase in demand. In 
order to reap the allocative benefits perceived to accompany correct stock prices, those prices 
must stay correct even after the insiders make their purchases. Some argue that insider trading 
can lead to permanent price changes because other investors observe the trading or resulting 
price shift and read into this shift the possibility of a significant corporate development. These 
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Abandoning the "disclose or abstain" rule and allowing insider 
trading thus appears to promote at least two forms of efficiency. Be-
cause the corporation need not disclose nonpublic, proprietary infor-
mation, it reaps the benefits of its own analysis and investigation. 
Such a policy preserves incentives to acquire valuable new knowledge, 
like the location of mineral deposits.46 At the same time, no informa-
tionally inefficient stock mispricing results from withholding corporate 
information. Trading by insiders (accompanied, perhaps, by some 
free-riding, trade-decoding investors) ensures that stock prices reflect 
the news before it is news.47 It is on the strength of this argument that 
"the deregulation of insider trading is often urged as one of the few 
reforms with any real promise of increasing the informational effi-
ciency of securities prices."48 
While complete legalization of insider trading is unlikely, concern 
for the market's informational efficiency has had great influence on 
legal rules defining the scope of the insider trading prohibition. For 
example, the need to promote market efficiency was the "overriding 
rationale"49 behind the Supreme Court's decision in Dirks v. SEC. so 
Raymond Dirks was an investment analyst who learned from a source 
inside Equity Funding of America that the corporation was fraudu-
lently overstating its assets on a rather ambitious scale.st Dirks and 
his source attempted to blow the whistle but were rebuffed by authori-
ties, including the SEC, which found the idea of such a massive swin-
dle incredible.s2 Dirks meanwhile advised his institutional clients to 
sell Equity Funding shares. These clients sold more than sixteen mil-
lion dollars in stock, and the price of Equity Funding dropped sharply. 
"trade decoding" and "price decoding" investors change their evaluations of securities because of 
insider transactions. As a result market prices remain correct even after the insiders have com-
pleted their transactions. See Carney, supra note 27, at 886-91; Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 
l, at 572-79. 
46. See Levmore, supra note 12, at 152-53 (requiring disclosure reduces incentives for explor-
ing and other information production); Macey, supra note 42, at 19, 28 n.98, 30-32 (must protect 
nonpublic nature of valuable firm information to maintain incentive to create such information). 
47. The idea that insider trading desirably enhances the market's efficiency is predicated on 
the view that, from a policy standpoint, it is desirable to pursue "strong form" efficiency so that 
stock prices include nonpublic corporate information. See supra notes 28, 30. 
48. Gilson & Kraakman,.supra note l, at 629. 
49. Hiler, The SEC and the Courts' Approach to Disclosure of Earnings Projections, Asset 
Appraisals, and Other Soft Information: Old Problems, Changing Views, 46 Mo. L. REV. 1114, 
1120 n.14 (1987). 
50. 463 U.S. 646 (1983). 
51. 463 U.S. at 648-49. Dirks' primary source was Ronald Secrist, a former officer of Equity 
Funding. 463 U.S. at 648-49. 
52. Dirks passed news of the fraud on to the Wall Street Journal. His inside source, Secrist, 
also informed various "regulatory agencies." One of these - the California Insurance Depart-
ment - apparently informed the SEC of Secrist's charges. 463 U.S. at 649, 650 n.3. 
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The drop triggered a trading halt by the New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE) and a subsequent investigation which revealed the accounting 
fraud.53 Credit for uncovering the chicanery was laid at Dirks' door.54 
Because Raymond Dirks had advised his clients to sell on the basis 
of an inside tip from a corporate source, he was sanctioned by the SEC 
for insider trading.55 The SEC claimed as authority, inter a/ia, Rule 
10b-5's prohibition against any "device, scheme, or artifice to de-
fraud."56 Neither the language of the rule nor attendant case law gave 
clear guidance as to the nature of Dirks' conduct. But in the SEC's 
view he was guilty of insider trading because he had received nonpub-
lic information from an inside source and passed it to other "tippees" 
who traded on it. -
The Supreme Court reversed Dirks' censure. 57 In doing so, the 
Court claimed market efficiency as a justification for adopting a nar-
. row definition of insider trading. Any other rule, the Court said, 
"could have an inhibiting influence on the role of market analysts."58 
The value of financial analysts like Raymond Dirks "cannot be gain-
said; market efficiency in pricing is significantly enhanced by [their] 
initiatives to ferret out and analyze information."59 As an example of. 
such benefits the Court noted that "until the Equity Funding fraud 
was exposed, the information in the trading market was grossly 
inaccurate. "60 
The scope of the insider trading prohibition remains far from set-
tled. Recent attention has focused on the novel "misappropriation" 
theory, which imposes Rule lOb-5 liability on noninsiders who trade 
on nonpublic information obtained through breach of a fiduciary duty, 
53. 463 U.S. at 649-50. 
54. See Dirks v. SEC, 681 F.2d 824, 829 (D.C. Cir. 1982) ("[l]argely thanks to D ... :ki. one of 
the most infamous frauds in recent memory was uncovered and exposed"). 
55. As an employee of an SEC-registered broker-dealer, Dirks was subject to SEC censure. 
463 U.S. at 652. 
56. 17 C.F.R. § 240.lOb-5 (1988). See 463 U.S. at 650-51. 
57. The Court concluded that Dirks was not liable as a tippee simply because he had know-
ingly traded on material, nonpublic information received from a corporate insider. 463 U.S. at 
657-58. More was required; the insider must have breached his fiduciary duty to his shareholders 
by reaping some personal benefit in disclosing the information. See 463 U.S. at 662 ("[a]bsent 
some personal gain, there has been no breach of duty to stockholders"). The tippee who knows 
or should know of that breach is liable as " 'a participant after the fact in the insider's breach of a 
fiduciary duty.'" 463 U.S. at 659 (quoting Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 230 n.12 
(1980)). 
58. 463 U.S. at 658 n.18. 
59. 463 U.S. at 658 n.17. See 463 U.S. at 658 (analysts like Dirks "necessary to the preserva-
tion ofa healthy market"); 463 U.S. at 658 n.18 (broad definition of insider trading which would 
"have serious ramifications on reporting by analysts" unwise). 
60. 463 U.S. at 658 n.18. 
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theft, or other wrongful behavior.61 In November of 1987, the 
Supreme Court affirmed the "misappropriator" trading conviction of 
Wall Street Journal reporter R. Foster Winans. Winans was convicted 
of fraud under Rule lOb-5 and the federal mail and wire fraud statutes 
because he had breached his duty to the Journal by tipping his room-
mate and two brokers to the stocks he planned to recommend in the 
Journal's financial column.62 Because Winan's lOb-5 conviction was 
affirmed without significant discussion on the basis of a 4-4 split 
among the Justices, the Court's view of the merits of misappropriation 
liability remains ambiguous. 63 Congress recently considered clarifying 
legislation that would statutorily extend insider trading liability to 
misappropriators. 64 
The misappropriation theory's expansion of lOb-5 liability to cover 
anyone tipping or trading on information obtained in a less-than-
wholesome fashion has been criticized as chilling the legitimate collec-
tion of data by analysts and investors. 65 Increased liability, it is ar-
gued, slows the incorporation of information into stock prices and 
harms informational efficiency.66 The majority in Dirks embraced 
61. Early cases premised Rule lOb-5 liability for insider trading on the fiduciary duty an 
insider of the corporation owed the shareholders of that same corporation. When the insider 
traded with his own shareholders, he had a duty to disclose his nonpublic information or abstain 
from trading. See In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 911 n.13 (1961) (duty to disclose or 
abstain arising from special facts or shareholder-fiduciary relationship). That fiduciary concept 
does not apply to the insider who trades in the shares of a different corporation. In Chiarella v. 
United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980), a financial printer's conviction for trading in the stocks of 
potential takeover targets was overturned because the printer had received his inside information 
(the identity of the targets) not from the targets, but from his indirect employers, the bidding 
corporations. In response to Chiarella, lower courts developed the alternative "misappropria-
tion" theory, finding a duty to disclose whenever someone trades on the basis of nonpublic infor-
mation he has stolen or otherwise wrongfully obtained, regardless of with whom he trades. In a 
later case, a Chiarella-like printer who traded in the stock of targets was convicted of insider 
trading on a misappropriation theory. See SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. 
denied, 471 U.S. 1053 (1985). 
62. Carpenter v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 316 (1987). 
· 63. 108 S. Ct. at 316. 
64. See S. 1380, lOOth Cong., 1st Sess. (1987), reprinted in 1987 Hearings, supra note 3, pt. 
II, at 48. 
65. Many potentially liable "misappropriators" do not fit typical notions of "insiders." See 
United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1986), ajfd. by an equally divided Court, 108 
S. Ct. 316 (1987) (reporter misappropriated from employing newspaper confidential information 
concerning the next day's financial column); United States v. Reed, 601 F. Supp. 685 (S.D.N.Y. 
1985) (a son might "misappropriate" information concerning a potential tender offer from his 
father). 
66. See Ruder vs. Ruder, Wall St. J., Nov • .13, 1987, at 14, col. 1 (editorial) (statutory defini-
tion of insider trading needed, but misappropriation liability chills search for valuable informa-
tion that aligns stock price with value, harming capital allocation); Comment, The 
Misappropriation Theory: Too Much of a Good Thing?, 17 PAC. L.J. 111, 122 (1985) 
("[E]xtensive liability for nondisclosure [of information] could result in a chilling effect on the 
dissemination of information that allows for an efficient market."); see also Seligman, Reformula-
tion, supra note 12, at 1120-21 (broad insider trading prohibition can be criticized as harming the 
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market efficiency as a desideratum in defining insider trading. 67 In 
doing so the Court revealed a "macroeconomic, free-market perspec-
tive [that] elevates market efficiency over the risk of injury to individ-
ual investors."68 Such solicitude for market efficiency will likely 
continue to influence whether legal rules prohibiting insider trading 
are expanded, or limited. 
B. Trading in Stock Index Futures 
A desire to cultivate informationally efficient stock markets has 
similarly influenced the SEC's position on the stock index futures in-
volved in "program trading" and "portfolio insurance." Criticizing 
index futures trading has come into fashion on the coattails of the Oc-
tober 19, 1987, market crash,69 and exchanges that trade such instru-
ments have imposed daily limits on price swings. 70 But before the 
crash, index futures trading was praised as contributing to informa-
tional efficiency,71 and the SEC continues to support it on that 
allocative efficiency of the market by reducing incentives to seek out new information relevant to 
stock values). 
67. Hiler, supra note 49, at 1120 n.14. See 463 U.S. at 677 n.14 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) 
(majority "reject[ed] the existence of any enforceable principle of fairness between market par-
ticipants," and adopted a view which "seems little different from the theory that insider trading 
should be permitted because it brings relevant information to the market"); see also Cox, Insider 
Trading and Contracting: A Critical Response to the "Chicago School," 1986 DUKE L.J. 628 
(criticizing Court's reasoning in Dirks that analysts further market efficiency on the ground that 
analysts enhance efficiency whether tipper gets personal benefit or not). 
Concern for efficiency similarly influenced the Seventh Circuit's decision in Freeman v. 
Decio, 584 F.2d 186, 190, 196 (7th Cir. 1978). The court refused to recognize a corporate deriva-
tive action under Indiana law for the profits of insiders who traded on nonpublic corporate infor-
mation. Judge Wood's opinion noted that broader applications of the insider trading prohibition 
may cause "a loss in the efficiency of the securities markets in their capital allocation func-
tion .... [I]nsider trading helps assure that •.. prices will reflect the best information available." 
584 F.2d at 190. 
68. ABA Report, supra note 6, at 225. 
69. On October 19, 1987, the Dow Jones average of 30 industrial stocks dropped 508 points 
to close at 1738.74. This fall was the largest recorded drop in history. The percentage of value 
lost - 22.6% - was nearly double the 12.8% decline recorded on October 28, 1929. Metz, 
Murray, Ricks & Garcia, The Crash of'87: Stocks Plunge 508 Amid Panicky Selling, Wall St. J., 
Oct. 20, 1987, at 1, col. 5. See BRADY REPORT, supra note 15, at 36 (October 19 was perhaps the 
worst day in the history of the U.S. stock market.). Official sources refer to this financial debacle 
as a "market break." See DIV. OF MARKET REGULATION, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMMN., THE 
OCTOBER 1987 MARKET BREAK [hereinafter SEC REPORT]; BRADY REPORT, supra note 15, at 
15. In the interests of both style and accuracy, the term "crash" is preferred here. 
70. SEC REPORT, supra note 69, at 3-23 n.62 (daily price change limits); Weiss, Was Pro-
gram Trading To Blame?, Bus. WK., Nov. 2, 1987, at 51 {following crash, program trading has 
"critics galore - and in high places"); see infra note 79 (authorities criticizing index futures 
trading). 
71. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMMN., THE ROLE OF INDEX-RELATED TRADING IN THE 
MARKET DECLINE ON SEPTEMBER 11 AND 12, 1986, at 17 (1987) [hereinafter MARCH 1987 
SEC REPORT] (index futures trading offers "significant" benefit of enhanced pricing efficiency in 
equity markets); Jonas & Farrell, supra note 38, at 100 (quoting Professor Malkiel that program 
trading in index futures makes the market more efficient by "speeding the adjustment of prices to 
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theory.72 
Stock indexes like the Standard and Poor's Index of 500 stocks (S 
& P 500) or the Major Market Index of twenty "blue chip'' industrials 
(MMI) measure the price performance of a market basket of different 
stocks as a means of•measuring the performance of an industry seg-
ment or the stock market as a whole. 73 Index futures are contracts for 
the future delivery of the stocks that underlie the index. 74 The index 
futures seller, in effect, agrees to deliver at some future date a com-
modity - a market basket of the stocks that constitute the index -
available for purchase now. Consequently, index futures contracts 
usually trade within a few percentage points of the current market 
prices for the stocks in the index.75 A futures trader who thinks the 
market will rise buys futures, hoping to lock in anticipated apprecia-
tion in the stocks that make up the index at today's price. Conversely, 
the bearish trader sells futures, believing that in due time he can buy 
the stocks for delivery at a lower price than he receives in payment 
now. 
Program traders use computers to search for discrepancies be-
tween the current price of a stock index future and the price of the 
stocks themselves. 76 When differences of even a point or two develop, 
new information"); Hannon, Opportunity, Thy Name Is Discrepancy, FORBES, Sept. 22, 1986, at 
156 (quoting finance Professor William Sharpe that program trading isn't "screwing up" the 
market but "making it more efficient."); Seligman, Don't Fret About Program Trading, FOR· 
TUNE, Oct. 13, 1986, at 87, 92 (SEC Commissioner John Shad believes that use of program 
trading for arbitrage and speculation "increase[s] market efficiency."). But see Hazen, supra note 
38, at 958 (criticizing proliferation of derivative trading as magnifying existing market 
inefficiencies). 
72. See SEC REPORT, supra note 69, at 3-5 (defending stock index futures trading as contrib· 
uting to pricing efficiency). 
73. See generally BRADY REPORT, supra note 15, at 5. 
74. BRADY REPORT, supra note 15, at 5. Stock futures and options are referred to as "deriv-
ative" financial instruments because they have no intrinsic value but depend for valuation on the 
price of the underlying security. A stock future is a promise to deliver a particular stock at a 
future date. The stock is delivered regardless of whether the market price has increased (in 
which case the futures buyer profits and the seller loses) or declined (in which case the buyer 
loses and the seller profits). Stock index futures are contracts for the delivery of each of the 
stocks reflected in a particular market index. Options are a right to sell a stock at a particular 
price at some future date ("put") or the right to buy at a particular price ("call"). The option 
seller receives a cash payment up front from the buyer. The buyer receives the right to exercise 
the option or not, depending on whether the market has changed such that the option price is 
more favorable than prevailing market price. Stock index options also exist, but for a variety of 
reasons arbitrage traders strongly prefer futures to options transactions. MARCH 1987 SEC RE· 
PORT, supra note 71, at 14. 
75. In a perfect futures market, the price of the future will equal today's cash price for the 
commodity plus the carrying costs of holding it until the future delivery date. The cost of carry-
ing an index futures contract is the difference between the treasury bill rate and the dividend 
yield on the futures portfolio. BRADY REPORT, supra note 15, at 6; U.S. FED. RESERVE Bo., 
FINANCIAL FUTURES AND OPTIONS IN THE U.S. ECONOMY: A STUDY BY THE STAFF OF THE 
FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM 11 (1986) [hereinafter FEDERAL RESERVE STUDY]. 
76. Program trading is more accurately described as "index arbitrage." See SEC REPORT, 
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traders who move quickly can make substantial profits by selling the 
stocks that constitute the index while buying the future at a slight dis-
count, or by buying the stocks while selling the overpriced future. In 
addition to such arbitrage trading, investors may also use index fu-
tures to hedge against risk on their stock portfolios. Portfolio insur-
ance is the practice of protecting against a market downturn by selling 
index futures contracts during periods of expected market decline. 77 
The futures seller, in effect, "sells" stock holdings at a price near or 
identical to the current market price, hoping to o~set any loss from a 
downturn in the market in general.78 
Since the inception of index futures trading in 1982, index futures 
have been criticized as increasing the stock market's volatility and the 
risk of abrupt and accelerated market declines. 79 Especially on the 
heels of the 1987 market crash, both program trading and portfolio 
insurance have been denounced by critics who claim that they caused 
(or at least exacerbated) the Dow's spectacular 508-point plunge on 
October 19, 1987.80 On that morning sell orders generated by institu-
tions and investors seeking to hedge against the risk of a market de-
cline flooded the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) stock index 
supra note 69, at 1-3 to 1-5; BRADY REPORT, supra note 15, at 6. The phrase "program" trading 
reflects the fact that index arbitrage requires simultaneous transactions that can only be success-
fully done through computer programs. These programs monitor the price of the future and as 
many as 500 stocks making up the underlying index. Access to the computer-driven NYSE 
electronic order-delivery system is also essential to program trading. See SEC REPORT, supra 
note 69, at 1-5 to 1-7 (computers used extensively in program trading). 
77. SEC REPORT, supra note 69, at 1-2 to 1-3 (describing portfolio insurance); BRADY RE-
PORT, supra note 15, at 7 (same). 
78. Of course, traders also can - and do - use stock index futures as a vehicle for pure 
speculation on the future course of the market. McMurray & Rose, Chicago's "Shadow Mar-
kets" Led Free Fall in a Plunge that Began Right at Opening, Wall St. J., Oct. 20, 1987, at 22, col. 
1; see BRADY REPORT, supra note 15, at 7. To the extent that index futures trading reflects the 
search for speculator's profits, such trading arguably serves no social function. See Lowenstein, 
Wall Street, Take a Valium, Wall St. J., Nov. 9, 1987, at 26, col. 3 (editorial) [hereinafter Wall 
Street] ("Not much [futures and options trading] represents hedging or anything but outright 
speculation."); infra notes 92, 460-62 and accompanying text (on value of derivative products). 
79. See MARCH 1987 SEC REPORT, supra note 71, at 16, 21 (commentators suggest index 
trading creates possibility of market collapse through "cascade scenario" when portfolio insur-
ance futures sales trigger sales by index arbitrageurs that create reinforcing cycle leading to mar-
ket collapse); FEDERAL RESERVE STUDY, supra note 75, at 14 ("Fears have long existed that 
futures and options markets destabilize prices in cash markets."); McMurray & Rose, supra note 
78, at 22, col. 2 (comments of Professor Miller that "many people had feared" that the breakneck 
pace of trading in the five-year-old futures market might foster panic). 
80. See, e.g., Weiss, supra note 70, at 51 (many criticize index futures' role in crash; quoting 
NYSE Chairman John J. Phelan Jr. that "[p]rogram trading exacerbated the decline"); Behr & 
Vise, Stock Market Suffers Largest Loss in History as Dow Industrial Average Drops 508 Points: 
Plunge Blamed on Anxieties and Computerized Trading, Wash. Post, Oct. 20, 1987, at 1, col. 4; 
McMurray & Rose, supra note 78, at 22, col. 1 ("panic began" in Chicago Mercantile stock-
index futures pit and free-fall of index futures prices "speeded stock-price declines"); Metz, Mur-
ray, Ricks & Garcia, supra note 69, at 1, col. 5 ("program selling" as index futures declined 
triggered sales of corresponding holdings in blue chip stock). 
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futures pit. 81 An imbalance between many sellers and almost no buy-
ers developed. At some points, S & P 500 futures were trading at 
discounts of 20% below the prices of the underlying stocks. 82 Such 
steep discounts created opportunities for program traders to sell their 
stock holdings in favor of purchasing cheaper futures contracts. 83 
Program traders dumping large amounts of stock on the market fur-
ther depressed stock prices and reinforced the cycle of decline. 84 
The SEC also believes that index futures trading contributes to un-
desirable market volatility and the risk of a market collapse.85 Never-
theless, both before and after the 1987 "market break," the SEC has 
continued to defend stock index futures trading. 86 In its report issued 
four months after the crash, the SEC stated that the deleterious as-
pects of index futures "should be viewed in the context of the benefits 
provided by such trading."87 Those benefits are twofold: risk hedging 
for institutional investors and more efficient stock pricing. 88 
81. McMurray & Rose, supra note 78, at 22, col. 2. See SEC REPORT, supra note 69, at 2-13 
(heavy selling pressure first appeared in United States in CME's futures markets). 
82. BRADY REPORT, supra note 15, at 36; Weiss, supra note 70, at 51. 
83. Weiss, supra note 70, at 51. 
84. Critics of stock index futures refer to this as the "cascade" scenario. See generally SEC 
REPORT, supra note 69, at 1-9 to 1-10; BRADY REPORT, supra note 15, at 41-42. 
85. SEC REPORT, supra note 69, at xiii, 3-6 to 3-8; MARCH 1987 SEC REPORT, supra note 
71, at 2. The SEC Report also suggests that knowledge of futures trading may have a "negative 
psychological impact" on investors. SEC REPORT, supra note 69, at xiii, 3-12 to 3-13 (knowledge 
that portfolio insurance techniques existed led potential buyers to fear that portfolio insurance 
triggered sales would depress prices, and knowledge that futures were trading at discounts espe-
cially gave signal that markets were headed still lower). 
86. See SEC REPORT, supra note 69, at 3-4 to 3-5 (Index futures "offer significant benefits to 
today's capital markets."); MARCH 1987 SEC REPORT, supra note 71, at 17 (same). 
87. SEC REPORT, supra note 69, at 3-4. 
88. See SEC REPORT, supra note 69, at 3-5 (benefits include pricing efficiency and risk con-
trol); MARCH 1987 SEC REPORT, supra note 71, at 17-18 (benefits are opportunity to hedge risk 
through portfolio insurance, and increased pricing efficiency in equity markets). 
The SEC has also suggested that stock index futures are beneficial because they offer an 
opportunity for investors to take positions in the equity market with greater liquidity. Increased 
liquidity is possible because futures have reduced margin requirements and lower transactions 
costs compared to transactions in the cash market itself. See SEC REPORT, supra note 69, at 3-5; 
MARCH 1987 SEC REPORT, supra note 71, at 17-18. (Of course, futures trading offers greater 
liquidity only if the futures transactions are not followed by equal stock transactions. Outside 
the index arbitrage context, many futures contracts normally do not involve delivery of the actual 
commodity, but are "closed out" before expiration by delivering the cash equivalent of the value 
of the index at the time the future is due. BRADY REPORT, supra note 15, at VI-18; FEDERAL 
RESERVE STUDY, supra note 75, at 3, 4). 
It is difficult to see any social benefit from such "liquidity" except a derivative benefit from 
enhancing hedging opportunities or pricing efficiency. In addition, lowered margin requirements 
and transactions costs may encourage destabilizing speculative trading. See SEC REPORT, supra 
note 69, at xv (suggesting review of futures trading margin requirements to see if higher require-
ments might add stability); BRADY REPORT, supra note 15, at 65-66 (margin requirements, by 
limiting leverage, control speculative behavior that destabilizes markets; questioning "[i]f, from a 
public policy viewpoint, a given margin level for investment in stocks makes sense, [whether] 
lower margins and the potential for more financial leverage and speculative investment [should] 
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The SEC had noted in earlier reports that "index products appear 
to have a significant effect on the prices of securities. Economic events 
that would be expected to affect stocks generally are quickly reflected 
in futures prices; these price effects are transmitted rapidly to individ-
ual stock prices through index arbitrage."89 The result, the SEC be-
lieves, is that stock index futures "offer significant benefits to today's 
capital markets" by adding "substantial ... pricing efficiency to equity 
markets."90 
The SEC's defense of program trading on the grounds that it helps 
stock prices to adjust to new information more quickly is instructive in 
two respects. First, the efficiency argument favoring program trading 
resembles the argument for insider trading in that the informational 
efficiency "benefits" of each may be de minimis. Insider trading on 
nonpublic information due to be announced in the future only acceler-
ates a price change that will occur in any event when the information 
is eventually disclosed days or weeks later.91 In the case of program 
trading, index futures transmit information into public stock prices 
only minutes or hours before it would otherwise arrive.92 
Second, the failure of portfolio insurance to protect institutional 
investors on October 19 has cast doubt on the efficacy of index futures 
be allowed for market participants investing in stocks via derivative instruments"). A principal 
purpose of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act was to increase margin requirements in order to 
reduce speculative trading. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 78g (1982) 
(establishing margin requirement to reduce speculation). The "liquidity efficiency" claimed as a 
benefit may be more accurately described as a detriment. See SEC REPORT, supra note 69, at xv 
(suggesting that "the ease with which an institution or investment firm can [take an equity posi-
tion] through the purchase or sale of derivative index products creates an environment in which 
investors buy and sell much larger positions than they might otherwise," contributing to specula-
tion and volatility). 
89. MARCH 1987 SEC REPORT, supra note 71, at 17. 
90. SEC REPORT, supra note 69, at 3-5; see MARCH 1987 SEC REPORT, supra note 71, at 2 
(allowing program trading "tend[s] to make markets more efficient by keeping futures and under-
lying stock prices in tandem"). 
The efficiency argument raised by the SEC in support of index futures trading has also been 
used to vindicate other forms of derivative trading, such as options and futures on individual 
stocks. See JOINT STUDY OF TRADING IN FUTURES, supra note 6, at I-11, II-24 to II-25. 
91. See, e.g., Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980) (trading on the basis of informa-
tion concerning tender offer targets to be disclosed within days); United States v. Carpenter, 791 
F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1986), ajfd. by an equally divided Court, 108 S. Ct. 316 (1987) (trading on the 
basis of nonpublic information contained in newspaper column to be published within the next 
few days); In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961) (trading on the basis of information 
concerning dividend cut that was made public within two hours); see also Easterbrook & Fischel, 
Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of lnl'estors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669, 682 (1984) (insider 
trading on news "bound to come out anyway . . . is not of much moment for allocative 
efficiency"). 
92. The Federal Reserve Board has suggested that "[w]hile [enhanced pricing efficiency 
through] price discovery and price basing are important roles of futures in physical commodities, 
they do not appear to be major roles for financial futures - cash and fonvard markets for many 
financial instruments are highly developed, competitive national markets that [already] rapidly 
process new information." FEDERAL RESERVE STUDY, supra note 75, at 36. 
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as a hedging device, and the use of portfolio insurance has declined 
substantially following the crash.93 These developments call into 
question the second principal advantage attributed to index futures 
trading - risk shifting. Pricing efficiency thus may be the sole re-
maining justification for allowing index futures trading. 
C. Disclosure of Merger Negotiations and Other Soft Information 
The Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act) and the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934 (1934 Act) prescribe an extensive disclosure regime re-
quiring corporations to provide investors and the SEC with certain 
information at certain times.94 In addition to requiring that specific 
facts be disclosed, these statutes also generally require disclosure of 
"any material fact" necessary to make the information actually dis-
closed "not misleading. "95 
An area of disclosure policy that has proved particularly fertile 
ground for dispute is the treatment of "soft" information.96 Soft infor-
93. "Portfolio insurance" or "dynamic hedging" usually involves institutional investors who 
buy or sell index futures in response to pre·determined changes in market price. SEC REPORT, 
supra note 69, at 1-2. The portfolio insurer sells futures after a drop in the market in the hope of 
stopping further losses. The problem with portfolio insurance as a hedging technique is that the 
futures seller can only effectively hedge risk if there is a buyer ready and willing to accept risk. 
Id. at 1-3, 3-16. Otherwise, the imbalance between many sellers and few buyers drives future 
prices down so the portfolio insurers must take a market loss after all: neither stocks nor stock 
futures can be sold at prior prices. This imbalance is exactly what happened in October 1987. 
See BRADY REPORT, supra note 15, at 55-56; Bleeke, Portfolio Insurance: When, Not What, Wall 
St. J., Dec. 11, 1987, at 24, col. 3; Wells, The Markets: Some "Heavy Tinkering" Ahead, Bus. 
WK., Nov. 9, 1987, at 40, 42. The drop in institutional use of portfolio insurance after the crash 
implies that market participants no longer believe that index futures carry substantial risk-shift-
ing benefits. See Sease, Dreary Street: In Wake of the Crash, Stock Market Turns Cautious - -
and Dull, Wall St. J., Apr. 11, 1988, at l, col. 5 (Portfolio insurance did not provide expected 
hedging benefits in October 1987 and its use has shrunk since then.); Smith, Use of Portfolio 
Insurance Fell After the Crash, Wall St. J., Jan. 12, 1988, at 4, col. 1 (Portfolio insurance has 
"shrunk two-thirds or more" since the crash.). 
94. The Securities Act of 1933 requires that any issuer selling securities to the public must 
file a registration statement with the SEC and provide a prospectus to potential investors. Those 
documents must disclose extensive information concerning the issuer and the proposed sale. The 
Securities Act of 1934 requires corporations with stock traded on a listed exchange, or corpora-
tions of a certain size and number of shareholders, periodically to file with the SEC and provide 
to shareholders issuer information similar to that required under the 1933 Act. See Securities 
Act of 1933, § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1982); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 12, 15 U.S.C. § 781 
(1982); 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13a-l, 240.lSd-l, 249.310 (1988); 17 C.F.R. § 229.10-.702 (1988) (Reg-
ulations S-K; standard instructions for contents of statements filed under 1933 and 1934 Acts). 
See generally L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION, at 148-65, 459-522 (1983) 
{describing disclosure system); M. HALLORAN, GOING PUBLIC 28-38, 49-57 (5th ed. 1983) 
(describing disclosure requirements of publicly held companies and those issuing stock to public 
for the first time). 
95. See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933, § lO(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77j(b) (1982) (prospectus must in-
clude any material information necessary to make prospectus not misleading); 17 C.F.R. 
§§ 240.12b-20 (1988) (reports under 1934 Act must include other material information necessary 
to make reports not misleading). 
96. See, e.g., Kerr, supra note 4; Hiler, supra note 49; Schneider, Nits, Grits and Soft Ittfor-
mation in SEC Filings, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 254 (1972). 
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mation is information of a subjective or speculative nature, such as 
news of preliminary merger negotiations, appraisals of asset values, 
management's opinions and predictions for the future, and projections 
of future dividends or earnings. 97 While much soft information is 
clearly material to investors, the SEC for many years adopted the view 
that disclosure of soft information was strongly disfavored and, in 
some circumstances, prohibited.98 Corporate disclosure was supposed 
to deal in fact, not speculation or prophecy. The SEC feared that al-
lowing expression of subjective information might tempt management 
to make unduly optimistic claims or might induce unsophisticated in-
vestors to attach too much importance to information which held little 
factual basis. 99 
Any provision limiting the dissemination of material information 
definitionally reduces the market's ability to incorporate that informa-
tion and increases the likelihood that market prices will depart from 
intrinsic value. 100 The prohibition on soft information has been criti-
cized accordingly for increasing the stock market's inefficiency and, it 
is assumed, the risk of resource misallocation.101 In recent years, the 
SEC has modified its hardline stance against soft information by per-
mitting - and even encouraging - certain forms of soft information 
disclosure. 102 For example, in 1979 the SEC adopted Rule 175 to en-
courage disclosure of projected future revenues. Rule 175 provides a 
"safe harbor" insulating management from liability for harm resulting 
from such disclosure as long as the projections had a reasonable basis 
97. Kerr, supra note 4, at 1071 n.2. "Hard" information generally refers to objective state-
ments of historical, verifiable fact. Id.; see Schneider, supra note 96, at 254-55. Obviously, 
"hard" and "soft" are not absolutes but describe opposite ends of a continuum of possible infor-
mation. Id. at 256. 
98. Hiler, supra note 49, at 1114-16; Steinberg & Goldman, Issuer Affirmative Disclosure 
Obligations - An Analytical Framework for Merger Negotiations, Soft Information, and Bad 
News, 46 Mo. L. REV. 923, 934-46 (1987). For example, at one point SEC rule 14a-9 provided 
that the disclosure of projected dividends in management's proxy materials was per se mislead-
ing. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1970). 
99. Kerr, supra note 4, at 1073; Steinberg & Goldman, supra note 98, at 935. 
I 00. As in the case of insider trading, requiring disclosure of soft information such as projec-
tions and merger negotiations enhances efficiency if we adopt "strong form" efficiency as a goal. 
See supra notes 28, 47. 
101. See, e.g., Dennis, Mandatory Disclosure Theory and Management Projections: A Law 
and Economics Perspective, 46 Mo. L. REV. 1197, 1213 (1987) ("More complete access to man-
agement's views on future worth should enhance market efficiency."); Kerr, supra note 4, at 1110 
("[T]he traditional SEC approach to soft information ... defeats another SEC policy: promotion 
of an efficient market."); Note, The Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis, Economic Theory and 
the Regulation of the Securities Industry, 29 STAN. L. REV. 1031, 1067 (1977) (should allow 
disclosure of more soft information to keep stock prices efficient). 
102. Kerr, supra note 4, at 1072-75; Steinberg & Goldman, supra note 98, at 937-39. 
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and were made in good faith. 103 Traditional prohibitions against ap-
praisals of asset values have also been softened.104 Nevertheless, the 
SEC has stopped short of actually requiring the disclosure of material 
soft information in circumstances where other material information 
must be disclosed. Some commentators suggest that the SEC should 
take that further step and maximize market efficiency by requiring dis-
closure of material soft information.10s 
One soft-disclosure issue which has received much recent attention 
is whether corporations must disclose merger negotiations which have 
not yet produced a finalized agreement.106 Corporations negotiating a 
merger may prefer to avoid public announcement of such matters for a 
number of reasons. Early disclosure creates the risk that the negotia-
tion process might suffer under public scrutiny, or that the fear of at-
tracting rival suitors will discourage bidders from identifying and 
approaching potential targets. 107 On the other hand, failure to dis-
close reduces market efficiency by slowing the market's incorporation 
of highly relevant information.1os 
The importance of the issue has been highlighted by the Supreme 
Court's recent decision in Basic Inc. v. Levinson. 109 That case dealt 
with the ticklish position of corporate management who were involved 
in confidential merger discussions and were called on by NYSE au-
103. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.175 (1987); Safe Harbor Rule for Projections, Securities Act Re· 
lease No. 6084, [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 82,117 (June 25, 1979). 
104. Kerr, supra note 4, at 1074-75. 
105. See Dennis, supra note 101, at 1213, 1217 (mandatory disclosure enhances market effi· 
ciency more than voluntary soft disclosure system because general rather than selective release of 
projections may lead to more rapid incorporation of information into market); Note, supra note 
22, at 351-52 (mandatory disclosure of soft information necessary to enhance efficiency). 
106. Goelzer, Disclosure of Preliminary Merger Negotiations - Truth or Consequences?, 46 
Mo. L. REV. 974, 975 n.4 (1987) (preliminary merger negotiations "the subject of considerable 
recent commentary"); see, e.g., Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 108 S. Ct. 978 (1988); Brown, supra note 
28; Gabaldon, The Disclosure of Preliminary Merger Negotiations as an Imperfect Paradigm of 
Rule JOb-5 Analysis, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1218 (1987); Hazen, supra note 32. 
107. See Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding to 
a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1178-79 (1981); Hazen, supra note 32, at 954; Steinberg 
& Goldman, supra note 98, at 925-27. Some jurists and scholars also argue that unsophisticated 
investors may attribute too much significance to tentative preliminary contracts which never lead 
to any agreement. See Staffin v. Greenberg, 672 F.2d 1196, 1206 (3d Cir. 1982); Steinberg & 
Goldman, supra note 98, at 925. But see Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 108 S. Ct. at 984 (this view 
assumes investors are "nitwits" unable to appreciate that mergers are risky propositions) (quot· 
ing Flamm v. Eberstadt, 814 F.2d 1169, 1175 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 157 (1987)). 
108. See Gabaldon, supra note 106, at 1249-50, 1267, 1281 (affirmative duty to disclose 
merger negotiations improves efficient allocation of capital by enhancing information in market); 
Goelzer, supra note 106, at 1022 (SEC position in favor of allowing "no comment" discourages 
misleading disclosure at the expense of the dissemination of accurate information to the trading 
market); Hazen, supra note 32, at 954 (accurate information concerning merger negotiations 
necessary for efficient market). 
109. 108 S. Ct. 978 (1988). 
December 1988] Unimportance of Efficiency 635 
thorities to explain unusual trading in 'the merger target's stock. In 
Basic, the target's management chose to respond with a public state-
ment that it was unaware of any corporate development which would 
explain the heavy trading. 110 That assertion seems false on its face. 111 
Nevertheless, the Third Circuit in Greenfield v. Heublein, Inc. 112 had 
upheld just such a "no corporate development" statement. It did so 
on the theory that soft information concerning merger negotiations 
need not be disclosed because it is "immaterial as a matter of law," 
given the importance of secrecy and the danger that investors will 
treat negotiations as faits accomplis. 113 
In Basic, the Supreme Court declined to address whether federal 
law required disclosure of preliminary merger negotiations. 114 The 
opinion focused instead on the Greenfield issue of whether news of 
negotiations could be described as "immaterial as a matter of law" in 
the face of a voluntary and misleading statement.115 However, in ad-
dressing another question arising in the case - the legitimacy of the 
"fraud-on-the-market" theory of investor reliance - Justice Black-
mun's opinion for the majority voiced a concern for efficient stock 
pricing that would support mandatory disclosure of merger 
negotiations.116 
The fraud-on-the-market theory responds to the need for reliance 
as an element of a plaintiff's claim for fraud under Rule lOb-5. 117 The 
theory presumes that the stock market does, indeed, efficiently process 
information, so that securities prices embody all available data. 118 
110. 108 S. Ct. at 979. 
11 l. Prior to Basic, NYSE authorities had taken the position that if management believed 
that a leak of confidential information concerning negotiations had occurred, the negotiations 
themselves must be disclosed. If, however, management believed that confidentiality had been 
maintained, they could respond that they were "unaware of any corporate development" which 
would explain the rumors or trading. Note, supra note 37, at 551. See New York Stock Ex-
change Listed Company Manual § 202.03, reprinted in 3 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~~ 23,513-
23,557, at 17,212 (Aug. 23, 1985). The theory underlying this distinction was that if manage-
ment did not believe that news of the negotiations had leaked, they had no reason to believe the 
unusual trading was attributable to the negotiations. In Basic, the Supreme Court gave short 
shrift to such fine distinctions, approving in a footnote the Sixth Circuit's "more natural" reading 
of a "no comment" statement as emphasizing no knowledge of any corporate development, 
rather than no knowledge of a leak of a development. See 108 S. Ct. 988 n.20. 
112. 742 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1215 (1985). 
113. 742 F.2d at 756. The Third Circuit held that negotiations would remain immaterial 
until agreement on both price and structure of the merger had been reached. 742 F.2d at 756-57. 
114. 108 S. Ct. 979 (1988). Of course, the Court's holding that preliminary merger negotia-
tions are not immaterial by law is consistent with a concern for enhancing informational 
efficiency. 
115. 108 S. Ct. at 985, n.13. 
116. See 108 S. Ct. at 988-90. 
117. 108 S. Ct. at 989. 
118. 108 S. Ct. at 988-89. 
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False or misleading statements that affect market price can "therefore 
defraud purchasers of stock even if the purchasers do not directly rely 
on the misstatements."119 Basic approved the use of the fraud-on-the-
market theory by holding that a showing that the defendant's mis-
statements had distorted market price could establish a presumption 
of reliance for purposes of certifying a class of plaintiffs. In doing so, 
the Court could have simply found sufficient causation and reliance 
under lOb-5 in proof that the plaintiff purchased stock at a price af-
fected by the fraud. Instead, the Court went on to suggest that fraud-
on-the-market is a desirable doctrine because it expands liability in a 
fashion that promotes pricing efficiency. 120 
Justice Blackmun's opinion for the Court described the issue as 
one of price "integrity," defined as a market in which investors can 
rely on the price of a stock "as a reflection of its value." 121 The fraud-
on-the-market theory permits lawsuits by investors who purchased se-
curities at a price distorted by fraud even if those investors never read 
or relied on the fraudulent statement. 122 According to Basic, allowing 
such plaintiffs to sue serves a "congressional policy embodied in the 
1934 Act"123 that "'market price reflects as nearly as possible a just 
price,' " and that markets operate " 'as indices of real value.' " 124 This 
dictum implies that market efficiency is a fundamental goal of securi-
ties policy to be pursued through the expansion of 1 Ob-5 liability if 
necessary. 125 
The Basic opinion does not directly address whether there is a duty 
to disclose merger negotiations in instances where other material in-
formation must be disclosed. 126 But cautious counsel will surely take 
119. 108 S. Ct. at 988-89 (quoting Peil v. Spei~er, 806 F.2d 1154, 1160-61 (3d Cir. 1986)). 
120. See 108 S. Ct. at 989-90. 
121. 108 S. Ct. at 990 (quoting Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154, 1161 (3d Cir. 1986)). See 108 
S. Ct. at 996 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (majority opinion defines 
"market integrity" as market in which stock prices reflect value). 
122. 108 S. Ct. at 996-97 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
123. 108 S. Ct. at 990-91. 
124. 108 S. Ct. at 991 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1934)). 
125. Basic seems to view the legitimacy of fraud-on-the-market reliance as a policy debate in 
which fraud-on-the-market liability wins approv14l because it creates incentives for increased and 
more accurate disclosure of information. Such disclosure in tum promotes market efficiency. 
Compare Note, Fraud on the Market: An Emerging Theory of Recovery Under SEC Rule JOb-5, 
50 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 627, 645-46 (1982) (noting that fraud-on-the-market liability promotes 
efficient markets by creating incentives for increased and more accurate disclosure of informa-
tion), with Fischel, Use of Modern Finance Theory in Securities Fraud Cases Involving Actively 
Traded Securities, 38 Bus. LAW. I, 14 (1982) (noting that fraud-on-the-market theory liability 
may reduce market efficiency because investors who believe they can sue and recover if market 
price is distorted by fraud may spend less effort investigating worth of securities). 
126. At present, it appears management has no abstract duty to disclose preliminary contacts 
along with other "material" information. See Gabaldon, supra note 106, at 1264 (prevailing view 
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a hint from the Court's observation that "[j]ust as artificial manipula-
tion tends to upset the true function of an open market, so the hiding 
and secreting of important information obstructs the operation of the 
markets as indices of real value."127 If market efficiency is a goal of 
securities law, and if disclosing all important nonpublic information 
serves that goal, merger negotiations must be disclosed. 
D. Summary 
The legal rules that legitimize insider trading, allow index futures 
trading, or require corporations publicly to disclose merger negotia-
tions are, to put it mildly, controversial matters. Many believe such 
rules improve market efficiency and support them. 128 Others, who 
think the costs of the rules outweigh the benefits, oppose them. 129 
But even those who oppose insider trading, index ftitures trading, 
or mandatory disclosure of merger negotiations generally do not dis-
pute the purported benefits of efficient markets. They may argue that 
such policies do not contribute to market efficiency or even contend 
that they harm it. For example, some adversaries of insider trading 
question whether the amount of trading involved is large enough to 
move stock prices significantly.130 Others argue that permitting in-
sider trading creates incentives for management to withhold news of 
important corporate developments until after they have traded on the 
information, thereby decreasing efficiency.131 Some opponents of 
among courts that no duty to disclose); Steinberg & Goldman, supra note 98, at 923 (neither 
courts nor SEC recognize general duty to disclose). An obligation to disclose may arise under 
particular circumstances. For example, a corporation trading in its own stock is under a duty to 
disclose such information to the stockholders with whom it trades. Also a corporation that has 
previously denied negotiations might have to disclose when subsequent events make the earlier 
statement misleading. 
127. 108 S. Ct. at 991 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1934)). 
128. See supra notes 39-48, 86-90 & 105-08 and accompanying text. 
129. See, e.g., Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational Advantage Under Federal Se-
curities Laws, 93 HARV. L. REv. 322 (1979) (criticizing insider trading); Cox, supra note 67 
(same); Schotland, infra note 131 (same); L. LoWENSTEIN, WHAT'S WRONG WITH WALL 
STREET 69-75 (1988) (Index futures trading encourages destabilizing speculation without provid-
ing commensurate benefits.); Laderman & Nussbaum, The Big Board's Crusade Against Program 
Trading, Bus. WK., Mar. 23, 1987, at 134 (NYSE Chairman John Phelan criticizes index futures 
providing opportunities for manipulation of prices); Hazen, supra note 32, at 961 (disclosing 
merger negotiations can harm negotiations and lead to misleading rumors); Steinberg & 
Goldman, supra note 98, at 925-27 (opposing mandatory disclosure of preliminary negotiations). 
130. See Cox, supra note 67, at 646-48 (criticizing view that insider trading "nudges" price 
on theory that surreptitious trading is insufficient to achieve equilibrium price); Gilson & Kraak-
man, supra note 1, at 631-32 (insider trading does not aid efficiency by moving stock prices in the 
correct direction because the amounts involved are too small to move stock prices significantly). 
But see Carney, supra note 27, at 889-91 (insider trading can "signal" other investors and change 
prices). 
131. See ABA Report, supra note 6; at 228-29 (legalizing insider trading may harm market 
efficiency by creating incentives for managers to delay disclosure of information until after they 
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mandatory disclosure of merger negotiations similarly assert that dis-
closure leads to rumors that prevent stock prices from reflecting in-
trinsic values. 132 But whatever their opinion of the merits of a 
particular law or rule, judges, scholars, and SEC policymakers alike 
seem to assume that informationally efficient markets must be nur-
tured and promoted. 
This belief remains strong even when a particular rule is shown to 
provide only small efficiency benefits. Government intervention is not 
a prerequisite for markets to incorporate information. Even if there 
were no SEC or securities laws, private incentives to provide and to 
seek out profitable information would ensure that stock prices embod-
ied a great deal of data concerning stocks' values. 133 Indeed, the belief 
that private market forces ensure that the stocks of large, publicly held 
corporations are efficiently priced was one premise for the SEC's adop-
tion of the "integrated" disclosure system which reduced the disclo-
sure responsibilities of such firms. 134 Government policies that 
enhance efficiency do so only at the margin. In many cases, the effi-
ciency benefits of a particular policy appear to be limited to accelerat-
ing the market's reaction to information by only hours or days. 135 
Nevertheless, the perceived need to fine-tune the market's effi-
have traded on it); Schotland, Unsafe at Any Price: A Reply to Manne, 53 VA. L. REV. 1425, 
1448-49 (1967) (same). But see Cox, supra note 67, at 635-42 (describing and critiquing this 
view). 
132. See Hazen, supra note 32, at 954, 956, 969; Comment, Corporate Disclosure of Merger 
Negotiations - When Does the Investor Have a Right To Know?, 36 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1155, 
1159 n.27 (1985). 
133. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 91 (describing private incentives for firms to 
disclose, and investors to seek out and trade on, information relevant to stock price); see also 
Benston, Required Disclosure and the Stock Market: An Evaluation of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934, 63 AM. EcoN. REv. 132, 153 (1973) (arguing that 1934 Act has not significantly 
improved the information available to i.nvestors). 
134. Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 1, at 550 n.4 (ECMH the "intellectual premise" of 
integrated disclosure). Under the integrated disclosure system, very large corporations that 
make periodic disclosure under the 1934 Act need not provide investors with information con· 
cerning the corporation but can simply "incorporate by reference" information disclosed in pre· 
vious SEC filings. See supra note 94 (describing 1934 Act disclosure). Integration reduces the 
burdens of the aisclosure system on corporations by reducing duplicative filings. The integrated 
system is predicated in part on the belief that the market is "semi-strong" efficient with respect to 
large corporations, so that all available public information, whether widely disseminated or not, 
is incorporated into price. See generally L. Loss, supra note 94, at 148-54 (integrated disclosure). 
If the stock market were to become so inefficient that integration became inappropriate even for 
the relatively few large companies which can now take advantage of it, it could be argued that 
government intervention to improve efficiency would be justified to preserve the regulatory sav-
ings that follow from integration. The analysis at this point becomes a simple balancing of ad· 
ministrative costs (i.e., the cost of administering efficiency-enhancing programs measured against 
the lost savings that follow from integration). The fact that the SEC has denied the benefits of 
integrated disclosure to the vast majority of firms suggests that the savings resulting from inte· 
gration are insufficient to overcome the costs of achieving the efficient pricing upon which inte· 
gration is premised. 
135. See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text. 
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ciency pervades security policy discussions. Virtually any issue touch-
ing upon corporate disclosure or the regulation of trading markets can 
be expected to affect the market's speed in adjusting to new informa-
tion. As a result, efficiency objectives have been raised not only in 
connection with insider trading, program trading and soft information 
disclosures, but with each of the following issues as well: stabilizing 
markets by halting trading or imposing daily price change limits; 136 
"shelf" registration of securities; 137 the integrated disclosure sys-
tem; 138 the development of a national market system; 139 computerized 
electronic filing and other developing information technology; 140 the 
appropriate role of management faced with a hostile tender offer; 141 
the value of arbitrageur speculation in takeover stocks; 142 the role of 
mutual funds;143 federal preemption of state takeover statutes;144 and 
the value of federal antifraud provisions.145 
The current preoccupation with market efficiency is perhaps best 
illustrated by the "revisionist" critique146 of the mandatory disclosure 
136. Compare BRADY REPORT, supra note IS, at 66 (recommending price change limits and 
trading halts as "circuit breakers" which facilitate "price discovery" by giving market time to 
pause and evaluate impact of new information), with Vise, Six Months After Collapse, Markets 
Near Pact on Trading Halts, Wash. Post., Apr. 20, 1988, at DI, col. 2, D8, col. 1 (quoting 
Michael Duval of First Boston Corp. that trading _halts would "significantly [weaken] the effi-
ciency of the capital markets" and Robert Rubin of Goldman, Sachs that trading halts distort the 
market's ability to set prices). 
137. Compare Banoff, supra note 38, at 184 (shelf registration allows issuers to sell securities 
at correct prices, benefiting allocation efficiency), with Fox, supra note S, at 1032 (shelf registra-
tion reduces underwriter due diligence, harming market efficiency and economy). 
138. Fox, supra note 5, at 1032-33 (Integration may reduce underwriter due diligence and 
reduce allocative benefits of an efficient market.). 
139. See SEC POLICY STATEMENT, supra note 12, at D-1 (central market system can maxi-
mize market efficiency); Gilson & Kraakman, supra note l, at 627-28 n.206 (adoption of market 
system might further informational efficiency, as "market structure has a substantial impact on 
the cost of information, and therefore on relative marketing efficiency"). 
140. See Langevoort, supra note 31, at 803 (new technology improves market efficiency). 
141. See infra notes 362-67 and accompanying text. 
142. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 107, at 1183 n.60 (defending arbitrageurs as con-
tributing to efficiency). 
143. Levy & Robbins, The SEC Forgets Its Economics, CoLUM. J. WORLD Bus., May-June 
1967, at 9 (expertised mutual funds direct capital into most attractive channels, "thereby improv-
ing the efficiency of the market and enabling companies that operate in areas of greatest eco-
nomic promise to raise equity capital more easily"). 
144. Ramifications of Black Monday Discussed at Annual PLI Conference, 19 Sec. Reg. & L. 
Rep. (BNA) No. 45, at 1726, 1729 (Nov. 13, 1987) (remarks of panelist at PLI's November S-7, 
1987, 19th Annual Institute on Securities Regulation that market cannot operate efficiently 
under regulation by a host of different statutes); Ruder Restates Support for Measure To Preempt 
State Antitakeover Laws, Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 46, at 1759 (Nov. 20, 1987) (November 
13, 1987, remarks of SEC Chairman David Ruder that limitations on transferability of shares 
imposed by the current generation of state takeover statutes "diminish the efficiency, depth and 
liquidity of the nation's security markets," justifying federal preemption of the area). 
145. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 91, at 673-79 (antifraud rules enhance efficiency). 
146. Professor Coffee appears to be the first to apply the term "revisionist" to securities 
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system developed under the 1933 and 1934 Acts.147 There is evidence 
that the extensive information corporations file with the SEC and pro-
vide to investors under those statutes does not change stock prices.148 
From these findings, some conclude that the information disclosed has 
already been incorporated into stock price through other channels -
in other words, mandatory disclosure does not make the market more 
efficient.149 On the strength of this observation, some revisionists ar-
gue that the mandatory disclosure scheme upon which more than a 
half-century of securities policy has been premised is valueless and 
should be abandoned.1so 
The position that mandatory disclosure serves no useful function if 
it does not enhance market efficiency is an extreme one. 151 But it illus-
trates well the perceived importance of efficient markets in securities 
policy. Such a view treats informational efficiency as not merely an 
important objective of securities policy, but as the only objective. 
II. THE EcONOMIC FUNCTIONS OF STOCK PRICES 
Why are efficient markets such a compelling goal? Commentators 
who stop to address the question generally conclude that informa-
scholars who believe that if markets are already informationally efficient, no purpose is served by 
disclosure regulation. See Coffee, supra note 5, at 717. See also Dennis, supra note 101, at 1205-
06 (describing "revisionist" work of Professor George Benston); Sargent, supra note 36, at 1062 
(referring to "post-revisionist" preoccupation with market efficiency). 
147. See supra note 94. 
148. See Benston, supra note 133, at 153. 
149. Id.; Wolfson, A Critique of the Securities and Exchange Commission, 30 EMORY L.J. 
119, 129-30 (1981). 
150. See Benston, supra note 133, at 153 (no evidence 1934 Act was needed or desirable); 
Dennis, supra note 101, at 1209 (Some argue that if securities prices reflect information 
mandatorily disclosed before filing, eliminating mandatory disclosure does not harm investors 
and reduces compliance costs.). See also Wolfson, supra note 149, at 129-30 (SEC's economic 
theory "fundamentally" flawed as pertinent information is usually received and evaluated by 
market long before it is dispersed through SEC-mandated reports). But see Seligman, The His-
torical Need for a Mandatory Corporate Disclosure System, 9 J, CORP. L. 1, 16 (1983) (if 
mandatory disclosure causes corporation to publish information that would not otherwise be 
announced, "it is of trivial significance" whether data first published in SEC filings or elsewhere). 
151. There are reasons to encourage corporate disclosure and discourage fraud apart from 
their effect on stock prices. Professor Coffee argues that mandatory disclosure may compensate 
for underproduction of information to investors due to its public-good nature, discourage waste-
ful private expenditures to obtain information, discipline management by overcoming incentives 
to withhold information or disseminate false information, and help investors who cannot diver-
sify and need information on diversifiable risk factors. See Coffee, supra note 5, at 721-23; see 
also Schulte, The Debatable Case for Securities Disclosure Regulation, 13 J, CORP. L. 535, 539-
542 (1988) (controlling fraud and abuse also enhances investor "confidence" in the stock market 
by ensuring that public investor's returns are not systematically diminished by fraudulent con-
duct, and federal scheme may prevent states from protecting in-state issuers by exploiting out-of. 
state investors); Seligman, supra note 150, at 9 (historical analysis shows that mandatory disclo-
sure reduces fraud and excessive underwriter and insider compensation while increasing investor 
confidence). 
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tional efficiency - which addresses only the market's speed in adjust-
ing prices to new information - is desirable because it serves 
allocative efficiency - the proper allocation of scarce resources among 
competing alternate uses. 152 
The grail of economic analysis is the optimal allocation of re-
sources so that no redistribution would allow some consumers to be 
made better off without others being made worse off. 153 A market 
economy relies on the pricing mechanism to channel goods and serv-
ices to their most highly valued use. 154 Economists thus consider cor-
rect pricing to be essential to maximizing social welfare in a market 
system. 155 If economists regard accurate pricing as necessary to the 
efficient allocation of commodities, it seems natural that efficient pric-
ing is crucial to the securities market as well. As a rule, scholars and 
policymakers assume that mispriced securities do misallocate re-
sources because stock prices influence the production, distribution, 
and consumption of goods and services. Thus, informational efficiency 
in stock prices is thought to improve allocative efficiency in general. 156 
However, unlike most goods and services distributed by the econ-
152. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 5, at 734 (Securities prices are important "not so much 
because of their distributive consequences on investors but more because of their effect on alloca-
tive efficiency."); Schulte, supra note 151, at 539 (securities prices important because of their 
effect on allocative efficiency); sources cited supra note 12. 
153. See R. LIPSEY & P. STEINER, EcoNOMICS 12, 918 (4th ed. 1975); P. SAMUELSON, Eco-
NOMICS 631-32 (9th ed. 1973). This articulation of efficiency incorporates notions of both pure 
efficiency (maximizing total wealth or production without concern for ultimate distribution) and 
"pareto-optimality" (the notion that the economic well-being of one actor cannot be increased by 
increasing production through another's sacrifice unless full compensation is paid to the "loser''). 
Compare Schulte, supra note 151, at 537 (wealth maximized if market efficiently allocates re-
sources) with Seligman, supra note 12, at 1119 (ideally, market would allocate resources so that 
no reallocation could make anyone better off without making another worse oft). See generally 
Coffee, Regulating the Market for Corporate Control· A Critical Assessment of the Tender Offer's 
Role in Corporate Governance, 84 CoLUM. L. REv. 1145,-1174 n.76 (1984) (importance of com-
pensation to pareto-optimality). 
154. Schulte, supra note 151, at 537. See R. LIPSEY & P. STEINER, supra note 153, at 63-65, 
925; P. SAMUELSON, supra note 153, at 43-47. 
155. A free market relies on a willingness to pay, as measured in monetary terms, to deter-
mine how highly individual consumers value particular goods. A good is presumed to be worth 
most to the consumer _who will pay the highest price for it. Market distortions may shift price 
from the equilibrium that would be set by supply and demand in a perfect market. Whether 
these distortions are the result of price controls (such as minimum wage laws), monopoly, or the 
slow incorporation of information concerning value, they are assumed to produce sub-optimal 
allocations of resources. These diminish the total wealth available to be distributed and reduce 
social welfare. See P. SAMUELSON, supra note 153, at 390-94, 497-98 (price controls and monop-
oly distort pricing and hurt resource allocation). 
156. Mundheim, Selected Trends in Disclosure Requirements for Public Corporations, 3 SEC. 
REG. L.J. 3 (1975) (increased pricing efficiency through disclosure of material information "gen-
erally thought" to enhance allocational efficiency); see, e.g., sources cited supra notes 12, 152; 
JOINT STUDY OF TRADING IN F'uTuRES, supra note 6, at 1-11to1-12 (defending stock futures 
and options as enhancing informational efficiency of underlying stock prices, and asserting, with-
out supporting citation, tl!at this trading "also promote[s] efficiency in the production, distribu-
tion, and consumption of goods and services over time"); Note, supra note 38, at 1529 
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omy, stocks have no intrinsic value.157 They are only instruments rep-
resenting other, possibly valuable, rights. Investors do not "consume" 
them. "Producing" securities requires no more than the paper and ink 
needed to print them. The connection between securities prices and 
the allocation of real resources is thus inherently uncertain. 
Recognizing the ambiguity of that link, commentators have devel-
oped a number of theories to explain why stock prices have economic 
effects and why the stock market should be viewed as "an instrument 
of social control" that "monitors and structures the allocation of 
scarce resources in the economy."158 The most significant of these are 
the "capital-allocation" theory and its two variations, the "investor-
confidence" and "substitute-good" theories. Other arguments raised 
in support of promoting the market's efficiency are the "managerial-
signaling" theory; the "wealth-effect" theory; and the "market-for-
control" theory. This section will examine each in turn. In each case, 
there is reason to question the extent to which securities prices influ-
ence real economic events. 
A. Efficient Markets and the Allocation of Investment Capital 
Among Corporations 
The argument most frequently raised in defense of the importance 
of efficient markets is that stock market prices allocate investment cap-
ital among corporations competing to raise investment funding. 159 
The capital-allocation hypothesis asserts that in an informationally ef-
ficient stock market, all firms will face the same equity "cost of capi-
tal" (i.e., the expected return that investors demand for each dollar 
(improving informational efficiency through disclosure "necessarily" improves allocational 
efficiency). 
157. Because securities are not consumables, proper pricing cannot maximize subjective hap· 
piness or "utility" by allocating a particular security to the individual who receives the most 
pleasure from it. A share of stock rationally expected to produce a stream of income with a 
present value of $25 will be worth exactly $25 to all investors. See W. BAUMOL, supra note 25, at 
47; S. KEANE, STOCK MARKET EFFICIENCY: THEORY, EVIDENCE AND IMPLICATIONS 6 (1983). 
The price mechanism may help to allocate consumables efficiently to those who subjectively 
value them most (e.g., only those who get the greatest subjective pleasure from expensive Italian 
shoes will be willing to pay for them). But to the extent that consumers differ in their valuations 
of securities, they do so because their predictions of the future earnings of the stocks differ, not 
because they subjectively "like" AT&T more than IBM. See infra note 276 (heterogeneous 
opinions). 
158. Fox, supra note 5, at 1009, 1015. 
159. See, e.g., Freeman v. Decio, 584 F.2d 186, 190 (7th Cir. 1978) (accurate securities prices 
route capital to its most productive uses); Anderson, supra note 4, at 314 (efficient markets better 
allocate capital); Barry, supra note 5, at 1318 (continual impoundment of information into prices 
"essential" to efficient capital allocation); Dennis, supra note 5, at 375 (efficient markets allocate 
capital into most profitable areas); Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 1, at 613 (moving informa-
tion quickly into market leads to more effective capital markets); Macey, supra note 42, at 31 
n.110 ("efficient" markets guide capital investment); sources cited infra note 167. 
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they ip.vest in common stock).160 A thriving corporation with high 
earnings can sell shares at a proportionately higher price than a less 
successful firm with the same assets but lower earnings.161 As long as 
stock prices reflect the company's expected future earnings, invest-
ment capital will "migrate to those companies and projects that seem 
most likely to succeed."162 Efficient prices thus "maximize welfare by 
allocating scarce resources to investment opportunities promising the 
greatest return."163 
The capital-allocation hypothesis views the stock market as "the 
nation's primary mechanism for allocating economic resources among 
competing companies"164 and "the allocator of capital resources par 
excellence. " 165 If we want to channel society's savings to their most 
productive use, it is essential that stock prices accurately reflect the 
prospects of the underlying corporations. Because "our capital alloca-
tion mechanism affects ... the long-run prospects of our entire econ-
omy," 166 stock market efficiency becomes a public issue of critical 
importance, and capital allocation becomes the stock market's "most 
important" economic function.161 
The capital-allocation hypothesis is perhaps the most compelling 
justification raised in support of pursuing informationally efficient 
stock markets. Its limitations are evident only if we recognize two 
realities of corporate financing behavior. The first is that corporations 
rarely rely on equity issues for funding, and stock prices have little or 
no influence on other, more commonly used sources of capital.168 The 
second reality is that, while informational efficiency is normally sought 
and discussed in the context of public trading on organized exchanges 
and in the over-the-counter (OTC) market, the funds that corpora-
160. See Barry, supra note 5, at 1316 n.46; Fischel, Efficient Capital Market Theory, The 
Market for Corporate Control, and the Regulation of Cash Tender Offers, 57 TEXAS L. R.Ev. 1, 4-
5 (1987); Friend, supra note 31, at 190. The "cost" of equity capital is the dividends and other 
payouts that shareholders expect in return for their equity investment. BRADY REPORT, supra 
note 15, at VII-2. 
161. See Barry, supra note 5, at 1317-18 ("When investors who see promise in a company bid 
up the price of its securities they enable it to pursue its various projects more intensively by using 
less expensive capital."); Wu, supra note 12, at 264 (Companies that are likely to be profitable 
will be able to sell their stock for more than companies whose futures are gloomy.). 
162. Barry, supra note 5, at 1317. 
163. Id. 
164. R. KARMEL, supra note 17, at 259. 
165. W. BAUMOL, supra note 25, at 4. 
166. Id. at 2. 
167. See Fischel, supra note 160, at 4 (efficient capital allocation is "most important" eco-
nomic goal of securities markets); Friend, supra note 31, at 190 (allocation of capital is market's 
"most important" economic function); Wu, supra note 12, at 263 (allocation of capital is mar-
ket's "most important" function). 
168. See infra notes 178-204 and accompanying text. 
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tions receive when they do sell equity are not determined by prices in 
the trading markets but by prices set in negotiations between under-
writers and issuers. 169 There are reasons to believe that trading mar-
ket prices have little influence on the pricing of many issues in the 
underwriting market, and that underwriters persistently misprice 
many issues for reasons that have nothing to do with the efficiency or 
inefficiency of the trading markets.17° In other words, efficient stock 
markets may be neither necessary nor sufficient for the proper alloca-
tion of capital among corporations. 
1. The Unimportance of Equity as a Source of Capital 
When a corporation first sells shares to investors and uses this 
money to hire employees, buy machinery, or expand its physical plant, 
that transaction involves the allocation of real resources to the produc-
tion of goods or services for consumption.171 But stock, once issued, is 
neither depreciated nor consumed. Instead it is sold and resold at 
changing prices in the over-the-counter and exchange markets. How-
ever significant these subsequent sales are to the individuals who par-
ticipate in them, they do not add a penny of additional investment 
capital to the corporation's coffers.172 When one investor sells stock to 
another investor, the two are essentially gambling on their expecta-
tions for the corporation's prosperity.173 The terms of the bargain 
they strike only reallocate wealth between them, as parimutuel wager-
ing reallocates wealth among bettors at the racetrack.174 
169. See infra notes 206-11 and accompanying text. 
170. See infra notes 212-67 and accompanying text. 
171. Of course, the reality is that investors almost invariably buy their shares not from the 
issuer, but from an underwriter (or dealer who purchased from an underwriter) who purchased 
from the issuer. Only the underwriter's purchase provides proceeds to the corporation. See infra 
notes 207-11 and accompanying text. 
172. See Levmore, supra note 12, at 156 (firm receives capital when stock is issued; subse-
quent changes in price "affect the relative wealth of individual shareholders, but not the amount 
of capital that is at the company's disposal"). 
173. When investor A sells a share of stock to investor B for $20, A is gambling that the 
issuing corporation's financial status will decline; B hopes it will improve. If A is right and the 
price of the stock declines to $10, we may say that resources have been "reallocated" in the sense 
that the winner, A, is $10 better off, while loser, B, is $10 poorer. But while such reallocations 
are important to the transaction's participants, no social consequences follow. Whether A is 
richer or B poorer has no predictable impact on the overall level of production of the economy, 
unless we have some reason to believe that A will use the money more productively than B 
would. See Coffee, supra note 5, at 733 (can regard trading markets for securities as pursuit of 
gain that does not increase social wealth, because one party's gain must come from another's 
loss); Fox, supra note 5, at 1010 (stock trading among investors as a zero-sum game in which one 
player's gain is another's loss). 
174. The point was well put by Professor Berle: 
When I buy AT&T or General Motors, I do not remotely "invest in" either concern. I have 
bought from Nym, who bought from Bardolph, who bought from Pistol, who bought 
through ten thousand predecessors in title from Falstaff, who got the stock when originally 
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Any careful investigation of the allocative function of stock mar-
kets must therefore distinguish between two types of transactions: 
corporate issuances of shares, and subsequent transactions in those 
shares among investors in the public trading markets of the stock ex-
changes and the over-the-counter National Association of Securities 
Dealers Automatic Quotation (NASDAQ) system. 175 The importance 
of the distinction is underlined by the disparity in the sizes of the two 
markets. In 1985, corporations issued seventeen billion dollars in 
common stock. Yet in the same year, over one trillion dollars was 
traded on the organized exchanges, with another $223 billion in equity 
traded on NASDAQ. 176 The dollar volume of trading in outstanding 
shares on the exchanges and in, the over,.the-counter market generally 
outweighs corporate issues by a ratio of nearly thirty to one.177 
a. Firms rarely use equity issues to raise capital. Corporations can 
finance their projects through a number of means other than issuing 
stock. Many expenditures can be met through internally generated 
revenues. 178 A host of forms of debt (including commercial loans, 
public or private bond sales, accounts payable, commercial paper, and 
letters of credit) also can provide capital to the corporation.179 The 
issued. Let us assume Falstaff was a genuine investor - that he bought the stock directly 
from the corporation .•.. This contribution, the only real "investment" in the chain, was 
probably an infinitesimal fraction of the price I paid to Nym. Now what Nym does with the 
price he receives from me nobody knows; the one certainty is that he does not contribute 
any of it to AT&T or General Motors. 
Berle, supra note 14, at 446. 
175. See Poser, R~trocturing the Stock Markets: A Critical Look at the SEC's National Mar-
ket System, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 883, 886 (1981) ("two distinct" markets for corporate issues and 
trading in outstanding shares). 
176. NEW YORK STOCK EXCH., NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE FACT BOOK 64 (1986) 
[hereinafter 1986 NYSE FACTBOOK] ($17.3 billion issued); id. at 74 ($1.2 trillion in exchange 
trading, calculated from table "Market Value of Shares Sold on Registered Exchanges"); NA-
TIONAL AssN. OF SEC. DEALERS, INC., NASDAQ FACT BOOK 11 (1986) [hereinafter 1986 
NASD FACTBOOK] ($233 billion NASDAQ trading). 
177. Between 1978 and 1985, approximately $218 billion in stock was issued to the public. 
See 1986 NYSE FACTBOOK, supra note 176, at 64 (table of annual public issues of equity from 
1978 to 1985). During the same years, approximately $5.2 trillion in oµtstanding stock was 
traded on the registered exchanges. See id. at 74 (table of market value of shares sold on ex-
changes). Another $878 billion was traded on the OTC market. See 1986 NASD FACTBOOK, 
supra note 176, at 4 (dollar volume of trading in NASD shares). The total dollar ratio of trading 
in outstanding shares to equity issued during these years was therefore 27.9 to 1. 
178. Retained earnings account for the majority of corporate expenditures. See infra notes 
193-95 and accompanying text. 
179. This article focuses on the economic advantages of efficient equity markets. Of course, 
corporations sell debt as well as equity to the public, and bonds are also traded in the securities 
markets. Indeed, corporations depend far more on bonds sales than stock issues for financing. 
Of the $355 billion in corporate securities sold to the public between 1980 and 1984, 63% was 
debt, while only 24% was common stock .. Hybrid instruments like convertible debt, convertible 
preferred, and preferred stock accounted for the remaining 13%. Smith, Investment Banking 
and the Capital Acquisition Process, 15 J. FIN. ECON. 3 (1986). . 
However, there are reasons to believe that informationally inefficient markets are far more 
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argument that efficient stock markets are essential to allocate properly 
investment capital assumes that, despite a plethora of alternate financ-
ing sources, corporations rely primarily on stock issues for raising 
funds. That assumption is at odds with actual corporate financing be-
havior. In fact, firms largely appear to avoid the stock market as a 
source of funding.1so 
Public issues of equity generally take two forms. The first is the 
initial public offering (IPO), or "new issue." An IPO occurs when a 
privately held corporation decides for the first time to sell common 
stock to the public. In doing so, it subjects itself to the SEC registra-
tion and disclosure requirements applicable to publicly held firms. 181 
IPOs account for approximately 70% of all public issues of stock. 182 
The second form of equity issue is the "seasoned" issue. After go-
ing public, a corporation desiring to raise further capital may sell addi-
tional stock, similar to that already held by public shareholders and 
traded in the public markets. Such issues are called seasoned because, 
in contrast to the IPO, a public market for the corporation's stock 
already exists. Seasoned issues are less common than IPOs, account-
ing for only 30% of corporate issues. ts3 
Many successful firms never "go public" at all, and the health of 
privately held firms is itself evidence that public equity issues are not 
an essential ingredient of financing success.184 More importantly, once 
a corporation has gone public it might never again return to the equity 
likely to misprice equity than debt, and, correspondingly, efficient markets are far less likely to 
improve the accuracy of debt pricing. Pricing bonds is much simpler than pricing stocks. While 
the value of stocks depends on a host of different factors relating to the macroeconomy and the 
issuing corporation, see infra notes 215-23 and accompanying text, bond prices are determined 
by only two variables: prevailing interest rates, and risk of issuer bankruptcy and default. Note, 
Auctioning New Issues of Corporate Securities, 71 VA. L. REV. 1381, 1404 n.128 (1985). Rarely is 
firm-specific information so grave that the issuer's default risk is seriously altered. Information 
on prevailing interest rates is cheaply and readily available from a number of sources outside the 
SEC's jurisdiction. Securities policies that help or hinder market efficiency are correspondingly 
limited in their influence on bond prices. See infra text accompanying note 222. 
180. See infra notes 184-91 and accompanying text. 
181. See supra note 94. 
182. This average can be calculated from figures provided in U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMMN., 
SEC MONTHLY STATISTICAL REVIEW 29 (Feb. 1988) [hereinafter 1988 SEC STATISTICAL RE-
VIEW] (Table M-455, listing number of issues and dollar amounts for seasoned and unseasoned 
common stock distributions for cash by corporation, 1984-1987). 
183. See supra note 182. However, seasoned issues tend to be for larger amounts than IPOs: 
nearly 62% of the corporate capital raised through the public sale of common stock is raised 
through a seasoned issue. Unseasoned issues account for only 38.3%. This average is calculated 
from figures provided in 1988 SEC STATISTICAL REVIEW, supra note 182, at 29 (table M-455, 
listing number of issues and dollar amounts for seasoned and unseasoned common stock distribu-
tions for cash by corporation, 1984-1987). 
184. Similar evidence is found in the numerous "going private" transactions that occur every 
year. See generally Lowenstein, Management Buyouts, 85 CoLUM. L. REV. 730 (1985). 
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market. 185 On average, publicly held corporations issue only once 
every eighteen years - less often than locusts. 186 In addition, equity 
issues (whether seasoned or unseasoned) provide a negligible fraction 
of corporate funding. Between 1973 and 1982, net stock issues annu-
ally provided an average of only 2.1 % of corporate funding, never ex-
ceeding 6% in any one year. 187 In some years, net stock financing was 
negative because corporations repurchased more shares than were 
issued.188 
Corporate reluctance to raise 9apital by issuing equity has been 
recognized for decades. 189 Professor Baumol has suggested that 
there appears to be only one inescapable conclusion: that a very substan-
tial proportion of American business firms manage to avoid the direct 
disciplining influences of the securities market, or at least to evade the 
type of discipline which can be imposed by the provision of funds to 
inefficient firms only on extremely unfavorable terms. 190 
From this, Baumol continues, "[o]ne might almost venture to con-
clude ... that the market in fact does not allocate much of the econ-
omy's capital."191 
185. See G. DONALDSON, CORPORATE DEBT CAPACITY 56·58 (1961) <"[T]he large majority 
[of American firms] had not had such a sale [of common stock] in the past 20 years and did not 
anticipate one in the foreseeable future."); M. Fox, supra note 27, at 143 (corporations that 
dominate industrial sector issued "bulk" of equity 50 to 100 years ago and have since financed 
expansion predominantly through retained earnings and debt). 
186. Between 1983 and 1986, the SEC received an annual average of 344 registrations for 
seasoned issuances of common stock by public corporations. See 1988 SEC STATISTICAL RE-
VIEW, supra note 182, at 29 (table M-455, listing annual registrations from 1984 to 1987). Dur-
ing the same period, approximately 6355 firms had common stock traded on the NYSE, AMEX, 
or NASDAQ markets. Seligman, Equal Protection in Shareholder Voting Rights: The One Com-
mon Share, One Vote Controversy, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 687, 708 (1986). Dividing 6,355 
firms by an annual average of 344 registrations for seasoned issues indicates that publicly held 
corporations issue seasoned stock, on average, every 18.5 years. These findings are consistent 
with the findings of Donaldson more than a quarter century before. See G. DONALDSON, supra 
note 185, at 56-58. 
187. This average is calculated from figures presented in R. BREALEY & S. MYERS, supra 
note 22, at 291 (table 14-3, net stock issues from 1965-1982). In the decade from 1973 to 1982, 
net stock issues have provided from -3% to 6% of corporate funding. Id. These figures overstate 
the role of public equity in corporate finance as they include both public sales and private place-
ments of stock. In the recent past, private placements have accounted for between 10% and 30% 
of equity sales. See 1986 NYSE FACTBOOK, supra note 176, at 64 (table for dollar amounts of 
private equity placement and total equity issues from 1978 to 1985). 
188. R. BREALEY & S. MYERS, supra note 22, at 291(table14-3, showing net stock issues of 
-2% and -3% in 1979 and 1981, respectively). 
189. See W. BAUMOL, supra note 25, at 69 (Corporations seem to avoid equity markets for 
capital.); G. DONALDSON, supra note 185, at 56 (Management avoids common stock issues as 
much as possible.). 
190. W. BAUMOL, supra note 25, at 70. 
191. Id. at 79. Professor Fox uses the observation that firms avoid external finance as a basis 
for suggesting that corporation management prefers internal finance because the lack of outside 
monitoring permits management to run firms relatively inefficiently, investing in projects with 
inadequate returns. Fox recommends policies that encourage greater dividend payout from earn-
ings and, correspondingly, greater reliance on external funds. M. Fox, supra note 27, at 335-39. 
648 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 87:613 
b. Equity prices do not significantly influence the cost of other 
sources of capital. The fact that most firms avoid the stock market as a 
source of investment capital undermines the contention that capital 
allocation is the stock market's most important function. Supporters 
of market efficiency (including Baumol) have responded by suggesting 
that even if corporations do not rely on equity for raising funds, the 
market for their shares influences the availability and cost of other 
types of financing.192 That claim raises the question of where firms do 
find investment capital if they are not finding it in the stock market. 
The "most striking" aspect of corporate behavior in choosing 
among alternate sources of funding is the predominance of internally 
generated cash.193 Operating revenues finance an average of 61 % of 
corporate expenditures.194 Efficient stock prices are irrelevant to this 
most important source of funding.195 
That portion of corporate funding which does not come from re-
tained earnings or equity, about 36%, is raised through corporate bor-
rowing.196 Baumol and others have defended the importance of stock 
prices by suggesting that the corporation whose stock is rising can bor-
row more, at a lower interest rate, than the corporation whose stock 
price is declining.197 While the argument has intuitive appeal, the as-
sumption of cause and effect is problematic. The corporation that is 
highly valued by the stock market may be able to borrow more readily 
not because its stock price is high, but because the same optimistic 
information that leads the market to view the firm's prospects favora-
bly also makes the firm a more attractive borrower.198 For example, 
192. See, e.g., W. BAUMOL, supra note 25, at 81 ("[t]he performance of a company's shares 
can ... influence the terms of which it can obtain funds from other sources"); Fox, supra note 5, 
at 1017 (share price can affect costs of other sources of capital); H. KRIPKE, supra note 14, at 123 
(size of corporation's equity can significantly affect company's borrowing power or the interest 
rate it pays by affecting debt-equity ratio). 
193. R. BREALEY & s. MYERS, supra note 22, at 290. 
194. This figure is calculated from the table presented in R. BREALEY & S. MYERS, supra 
note 22, at 291 (table 14-3, summarizing the sources and uses of funds by nonfinancial corpora-
tions between 1965 and 1982). 
195. The 61% figure cited in note 194 and accompanying text measures operating revenues 
as cash generated by operations, less cash dividends paid to shareholders. R. BREALEY & S. 
MYERS, supra note 22, at 291. To the extent that corporations elect not to pay cash dividends, 
even greater amounts of internally generated capital would be available if needed. See id. at 349-
50 (Managers tend to set a "fair" dividend rate and try to pay out equivalent amounts each year, 
but dividend payout should· be targeted sufficiently low that the company can "minimize its 
reliance on external equity."). 
196. The average is calculated from figures presented in R. BREALEY & S. MYERS, supra 
note 22, at 291 (Table 14-3, summarizing net borrowing, including long-term debt, short-term 
debt, and accounts payable, by nonfinancial corporations between 1965 and 1982). 
197. See W. BAUMOL, supra note 25, at 81; H. KRIPKE, supra note 14, at 123; Fox, supra 
note 5, at 1017 (citing Kripke). 
198. Professor Fox implicitly recognizes this point when he argues that "the misinformation 
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suppose Texas Gulf Sulphur announces a major mineral strike. While 
that announcement would likely increase both the firm's stock price 
and its borrowing capacity, the former would not cause the latter. 
Inefficient stock prices will not distort the firm's cost of borrowing 
unless changes in stock price alone - as opposed to changes in infor-
mation relevant to both stock price and creditworthiness - influence 
the firm's ability to borrow. In other words, insider trading by Texas 
Gulf employees would not enable the company to borrow more, at a 
lower rate, unless an unexplained rise in Texas Gulf stock made banks 
more eager lenders even before the mineral strike was announced. 
This causal link, however, is highly questionable.-
The usual theory raised to explain why sto_ck price per se may be 
significant to creditworthiness is that lenders evaluating firms as po-
tential borrowers compare the market price of the firm's equity to its 
outstanding debt in order to measure "leverage" (i.e.~ the size of the 
firm's debt load relative to total worth). 199 The flaw in the debt-to-
equity ratio argument is that it assumes that banks evaluate leverage 
by measuring debt load against market equity prices, rather than 
against the value of the corporation's underlying eainings and as-
sets. 200 The bank that readily lends on the basis of high share value 
unsupported by assets or revenues is unlikely to stay in the banking 
business long.201 Nor would rational lenders be deterred by depressed 
that causes inaccuracies in the prices .•. as well as the share prices themselves," affects the terms 
on which financial intermediaries are willing to make loans. Fox, supra note 5, at 1017 (emphasis 
added). 
199. See H. KRIPKE, supra note 14, a~ 123 (market appraisal of equity affects borrowing 
power or interest rate); Fox, supra note 5, at 1017 (citing Kripke); see also W. BAUMOL, supra 
note 25, at 81 ("[L]enders are likely to base their risk estimates, and hence their interest terms, in 
part on the market's evaluation of the corporation's stocks."). Highly leveraged firms are re-
garded as riskier borrowers because a larger portion of the firm's revenues must be devoted to 
fixed debt charges and is unavailable for operating expenses or inve!jtment. M.' Fox, supra note 
27, at 122. 
200. See W. BAU~OL, supra note 25, a! 81 (suggesting, without citation, that lenders base 
their risk estimates in part on the market value of the company's equity); H. KRIPKE, supra note 
14, at 123 (suggesting, without supporting, that banks prefer to measure debt level against mar-
ket equity, as "[t]he market appraisal of the equity is considered by most analysts a far better 
indication of that equity than the accountant's computation"). 
201. Of course, a new stock issue brings in money that increases the corporation's net worth. 
In this sense, issuances that increase net worth may lower the cost of debt capital. See M. HAL-
LORAN, supra note 94, at 3 (public offerings increase firm's net worth and should make it easier 
to borrow); Schneider, Manko & Kant, Going Public: Practice, Procedure and Consequences, 27 
VILL. L. REV. 1, 3 (1981) (benefits of going public include "improv[ing] net worth, enabling the 
company to borrow capital on more favorable terms"). But net worth will be increased whether 
the new issue sells at an efficiently "correct" price or not. The company that feels its shares are 
undervalued can simply sell more pf them. R. BREALEY & S. MYERS, supra note 22, at 292 
(company can always raise money by selling shares as long as price is low enough). Of course, 
such action dilutes the financial interests of existing shareholders. That may result in wealth 
reallocations from existing shareholders to the new shareholders, but it has no other economic 
consequence. See infra note 270 and accompanying text (sales of undervalued equity). 
650 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 87:613 
stock prices if the assets and revenues to support the loan exist. Bank-
ing literature confirms that lenders prefer to measure risk by compar-
ing outstanding debt against the value of a corporation's underlying 
assets, rather than the market price of its stock.202 
These observations imply that equity markets that do not speedily 
reflect all available information need not produce misallocations in the 
corporate debt market. Of course, misinformation that causes the 
stock market to misprice a firm's equity may also induce lenders to 
misjudge the firm's creditworthiness. Suggesting that efficient stock 
pricing is less important to capital allocation than generally supposed 
does not imply that we should be unconcerned about misinformation 
or fraud. Nevertheless, the issue of misinformation and the issue of 
efficient pricing are not identical.203 Moreover, misinformation in the 
public stock markets is not necessarily mirrored by similar misinfor-
mation in other capital markets such as the markets for private place-
ments or commercial lending. 204 Even if Texas Gulf Sulphur could 
202. Many of the credit-scoring formulas used by commercial lenders to evaluate the 
creditworthiness of corporate borrowers do not consider stock price at all. See J. SINKEY, COM-
MERCIAL BANK FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT IN THE FINANCIAL SERVICr;S INDUSTRY 408-09, 
412-14 (2d ed. 1986) (describing Libby and Chesser tests of accounting ratios as predictors of 
creditworthiness; none of ratios include market equity as a factor); 3 CONTEMPORARY STUDIES 
IN EcoNOMIC AND FINANCIAL ANALYSIS, Application of Classification Techniques in Business, 
Banking and Finance, 167-89, 255-78, 284, 294) (E. Altman & I. Walter eds. 1981) (describing 
series of credit-scoring models by Libby, Beaver, Blum and Elam, in which market equity does 
not appear as a factor); HANDBOOK FOR BANKING STRATEGY 483-89 (R. Aspinwall & R. 
Eisenbeis eds. 1985) (outlining credit-scoring models that rely on cash flow to evaluate risk of a 
commercial loan). Those credit-scoring models that do consider market equity price consider it 
as only one out of five or more factors, and a lightly weighted one at that. See J. SINKEY, supra, 
at 409-13 ("Zeta" analysis method of using five unevenly weighted ratios to predict bankruptcy 
risk; five-year average of common stock prices to debt a factor in only one, and most lightly 
weighted, of ratios); HANDBOOK FOR BANKING STRATEGY, supra, at 489-94 (same). In contrast, 
direct asset valuation is a weighty factor in virtually all the models. See J. SINKEY, supra, at 408, 
410, 413; HANDBOOK FOR BANKING STRATEGY, supra, at 486, 488, 491. The literature also 
emphasizes that financial credit-scoring models are no substitute for close attention to the cir· 
cumstances of the particular corporation. J. SINKEY, supra, at 410; HANDBOOK FOR BANKING 
STRATEGY, supra, at 494-95. Surely one circumstance that would be considered by any rational 
lender would be whether a debt-equity ratio was distorted by market over- or under-pricing. 
Banks, like other economic actors making decisions concerning the circumstances of a particular 
corporation, are better off if they gather information about those circumstances directly rather 
than relying on the proxies of stock prices or financial ratios reflecting past economic perform-
ance. See infra notes 327-43 and accompanying text. 
203. There can be misinformation without inefficiency. For example, insider trading can 
move market price to the "correct" or efficient valuation even if the information underlying the 
insider trading remains nonpublic, and the public remains misinformed. See supra notes 39-48. 
There can also be inefficiency without misinformation. Trading halts or daily price limits can 
prevent market price from incorporating information even if the public may be fully informed. 
Nor is public "misinformation" always a bad thing. Current disclosure requirements recognize 
that not all corporate information should be disclosed, even when this action by definition 
reduces misinformation and enhances efficiency. See supra notes 106-08 (merger negotiations 
and other soft information); Fischel, supra note 125, at 13-14 (recognizing corporation's property 
right in useful proprietary information desirably preserves incentives to create such information). 
204. Corporations can disclose to private investors and commercial banks proprietary infor· 
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not publicly announce the ore strike until it obtained mineral rights in 
the land, it can confidentially relay the news to a lender. As a result, 
efficient and accurate markets for corporate borrowing could exist in 
the face of policies that permit inefficient and uninformed public stock 
prices. 
2. The Limited Influence of Trading Market Prices on the Proceeds 
Received by Corporations Making Equity Issues 
Evidence that corporations usually avoid the stock market as a 
source of finance, and that stock market prices have little or no influ-
ence on firms' abilities to raise funds from other sources, reveals as 
somewhat threadbare the assertion that stock prices determine the al-
location of capital among corporations. However, we cannot conclude 
that equity prices are unimportant to all corporations all of the time. 
Speculative ventures with no assets or operating history cannot depend 
on retained earnings and may be unable to borrow except at usurious 
rates. In addition, when a corporation does issue equity, the price at 
which the new shares are sold (together with the number of shares 
sold) determines the amount of additional investment capital provided 
to the firm. The allocative implications when corporations do issue 
shares, however rarely, suggest that efficient stock markets may re-
main a worthwhile goal.205 To test the persuasiveness of this view, we 
must begin with an inquiry into the peculiar nature of the equity issues 
market. 
a. The corporate issues market is discrete from the public trading 
markets. The issue of market efficiency is almost invariably raised in 
the context of securities trading on listed exchanges or in the over-the-
counter (OTC) market.206 But corporations do not sell issues directly 
mation they would hesitate to make public, and such financial intermediaries have both the op-
portunity and the incentive to create new information by direct investigation into the 
corporation's affairs. See M. Fox, supra note 27, at 138 (information can be provided in confi-
dence to investor in private placement); H. KRIPKE, supra note 14, at 121, 135 (institutional 
investors in the private placement market have ability to obtain information they require, and 
have ignored SEC's attempts to influence nature of disclosure). 
205. See Fox, supra note 5, at 1023-24 ("Whatever the effect of securities prices on the invest-
ment behavior of firms that do not engage in any public offerings, it is much harder to argue that 
prices have no such effect on those that do ...• "). 
206. Studies seeking to test "market efficiency" generally do so by examining the price per-
formance of shares traded in the public markets. See Fama, supra note 1, at 390, 396-98, 405, 
409 (describing studies which test ECMH by observing behavior of indices of heavily traded 
stocks and stocks listed on NYSE). 
Similarly, the need to ensure efficient pricing normally is raised with respect to securities 
publicly traded in an exchange or OTC. For example, insider trading is defended as contributing 
to efficient pricing. See supra notes 39-48 and accompanying text. Such trading normally in-
volves transactions in the public trading market, whether on an exchange or OTC. See, e.g., 
Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 650 (1983) (trading in Equity Funding shares on NYSE); SEC v. 
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 846-47 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 967 (1969) 
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to investors on the exchanges or OTC. 207 Equity issues are sold in a 
discrete market of an essentially private nature: the underwriting 
market. 
Most firms planning a public issue of stock contract with a syndi-
cate of underwriting firms that takes responsibility for the pricing and 
sale of the new issue.208 The most common form of underwriting is 
"firm commitment" underwriting, in which the syndicate purchases 
the entire issue from the corporation at a m;gotiated price.209 The syn-
dicate assumes the risk ofloss should the issue prove unmarketable.210 
The amount of new capital received by an issuing corporation con-
sequently depends more directly on the price received from the under-
writing syndicate than the price prevailing in the public markets where 
outstanding shares are traded.211 Efficient trading markets can only 
(trading in Texas Gulf shares on Midwest Stock Exchange and NYSE); In re Cady, Roberts & 
Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 908 (1961) (trading in Curtiss-Wright on the NYSE). Trading in stock index 
futures is also defended on the ground that it enhances the pricing efficiency. See supra notes 71-
72 and accompanying text. But index futures can only enhance the pricing efficiency of the 
stocks that comprise that particular index, generally blue chip issues traded on the NYSE. See 
SEC REPORT, supra note 22, at 1-5, 1-8 (describing indices). Disclosure of merger negotiations 
usually involves NYSE-listed companies who are called on by exchange authorities for a public 
statement explaining unusual trading. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 108 S. Ct. 978 (1988) (target 
NYSE-listed company denying merger negotiations in "no corporate development statement" 
issued in response to exchange request). Only a few scholars have investigated the existence or 
consequences of pricing inefficiency in other markets for stock. See, e.g., Banoff, Regulatory 
Subsidies, Efficient Market, and Shelf Registration: An Analysis of Rule 415, 10 VA. L. REV. 135, 
154 (1984) (noting mispricing in new issues market and defending shelf-registered offerings as 
reducing mispricing); Brandi, Merit Securities Regulation, Market Efficie11cy, and New Issue 
Stock Performance, 12 J. CoRP. L. 699, 712 (1987) (concluding that state law merits regulation 
and improves the pricing efficiency of new issues); Ibbotson, Price Pelformance of Common Stock 
New Issues, 2 J. FIN. EcON. 235 (1975) (investigating pricing of new issues of stock by the 
corporation). 
207. Note, supra note 179, at 1381 (corporations do not sell to public directly but issue secur-
ities "almost exclusively" by negotiated sale to underwriters); see Poser, supra note 175, at 886-87 
(distinguishing between new issue markets in which companies issue securities through syndi-
cates of underwriters, and trading markets of exchanges and over-the-counter market in which 
outstanding issues are sold). 
208. R. BREALEY & s. MYERS, supra note 22, at 304-05; M. HALLORAN, supra note 94, at 
12. 
209. M. HALLORAN, supra note 94, at 14-15. The other principal form of underwriting used 
to bring new issues to markets is "best-efforts" underwriting. Here the underwriter acts as the 
corporation's agent in bringing the issue to the market. See In re National Assn. of Sec. Dealers, 
Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 17,371, [1980 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 
~ 82,705, at 83,849 (Dec. 12, 1980) (describing firm commitment and best-efforts underwriting); 
M. HALLORAN, supra note 94, at 14-15 (sanie). As in the case of firm-commitment underwrit-
ing, best-effort underwriters normally advise the corporation in setting a sale price for the issu-
ance, which is then fixed under applicable law. Note, supra note 179, at 1382-83; see infra note 
235. 
210. Firm-commitment underwriters not only midwife the birth of the new issue: they buy 
the baby. In this fashion, they may perform a risk-shifting insurance function for issuers. See 
Ibbotson, supra note 206, at 262-63 (underwriters bear risk that market price will fall below 
offering price); Schneider, Manko & Kant, supra note 201, at 24 (same). 
211. See L. SODERQUISI', SECURmES REGULATION 37-38 (2d ed. 1988) (issuers enter agree-
ment with underwriter, including agreement as to price, before securities are ever sold to public). 
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serve the ultimate goal of optimal capital allocation if trading market 
prices produce accurate pricing in the underwriting market. This in 
turn depends on whether the distribution in question is seasoned stock, 
or an initial public offering. 
b. The influence of trading market prices on the pricing of sea-
soned issues. The underwriter trying to select a proper price for a sea-
soned issue finds that trading market prices have obvious value. What 
better way to gauge the market's receptiveness to the issue than to 
observe the price the public is currently willing to pay for identiCal, 
outstanding stock? 
This fact does not necessarily mean that trading market prices de-
termine the prices set by underwriters for seasoned issues. Despite 
some theoretical arguments to the contrary, most underwriters believe 
that issuing large amounts of stock increases the supply available on 
the market and, in the absence of a corresponding increase in demand, 
depresses market price below prior prevailing levels.212 If that belief is 
Given the substantial commission demanded by most underwriters, see infra note 251, it is a 
puzzle why issuers use underwriters instead of selling their shares directly to the public. The 
question becomes more focused in the case of best-efforts underwriting, as such "underwriting" 
does not shift risk the way firm-commitment underwriting does. See supra notes 209-10. One 
answer is that underwriters, as Jong-term players in the securities business, may allow issuers to 
sell at higher prices because the "stamp of approval" of a senior banking house provides credibil-
ity that a first-time issuer may Jack. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 1, at 602 (issuers who 
use best-efforts underwriters may be "renting" the underwriter's reputation in the market to 
overcome investor suspicion of a new business entity). But such a service could arguably be 
performed by private rating services similar to that operated by Moody's and Standard & Poors 
for corporate debt. See Langevoort, supra note 31, at 752, 775-76 (underwriter due diligence 
may perform quality signaling function that could be replaced by private rating services). An-
other possibility is issuers who must sell at a fixed offering price rather than "at the market," see 
infra notes 244-47, have great need for both accurate pricing advice and the underwriter's retail 
capacity to distribute a large issue quickly, before market conditions change. See L. SODER· 
QUIST, supra, at 27, 38; Langevoort, supra note 22, at 752. 
212. Pegging, Fixing and Stabilizing Security Prices, Release No. 34-2446, 3 Fed. Sec. L. 
Rep. (CCH) 1122,512 (Mar. 18, 1940). See R. BREALEY, SECURITY PRICES IN A COMPETITIVE 
MARKET: MORE ABOUT RISK AND RETURN FROM COMMON STOCKS 81 (1971) (institutional 
fund managers believe large purchases or sales affect stock price); Scholes, The Market for Secur-
ities: Substitution versus Price Pressure and the Effects of Infonnation on Share Prices. 45 J. Bus. 
179, 180-81 (1972) (many in financial services industry believe that large sales of stock depress 
prices). The extent to which this depression occurs will depend upon the amount.issued and the 
"elasticity of demand" for the particular stock. See generally Levmore, supra note 32, at 651-54 
(effect of demand elasticity on market prices). Some economists believe that issuing new stock 
should have no influence on prevailing market price. These economists argue that different 
stocks ought to be perfect substitutes for each other, see infra notes 309-12 and accompanying 
text, and therefore demand for any particular stock should be perfectly "elastic." See R. 
BREALEY & S. MYERS, supra note 22, at 278-79 (stocks should be perfect substitutes, and de-
mand infinitely elastic); Scholes, supra, at 206-07 (concluding that demand for stocks is perfectly 
elastic). Obviously, perfectly elastic demand for stock is at odds with underwriters' belief that 
stock prices are not perfectly elastic and that changes in price produce only marginal, finite 
changes in demand. Empirical evidence also suggests that the demand curve for stocks may be 
downward-sloping. See Shleifer, Do Demand Curves/or Stocks Slope Down?, 41 J. FIN. 579, 588-
89 (1986) (citing empirical evidence of price elasticity). Theoretical support for the view that 
stock prices are not, in fact, perfectly elastic, and that different stocks are not perfect substitutes 
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correct, trading market prices can only signal a ceiling above which 
the seasoned issue's offering price should not rise; they do not neces-
sarily inform the underwriter of how much lower she must set the 
price to ensure the issue's success.213 Nevertheless, to the extent that 
efficient trading market prices help underwriters accurately price sea-
soned issues and to the extent that seasoned issue prices affect the allo-
cation of capital among the firms that use them, an informationally 
efficient stock market helps properly allocate capital.214 
c. The influence of trading market prices on the pricing of initial 
public offerings. In contrast to the case of a seasoned issue, the under-
writer for an initial public offering (IPO) must set a price at a time 
when, by definition, no public market for that particular stock ex-
ists. 215 There are reasons to suspect that the market prices of different 
stocks provide little guidance. Stock values are influenced by a host of 
different factors, many of which are unique to the corporation in ques-
tion. The underwriter setting IPO price must consider the size of the 
offering, the nature and prospects of the issuer's business, its assets and 
earnings, management expertise, and the markets in which it com-
petes.216 Because the factors relevant to equity pricing are numerous, 
and vary widely from corporation to corporation, the trading price of 
any particular outstanding issue may provide little or no information 
concerning the appropriate price of a different new issue.217 The ra-
tional underwriter pricing an initial public offering must judge the of-
fering on its own merits, and cannot set the offering price of a 
speculative new firm based on the price at which IBM is currently 
for each other in the mind of the investor, is found in recently developed economic models that 
assume investors have differing beliefs concerning the value of stocks. See infra notes 372-78 nnd 
accompanying text. 
213. Marginal trading in the seasoned-issuance context, by signaling a ceiling rather than a 
floor, appears to perform a mirror-image of its function in the control-change context. See infra 
notes 372-78 and accompanying text. 
214. Initial Public Offerings tend to be for much smaller amounts than seasoned issues. See 
supra note 183 and accompanying text. This fact suggests that the companies that make initial 
public offerings are smaller, more speculative ventures with shorter operating histories. If such 
firms find borrowing more difficult than large established corporations do, nnd lack the substan-
tial operating revenues of bigger firms, IPOs may be more allocatively significant than seasoned 
issues. See supra notes 183-96 and accompanying text. 
215~ The exact issuance price of the security and the proceeds to be received by the corpora-
tion from the underwriting syndicate is usually fixed on the last business day before the offering 
date "on the basis of general market conditions and preliminary expressions of interest by poten-
tial investors." M. HALLORAN, supra note 94, at 17. As a result, the issuer cannot observe the 
offering's performance in the marketplace until after the issue has already been sold to the under-
writer. Note, supra note 179, at 1389. 
216. See M. HALLORAN, supra note 94, at 15-17 (listing numerous factors underwriters must 
consider in setting price); Schneider, Mnnko & Kant, supra note 201, at 6 (same). 
217. Note, supra note 179, at 1390 (number of variables involved in pricing securities "makes 
it difficult to price securities by comparing them to each other''). 
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trading. These observations explain why underwriters find it much 
more difficult to price equity than debt, and why unseasoned equity is 
the most notoriously difficult to price of all securities.21s 
The principal fashion in which trading market prices seem to influ-
ence IPO prices is by providing information as to the typical price/ 
earnings (PIE) ratios prevailing in the marketplace.219 However, 
there are two reasons to doubt that reduced market efficiency would 
produce distorted PIE ratios which in turn would produce mispriced 
IPOs. First, to the extent that underwriters use PIE ratios as ball-
park measurements of macroeconomic factors, such as prevailing in-
terest rates or inflation expectations, that information is readily avail-
able elsewhere and the underwriter is unlikely to be misled by 
inefficient prices. 220 Second, PIE ratios are normally calculated by 
looking at several similar stocks, not' a single company.221 Conse-
quently, unless policies that allow inefficiency produce mispricing that 
is both widespread and uniform (so that all stocks are either under- or 
overpriced), such policies will not distort PIE ratios in a fashion that 
leads to IPO mispricing. 
Securities policies that allow the market to digest firm-specific in-
formation more slowly or incompletely seem unlikely to produce such 
wholesale inflation or deflation of market prices. For example, the 
prohibition on insider trading would not affect all stocks in the same 
218. See R. BREALEY & S. MYERS, supra note 22, at 306 (underwriters find it easiest to price 
seasoned issues and high-grade debt; pricing is most difficult for unseasoned issues, where there is 
very little guidance for the market value of the security); Note, supra note 179, at 1404 n.128 
(equity more difficult for underwriters to price than debt, because it is more complicated); see 
also Gordon & Kornhauser, supra note 1, at 821 (arguing against shelf registration for unsea-
soned issues on the ground that there is not enough information available to aid in setting an 
appropriate price). 
219. See M. HALLORAN, supra note 94, at 17 (for companies with an earnings record, price 
can be set on basis of similar PIE and other financial ratios for other firms "and on the basis of 
market conditions"); see also R. BREALEY & S. MYERS, supra note 22, at 57-58 (PIE ratios 
"sometimes" helpful in evaluating stocks "if you can find a traded firm that has the same profit-
ability, risks, and growth opportunities"). For the uses, and weakness, of PIE ratios for other 
firms in the appraisal context, see Seligman, supra note 27, at 851-54 (earnings ratios are only "a 
crude surrogate for market value"; any recent market price for that particular stock, no matter 
how limited the trading activity, will usually be superior). 
220. Professors Gilson and Kraakman recount the case of a video game manufacturer, 
Imagic, which had to lower its IPO price because a competitor, Atari, disclosed lower-than-
expected sales and earnings. This disclosure "caused a sharp drop in the stock prices of video 
game manufacturers and, presumably, the price at which the Imagic issue could be sold." Gilson 
& Kraakman, supra note 1, at 617 n.187. It seems likely that the Imagic underwriters were 
responding less to reduced prices of video stocks than to the obvious implications of Atari's 
disclosures - that the market for video games was flagging. See infra notes 327-43 and accom-
panying text for a discussion of the defects of any signaling argument. 
221. See M. HALLORAN, supra note 94, at 17 (underwriters setting prices look at ratios of 
similar "companies"). The smaller the sample of companies the underwriter looks at in evaluat-
ing typical PIE ratios, the more likely an instance of inefficient mispricing will affect that 
calculation. 
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fashion; where one. firm's "inside" information is good tidings, an-
other's may well be bad news. Policies that slow the market's incorpo-
ration of macroeconomic news, like a change in the prevailing interest 
rate, will affect all firms in the same fashion. But the production and 
disclosure of such macro information is a matter beyond the SEC's 
disclosure mandate.222 Consequently, the only SEC policies likely to 
harm the market's efficiency in incorporating such news would be poli-
cies that limit trading, such as the introduction of marketwide trading 
halts, or the elimination of index futures trading. Because trading pol-
icies only seem likely to slow the incorporation of information by a few 
hours or days, persisting distortions of PIE ratios that lead to substan-
tial IPO mispricing are unlikely.223 
3. The Likelihood of Mispricing Initial Public Offerings in an 
Efficient Market 
The observation that trading market prices provide little guidance 
to underwriters outside the seasoned issue context raises an interesting 
puzzle. If trading market prices are of little value in setting prices for 
the IPOs that comprise the majority of stock issues, how are such is-
sues priced?224 
Estimating the likely demand for an IPO is a notoriously difficult 
and unscientific business.225 Indeed, it is the custom to state in an IPO 
222. See supra note 94. 
223. While informational inefficiency seems unlikely to lead to widespread and uniform mis· 
pricing, other factors may produce markets that are, on the whole, over- or under-valued. A 
dearth of information concerning corporate issuers may produce marketwide underpricing if in· 
vestors who lack information assume the worst. Judge Easterbrook and Professor Fischel have 
persuasively argued that effective anti-fraud provisions will do much to ameliorate such investor 
pessimism. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 91, at 673-74, 680-85 (describing and rebutting 
"market for lemons" argument). Moreover, although lack of information may lead to mispriced 
securities, that is not due to informational inefficiency per se; the question of market efficiency 
generally relates only to how quickly information is incorporated into price, not to the amount of 
information incorporated. Cf supra notes 28 & 36; infra note 433. 
Another possible source of marketwide mispricing is the "irrational" m~rket. Many believe 
the stock market has succumbed, on occasion, to speculative "bull" markets followed by precipi· 
tous market corrections. Such wholesale mispricing is not due to informational inefficiency, in 
the sense that markets do not quickly incorporate information, but to market prices incorporat· 
ing the wrong sort of information - the mass market psyche, rather than rational earnings 
expectations. See infra notes 407-19 and accompanying text. In such a market, inflated PIE 
ratios may indeed serve investment bankers trying to price new issues as a barometer of investor 
"bullishness" or "bearishness" unrelated to objective economic conditions. However, the result-
ing inflated new issues prices cannot be attributed to lack of efficiency. The problem is one of 
market irrationality. 
224. The importance of the question is heightened by the suspicion that underwriter pricing 
of initial public offerings may be more likely to influence the real investment decisions of corpora-
tions than seasoned issue mispricing. See supra note 214. 
225. See R. BREALEY & S. MYERS, supra note 22, at 306 (underwriters have "very little 
guidance" in setting prices for unseasoned stock); Note, supra note 179, at 1390, 1404 (estimating 
market-clearing price of new issues "very difficult" and "complicated"). See also Peil v. Speiser, 
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prospectus that offering price has been determined "arbitrarily."226 
Comparing other stocks' prices is of limited value because the new 
firm must be evaluated in terms of its own unique assets, operating 
history, management quality, product market, and so on.227 Faced 
with a dearth of hard information, underwriters making their best 
guess of likely market-clearing price generally rely on informal polling 
of potential customers for indications of interest.228 
a. Empirical evidence of !PO mispricing. If IPO prices are under-
writer "guesstimates" based on soft information and speculation, it 
follows that underwriters are likely to misjudge investor interest and 
set ex ante IPO prices that differ from the ex post equilibrium price in 
the trading markets. One way to test this hypothesis is to compare the 
announced offering prices of IPOs with the "aftermarket" prices at 
which the newly issued shares trade in the public markets. Empirical 
studies confirm that underwriters systematically fail to set offering 
prices which conform to eventual equilibrium market-clearing 
prices.229 
Professor Ibbotson has described the differences between initial 
public offering prices and prices immediately following the beginning 
of distribution as "an extremely skewed and disperse distribution" 
with a standard deviation of 35.2%.230 This is 50% more variation in 
a two-week period (on average) than the stock market shows in an 
entire year.231 Out of Ibbotson's sample of 112 IPOs, nearly a quarter 
had lost more than 10% of their value by the close of the month in 
which distribution began;232 just over a quarter had gained more than 
25%.233 
806 F.2d 1154, 1161 n.10 (3d Cir. 1986) (fraud-on-the-market theory of reliance under rule lOb-5 
rests on assumption that market price reacts to and reflects all available information; this as-
sumption may not apply to newly issued stock, and applicability of fraud-on-the market to new-
issues cases is unclear). 
226. Schneider, supra note 96, at 297. Another common phrase is that price has been deter-
mined by "negotiations" between the issuer and underwriter. Id. at 297 n.109. 
227. See supra notes 216-18 and accompanying text. 
228. L. SODERQUisr, supra note 211, at 36; Banoff, supra note 38, at 151; Note, supra note 
179, at 1390. Client expressions of interest cannot be more than "informal" as federal law pro-
hibits the making of formal agreements to purchase or sell before the registration statement has 
become effective, an event that usually occurs the day that public distribution begins. Banoff, 
supra, at 145 n.81. 
229. See Brandi, supra note 206, at 699-700 (summarizing research findings); Ibbotson, supra 
note 206, at 235-36 (same). 
230. Ibbotson, supra note 206, at 250 (measuring difference between offering price and trad-
ing market prices reported at the close of the month in which distribution began). 
231. See R. BREALEY & S. MYERS, supra note 22, at 123 (between 1926 and 1981, annual 
standard deviation of common stock portfolio was 21.9%). 
232. See Ibbotson, supra note 206, at 248 (fable 8) (table of sorted residuals). 
233. Id. See Beatty & Ritter, Investment Banking, Reputation, and the Underpricing of Ini-
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Some of this underwriter error may be due to insufficient informa-
tion concerning the new company.234 Private companies generally are 
not subject to federal disclosure requirements or the scrutiny of finan-
cial analysts, and it may be more difficult for underwriters to investi-
gate such firms thoroughly.235 Accurate IPO pricing might be served 
by developing additional ways for underwriters to gather information 
cheaply concerning the issuing corporation and the likely market for 
the issue. 236 But there are reasons to believe that simple lack of infor-
mation cannot explain all of the mispricing phenomenon. For one 
tial Public Offerings, 15 J. FIN. EcoN. 213, 217 n.6 (1986) ("not unusual to see an underwriter 
misestimate the aftermarket price by 20 percent or more"). These statistics may understate the 
inaccuracy of offering price because aftermarket price in the month or two following the distribu-
tion may often be artificially manipulated to resemble offering price through the "stabilization" 
purchases of underwriters. See infra note 217. 
234. See Levmore, supra note 32, at 662 (underwriters bidding for new issues face "substan-
tial search costs" in evaluating worth of shares, and it is "quite likely that no single underwriter 
will expend sufficient resources to uncover such information"). 
235. Privately held companies are not subject to the federal disclosure requirements of the 
1934 Act. See supra note 94; Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 12(a), 12(g), 13, 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 78/ (a), 78/ (g), 78m (disclosure requirements apply only to corporations with stock traded on 
registered public exchange, or with assets of a certain value and stock held by more than 500 
shareholders). Also, as professional analysts study only a small portion of listed, publicly held 
companies, they are still less likely to focus much attention on private companies making IPOs. 
See Coffee, supra note 5, at 731 (only 1,000 of existing 10,000 publicly held companies that file 
reports under 1934 Act are regularly followed by securities analysts). Underwriter mispricing 
cannot be explained by the fact that companies making IPOs tend to be smaller and have shorter 
operating histories than publicly held companies, so that their futures are more speculative. Un-
derwriters ought to be able to discount the stock's price to reflect its speculative nature just as 
well as the public does. Underwriter mispricing that manifests itself in the form of significant 
differences between issuance price and the prices set in the aftermarket only hours or days later 
cannot be attributed to human lack of foreknowledge. This observation follows because it is 
unlikely that aftermarket prices reflect new information unavailable to underwriters at the time 
price was set. 
236. IPO mispricing seems especially regrettable when we consider that IPOs account for the 
majority of public stock issues, see supra note 182 and accompanying text, and that IPOs may be 
more allocatively significant than seasoned issues, see supra note 214. Policymakers hoping to 
improve the allocation of capital among corporations may do better to pursue informational 
efficiency in the IPO underwriting market than in the trading markets. One fashion in which 
issuers and underwriters could obtain additional information to help them price IPOs more accu-
rately would be to lengthen the distribution period in order to allow an aftermarket to develop, 
and to sell IPOs at "at-the-market" prices. Limited use of such delayed distributions for sea-
soned issues is authorized under the Rule 415 "at-the-market" shelf registration provision. See 
Fox, supra note 5, at 1005. Of course, in the case of firm-commitment underwriting, delayed 
distribution still poses no allocative benefits because the issuing corporation has, in effect, already 
sold the entire issue and subsequent changes in price redound only to the benefit or detriment of 
the underwriters. See Banoff, supra note 38, at 148-49 (approximately one half of equity sold 
through shelf registration is "bought deal" where underwriter purchases entire issue); Gordon & 
. Kornhauser, supra note l, at 822 (most popular shelf registration technique is bought deal). But 
in the case of "best-efforts" underwriting, delayed distribution at the market price might enable 
issuers to alter the price of the securities to reflect new information concerning the public mar-
ket's response. Unfortunately, federal law compounds the problems of IPO mispricing and un-
derpricing by prohibiting delayed sales ofIPOs. At-the-market, shelf-registered delayed offerings 
are restricted to seasoned equity issues by large corporations. See Banoff, supra note 38, at 143 
(shelf-registered at-the-market offering restricted to S-3 filing corporations); Gordon & Korn-
hauser, supra note l, at 822 (at-the-market offerings limited to seasoned issues). 
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thing, the evidence indicates the error is not random. While instances 
of overpricing are common, studies of new issue pricing conclude that, 
on average, underwriters underprice new issues.237 For example, Ib-
botson found that the IPO investor enjoys an average 11.4% increase 
in the value of his stock by the end of the first month of trading, and 
an average 7.6% increase in the second month.238 Other studies have 
found average increases of up to 41.7% in the first month of 
trading. 239 
If the underwriting business were a competitive one, corporations 
presumably would choose the underwriting syndicate willing to pay 
the highest possible price for a new issue. Underwriters competing for 
the highest bid would err, .if at all, by overpricing - the proverbial 
winner's curse.240 Why, then, the "now familiar puzzle" of underpric-
ing?241 Why the anecdotal accounts of "hot issue" markets in which 
the demand for new issues far outstrips the number of shares available, 
and aftermarket prices soar above offering prices? 242 
b. /PO market imperfections resulting from the nature of under-
writer compensation and the influence of federal law. One plausible 
explanation for IPO underpricing is that it is the natural result of mar-
ket imperfections arising from the form of underwriters' fees and the 
requirements of federal law. Issuers usually compensate underwriters 
by the "spread" between the discount price the underwriting syndicate 
pays the corporation for the stock, and the offering price at which 
underwriters sell the issue to the public.243 Because federal law pro-
237. See Beatty & Ritter, supra note 233, at 214-15 (on average new issue prices increase, but 
"a large fraction" of new issues suffer price declines); Brandi, supra note 229, at 699-700 (sum-
marizing studies showing average excess returns in first month from 3.36% to 41.7%); Ibbotson, 
supra note 206, at 235-37, 262 (empirical study concludes that "positive initial performance can 
only be attributed to a downward bias in the offering price"). The result is that the lucky inves-
tor who can regularly purchase new issues at the public offering price will discover that they 
bring a risk-adjusted return significantly exceeding that of a market portfolio. Not surprisingly, 
many new issues are oversubscribed and there is evidence that underwriters ration "hot" issues 
and tend to shunt them to favored clients. See infra note 315; Ibbotson, supra note 206, at 265 
n.22. 
238. Ibbotson, supra note 206, at 246, 250. 
239. Brandi, supra note 206, at 699. 
240. In an auction market of bidders with different expectations of value, the participant with 
the most optimistic - perhaps overoptimistic - view will win. Hence the observation that 
auction markets are likely to lead to overinflated prices, except perhaps where bidders are repeat 
participants who either learn to avoid overpaying or are "weeded out." See Hiler, supra note 49, 
at 1192 n.328. 
241. Levmore, supra note 32, at 657. 
242. See D. RATNER, SECURITIES REGULATION 471-86 (3d ed. 1986) (materials describing 
"hot issues" problem). The exception to the rule of new issues underpricing is the case of the 
extremely speculative "penny" stock. See infra note 386. 
243. See In re National Assn. of Sec. Dealers, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 17,371 [1980 
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 11 82,705, at 83,850 (Dec. 12, 1980) (underwriter 
compensation is gross spread). In the case of firm-commitment underwriting, the underwriters 
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hibits adjusting the offering price once distribution has begun, under-
writers bear the risk that an overpriced issue may not sell out and that 
they will be left "holding the bag" of shares the public does not care to 
purchase. 244 On the margin, underwriters maximize compensation by 
ensuring that all the shares sell rather than trying to set the highest 
possible price ex ante. 245 Underwriters thus can be expected to err on 
the side of underpricing,246 which helps ensure that all the shares sell 
quickly and they receive the spread on the entire issue.247 
agree to pay a fixed amount for the issue and the corporation is effectively insulated from any 
change in market price for the securities. Even if the underwriters themselves were unable to sell 
a single share to the public, the corporation's capital is secured. See supra note 210. 
In the case of best-efforts underwriting, the amount of money to be received by the corpora-
tion will be determined by the percentage of shares sold. Best-efforts underwriters are also gener-
ally compensated by spread, although the underwriter does not bear the risk of unsold shares. 
See supra note 209. 
244. Federal law requires issuers and underwriters to file a registration statement with the 
SEC and to wait until that filing becomes effective before selling securities to the public. Securi-
ties Act of 1933, § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77(e) (1982). The registration statement must include disclo-
sure of the public offering price. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.501(c)(7) (1987). Public sale at any other 
price renders the registration misleading and the sale in violation of law. See Securities Act of 
1933, § 17, 15 U.S.C. § 77(q) (1982); see also Banoff, supra note 38, at 150 ("[T]he terms of the 
[traditional underwritten] offering are generally fixed once the registration statement becomes 
effective and [price] cannot be adjusted to meet shifting market demands."); Levmore, supra note 
32, at 660 n.50 (presumed illegality of changing offering price). The typical underwriting agree-
ment also binds underwriters and selected dealers from selling to the public at any price other 
than the selected offering price. Banoff, supra note 38, at 163 n.141. NASD regulations similarly 
require underwriters to sell at the stated offering price. R. BREALEY & S. MYERS, supra note 22, 
at 305; Ibbotson, supra note 206, at 262-63. The result is that federal disclosure requirements 
and private contractual arrangements prohibit underwriters from adjusting the price of a new 
issue to reflect the market's reaction once sale of the stock to the public has begun. 
Such a fixed-price system poses problems for pricing seasoned issues as well as initial public 
offerings. Underwriters who correctly price a seasoned issue at the outset of the distribution are 
precluded by federal law from subsequently adjusting the offering price to reflect new informa· 
tion or the public market's reaction. The result is that underwriters are under great pressure to 
complete distribution of the issue as quickly as possible, before "market conditions" change. L. 
SODERQUIST, supra note 211, at 27. 
245. Limited room is left for underwriters to respond to market conditions not by altering 
price but by altering quantity. Underwriting agreements may contain "overallotment" provi-
sions that require issuers to issue, and entitle underwriters to sell, up to ten percent more stock 
than the original underwriting agreement calls for. Schneider, Manko & Kant, supra note 201, at 
25. 
246. Banoff, supra note 38, at 152 n.82 (underwriters have incentive to underprice to avoid 
risk security will not sell); Brandi, supra note 206, at 700 (underwriters may use underpricing 
strategy to ensure sale); Ibbotson, supra note 206, at 262 ("The primary legal requirement that 
could [explain underpricing] is the constraint that new issues must be offered at a fixed price."); 
Note, supra note 179, at 1390 (firm-commitment underwriters bear risk issue may not sell, but 
commission system precludes them capturing all the economic gain from raising price, with re-
sult that underwriters have incentive to underprice). Another hypothesis raised in explanation of 
underpricing is that, because the investing public knows that underwriters ration underpriccd 
"hot issues" and direct them to favored clients, underwriters must underprice overall in order to 
induce the public to buy new issues. See Rock, Why New Issues Are Underpriced, 15 J. FIN. 
EcoN. 187 passim (1986). The problem with this hypothesis is that it does not explain why 
underwriters are so eager to subsidize favored clients at the risk of alienating the issuers whose 
offerings are underpriced. 
247. The result is that federal law, by requiring new issues to be distributed at a fixed price, 
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c. IPO market imperfections resulting from the separation of own-
ership and control in the corporation. That underwriters have an in-
centive to underprice cannot, alone, answer the puzzle of persistent 
new issue mispricing. If corporate management viewed stock prices as 
crucial to the firm's ability to raise capital, underwriting firms that 
underprice would lose business to firms that do not.248 One explana-
tion for corporate management's tolerance of habitual underpricing is 
that, while management plans to raise money by making an equity 
issue, they are relatively unconcerned with the price at which those 
funds are obtained. Such behavior seems irrational at first glance. But 
that attitude becomes more un_derstandable when one recognizes the 
transaction costs and political consequences associated with equity is-
sues and the fact that management's personal interests in making an 
IPO may differ from the interests· of shareholders. 249 
When a corporation first contemplates an initial public offering it 
may have only a vague idea of what price its stock will command, or 
whether the offering will be successful.250 But it can be certain that 
the costs of the undertaking will be substantial. Underwriters' fees 
alone siphon off 7% to 10% of the proceeds.251 There are other ex-
penses as well, including fees for accounting and legal advice, financial 
printing, and possibly indemnity insurance.252 Total expenses for un-
derwritten equity run as high as 15%.253 Given such hefty transaction 
contributes to inefficiency in the market for underwriting corporate issues - a market with far 
more direct allocative impact th~ the trading markets where efficiency is normally pursued. 
248. See Levmore, supra note 32, at 658 (questioning why issuers tolerate underpricing). 
249. The consequences of separating ownership of the corporation (which rests with the 
shareholders) from control (which rests with management, whose personal interests may well 
differ from shareholders') was first explored thoroughly in the classic work on the modern corpo-
ration, A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CoRPORATlON AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932). 
As agents, corporate management faces conflicts between their own self-interest and their share-
holders' interests. When management pursues self-interest to the detriment of shareholders it 
reduces shareholders' returns, imposing "agency costs." See generally Fama, Agency Problems 
and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. EcoN. 288 (1980); Jensen & Meckling, Theory of the Firm: 
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. EcoN. 305 (1976). We 
rely on the market for management, product market, credit market, and market for corporate 
control to police these and other management failings. See L. LoWENSTEIN, supra note 129, at 
96; Coffee, supra note 153, at 1154-55; Fischel, supra note 160, at 8-9. 
250. See W. BAUMOL, supra note 25, at 75; M. HALLORAN, supra note 94, at 17, 20 (most 
underwriters will not state a price during negotiations with issuer but rather suggest a range; 
price is not fixed until close of business on last day before public offer begins; not unusual for 
offering to be postponed or cancelled if conditions change); Schneider, Manko & Kant, supra 
note 201, at 24-25 (The uncertainty of offering size or success is a risk borne by the issuer during 
- the waiting period. As a result, the issuer incurs "very substantial expenses with no assurance 
that the offering will take place."). 
251. M. HALLORAN, supra note 94, at ,24; Schneider, Manko & Kant, supra note 201, at 29. 
252. M. HALLORAN, supra note 94, at 24-25; Schneider, Manko & Kant, supra note 201, at 
29-33. 
253. See R. BREALEY & S. MYERS, supra note 22, at 303 (Table 15-1). In addition to the 
expense of meeting disclosure requirements under the 1933 Act, a corporation going public can 
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costs, it is not surprising that the corporate culture regards equity as 
one of the most expensive means of raising capital.254 
Moreover, the political consequences of going public are so grave it 
would be foolish for management publicly to distribute stock simply to 
raise funds at a slightly lower rate. Publicly held companies are sub-
ject to costly federal disclosure requirements and restrictions on in-
sider transactions inapplicable to the private firm. 255 Management 
also faces the specter of losing control through a proxy battle, public 
stock purchases, or tender offer.256 These observations imperil the 
view that corporations issue stock simply to raise investment capital 
more cheaply than by borrowing or relying on operating revenues.257 
Perhaps most significantly, anecdotal evidence suggests that man-
agement regards an initial public offering as "successful" if the price of 
the issue in the afteimarket rises substantially above the offering 
price.258 Such satisfaction is hardly rational if the corporation issues 
expect continuously to incur similar costs of complying with continuing disclosure mandated 
under the 1934 Act. See supra note 94; see also s. PHILLIPS & J. ZECHER, THE SEC AND THE 
PUBLIC INTEREST 51 (1981); M. HALLORAN, supra note 94, at 3, 50-52 (descpbing continuous 
reporting requirements as disadvantage of going public). 
254. Sees. FRIEDLAND, THE EcONOMICS OF CORPORATE FINANCE 228 (1966) (common 
stock is probably the "most expensive" source of raising capital). See also Myers, The Capital 
Structure Puzzle, 39 J. FIN. 575, 581-82, 589 (1984) ("pecking order" theory of corporate finance 
in which issuers prefer internal sources to external and debt to equity). Another "cost" of public 
stock issuances is exposure to liability under the 1933 and 1934 Acts for misleading disclosures. 
See M. Fox, supra note 27, at 138. 
255. See supra note 94 (disclosure requirements); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 16, 15 
U.S.C: § 78 (p) (1982) (insider stock transactions). 
256. See M. HALLORAN, supra note 94, at 4 (possible loss of control is a disadvantage of 
going public); Schneider, Manko & Kant, supra note 201, at 5 (same). Other disadvantages 
attendant on going public include: increased shareholder oversight of management's compensa-
tion, perquisites, and business decisions; dilution of equity values; management's possible preoc-
cupation with stock price changes rather than true profits; resources devoted to shareholder 
relations; and the need to readjust dividend policy to reflect desires of other shareholders. See W. 
BAUMOL, supra note 25, at 74-76 (explanations for reluctance to issue equity); M. HALLORAN, 
supra note 94, at 4-5 (disadvantages of public issue); Schneider, Manko & Kant, supra note 201, 
at 4-5 (same). 
257. Similar considerations may operate in the case of seasoned issues, which also carry 
political consequences. In selling stock on the public market, the corporation is selling control 
(in the form of voting shares) to unknown persons who may at some future time disagree with, 
and pose a threat to, management's interest. Also, existing shareholders may perceive an issu-
ance of new shares as a negative event that dilutes the voting strength of their own holdings or 
the value of their shares. See W. BAUMOL, supra note 25, at 74 (new issues can dilute equity, 
harming present shareholders); Schneider, Manko & Kant, supra note 201, at 5 (subsequent is-
sues of additional seasoned stock dilutes original shareholder's holdings). Finally, investors may 
perceive seasoned issues as a negative signal of the firm's financial prospects. This perception 
may explain why announcements that a seasoned issue is planned generally are followed by a 
decline in the price of already-outstanding stocks. See Asquith & Mullins, Equity Issues and 
Offering Dilution, 15 J. FIN. EcoN. 61, 85-87 (1986) (announcing seasoned equity offering 
reduces stock prices by approximately 3%); Smith, supra note 179, at 4 (announcing common 
stock sale depresses price). 
258. See, e.g., R. BREALEY & S. MYERS, supra note 22, at 306-07 (citing example where 
issuer praised underwriter, suggesting that $15 issue price may have helped stock price rise to 
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stock to obtain investment capital as inexpensively as possible. It is 
quite rational, however, if management is issuing stock for reasons 
other than simply raising capital cheaply. The advantages to going 
public include the status and prestige of listing, the creation of a public 
market for insiders' shares, and enhanced ability to acquire other busi-
nesses for shares instead of cash.259 These motives may predominate 
over any desire to obtain funds at a low price relative to other sources 
of funding. In such a case, management may be tempted to serve its 
self-interest and underprice, thus tempering the danger of passing vot-
ing shares into strangers' hands by ensuring that these new sharehold-
ers will be pleased with their investment's performance - and with 
management's.260 
The possibility that management views stock issuances in this fash-
ion poses an answer to issuer tolerance of underpricing. It also sug-
gests that while any stock issue brings additional investment capital to 
the corporation, the price at which new stock may be sold and the 
implied cost of that new equity capital may play only a weak role in 
management's decision to make an issue. In other words, in those rare 
circumstances where the corporation raises capital by issuing equity, 
management may be relatively indifferent to the possibility that shares 
worth $10 might be underpriced by underwriters at $8, or overpriced 
at $12. The result is that issuers countenance new issue mispricing 
and underpricing, and underwriters lack any incentive to correct it. 261 
d. !PO mispricing and the corporation's cost of equity capital. The 
capital-allocation theory asserts that in a perfectly efficient market all 
stocks are correctly priced, so that all firms face the same cost of eq-
uity capital. Companies with better earnings sell their shares at more 
$50 in aftermarket, and observing that "[c]ontentment at selling an article for one-third of its 
ultimate worth is a rare quality"); M. HALLORAN, supra note 94, at 17 (suggesting that "it is not 
necessarily advantageous for the company's stock to be sold for the highest possible price"); 
Schneider, Manko & Kant, supra note 201, at 7-8 (issuer should select underwriters whose prior 
issues show good aftermarket performance; not necessarily wise to issue at highest possible 
price). 
259. See M. HALLORAN, supra note 94, at - (listing advantages of going public; new capital 
is only one of four); Schneider, Manko and Kant, supra note 201, at 3-5 (increasing working 
capital is only one of the seven reasons listed for going public). 
260. See M. HALLORAN, supra note 94, at 12-13 (suggesting that issuer should select under-
writer who can assure "good price performance" of shares after issuance and place securities 
with investors to avoid large blocks of shares coming into the hands of persons or institutions 
who might try to oust management); Ibbotson, supra note 206, at 264 (underpricing new issues 
may serve underwriters and issuers as a form of insurance against investor lawsuits). See also 
infra note 270; Dent, Unprofitable Mergers: Toward a Market-Based Legal Response, 80 Nw. U. 
L. REV. 777, 782 (1986) (when management publicly issues stock, it may not care about under-
pricing because the loss falls on existing shareholders). 
261. See Levmore, supra note 32, at 665-67 (recommending underwriting agreements that tie 
underwriter compensation to accurate pricing). 
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favorable prices and receive proportionately more funding than com-
panies that do poorly. Private savings are allocated by Adam Smith's 
"invisible hand" to the firms likely to use them most productively. 
Society achieves, without the expenditure of thought or effort, the best 
of all possible economic worlds. 
But reality departs from theory. Underwriter mispricing of new 
issues means that corporations going public may face wildly differing 
costs of equity capital; some firms sell stock at steep discounts while 
others raise funds at bargain basement rates. Any resulting misalloca-
tions are not due to inefficiency in trading market prices, but to defects 
in the IPO underwriting market.262 
To speak of efficient stock markets optimally allocating capital 
under these circumstances is, to say the least, a bit nearsighted.263 
Policies that promote efficient trading markets may help underwriters 
set more accurate prices for seasoned distributions, but trading market 
prices appear to give little guidance to an underwriting market that 
persistently misprices and underprices the IPOs that account for 70% 
of public equity issues.264 It is a paradox that the current regulatory 
system actively promotes trading market efficiency while neglecting 
the problem of new issue mispricing and, indeed, contributing to it 
through SEC rules that require new issues to be distributed at fixed 
prices.265 If capital allocation is truly the stock market's most impor-
tant economic function, this policy is the equivalent of frantically 
working to save the bath water while the baby goes unnoticed.266 At-
262. See supra notes 243-61 and accompanying text. 
263. A few commentators have addressed the pricing imperfections of the new issues market, 
but none appear to have thought out the implications of this reality for the sensibility of adopting 
efficient trading markets as a goal. See, e.g., Banoff, supra note 38; Note, supra note 179. 
264. See supra note 182. 
265. See supra notes 244, 247. The SEC's "stabilization" provisions add insult to efficiency 
injury: If the market price of an issue declines following the start of distribution underwriters 
may buy back shares in the public trading market in the hope that this artificial increase in 
demand will prevent any further decline. In other words, while issuers and underwriters may 
not alter issue price fo reflect new information or aftermarket performance, they are permitted to 
manipulate the market price to conform to the incorrect issue price! This sort of dog-wagging is 
authorized by Rules lOb-6 and lOb-7, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.lOb-6, 240.lOb-7 (1987), which allow 
underwriters to buy back shares and support sagging prices that threaten the "orderliness" of a 
distribution. Such manipulative transactions for the purpose of influencing market price are nor-
mally prohibited by federal law. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 9, 15 U.S.C. § 78(i) 
(1982). 
266. We have a regulatory paradox. Current policy promotes efficient pricing in the ex-
change and over-the-counter markets, relying on the supposed capital allocation benefits that 
follow. Yet in the market that most directly allocates capital to corporations - the market for 
underwriting new issues - our regulatory scheme not only tolerates persistent mispricing of 
initial public offerings but exacerbates it. Expanded use of the Rule 415 "shelf-registration" 
provision, allowing "at-the-market" shelf offering, might ameliorate some of this mispricing were 
the Rule not so restricted in its application, and were issuers not so apparently uninterested in 
taking advantage of the opportunity it presents. See supra note 236; Banoff, supra note 38, at 144 
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taining pricing efficiency in the market for underwriting new issues 
must be emphasized over achieving efficiency in the trading 
markets.267 
4. The Limited Misallocative Consequences 
of Corporate Issues Mispricing 
However, there are reasons to question whether it is worthwhile to 
sacrifice other policies to advance the efficiency of either the under-
writing or trading markets. Economic theory suggests that even if 
corporate issues mispricing causes substantial capital to be misallo-
cated, the economic losses resulting from such misallocation may be 
limited in scope. This is true whether corporate issues mispricing re-
sults from an inefficient trading market distorting seasoned issue prices 
or from an imperfect IPO underwriting market di~torting new issue 
prices. 
The point is most obvious in the case of the firm whose stock is 
inefficiently undervalued; Such a corporation can tum to other 
sources for the capital necessaf¥ to finance revenue-producing 
projects.268 More established firms can finance projects from operat-
ing revenues. A truly promising project can always find backers in the 
private placement or corporate borrowing markets (though perhaps at 
a higher cost).269 As a result, only the most marginal projects at the 
most marginal firms are likely to fail for lack of funding. 270 
(issuers make limited use of shelf registration for equity, and at-the-market equity is especially 
rare). · 
267. See supra notes 236, 247. 
268. See Levmore, supra note 32, at 661-62 (positing that a firm that fails to raise sufficient 
funds in a public offering will turn to commercial lenders or make another offering at a lower 
price). 
269. See Planned Offerings of Firms Are Victims of Market Fall, Wall St. J., Oct. 21, 1987, at 
27, col. 5 (after market crash of October 19, 1987, many corporations planning initial public 
offerings scuttled their plans because of poor market conditions; these actions did not affect the 
development plans of most of the firms involved as they could turn to other sources of funding). 
270. Rational corporate management ranks potential projects in order of expected returns, 
with the most profitable projects ranked above those less so. See generally R. BREALEY & S. 
MYERS, supra note 22, at 10-22, 69-108, 408-24. Projects are then undertaken in their order of 
priority, so long as expected revenue of the project (R1 ) continues to exceed the return that could 
be achieved by individual shareholders (R'h). If the firm cannot raise enough money on its own 
to undertake all revenue-positive projects but must seek financing elsewhere, an inflated cost of 
capital due to inefficient stock underpricing does not change the firm's investment priorities (all 
projects where R' > R'h, in descending order of returns) but may limit its ability to pursue those 
last few projects at the margin that still have revenue-positive returns. 
The above analysis ignores, of course, the fact that the corporation is not really "borrowing" 
at any particular rate. It is simply selling pieces of paper which can be produced at little or no 
direct cost, and receiving money in return. If a firm identifies a project with a higher return than 
its shareholders can achieve for themselves, it "can always raise money by the sale of shares so 
long as it sets the price sufficiently low." R. BREALEY & S. MYERS, supra note 22, at 292. Such 
financing techniques may be unpopular with the original shareholders if the sale of stock to 
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The mirror image of this problem is the firm whose stock is over-
valued by the market. Selling equity at grossly inflated prices allows 
overvalued firms to raise funds more cheaply than other, perhaps more 
promising, businesses which lack this advantage.271 The high transac-
tion costs of issuing equity, as well as empirical evidence that under-
writer error tends toward undervaluation, may lead us to conclude 
that misallocations from inefficient overpricing are rarer than misallo-
cations from underpricing.272 But if a firm does raise bargain-base-
ment capital by selling inefficiently overpriced stock, those excess 
funds are unlikely to be wasted in unproductive projects. 
Substantial waste is unlikely because a corporation deciding 
whether to invest in a project will do so only if the expected revenue 
from the project exceeds that which the shareholders could achieve if 
they invested the money themselves. Otherwise, the shareholders are 
others at bargain basement prices dilutes their proportionate stake in the revenues that result: 
but so long as the venture produces sufficient revenue it may be undertaken. See Dent, supra 
note 259, at 782 (If management sells underpriced stock, loss is borne by existing shareholders.). 
Indeed, if the project is so profitable that the additional revenues can be expected to more than 
make up for any dilution of the original shareholders' interest, all parties will be better off. W. 
BAUMOL, supra note 25, at 74 (dilution of present shareholders' equity by underpricing new issue 
does not harm present shareholders so long as funds are invested in project with rate of return 
that exceeds implicit cost of new equity). 
271. Fox, supra note 5, at 1017 (if stock overvalued, J corporation likely to finance project by 
selling shares rather than other sources); see Barry, supra note 5, at 1317 (Increasing the price of 
securities reduces the costs of capital because the corporation "will rarely pay more for alterna-
tive sources."). 
272. See supra text accompanying note 237. Misallocations from overpricing may be more 
likely if corporate management, recognizing overpricing, takes steps to issue stock that it other-
wise would not issue. But such a scenario seems doubtful. First, the high transactions costs and 
political consequences of issuing equity suggest that a firm's stock would have to be very over-
valued indeed to tempt the corporation to issue equity simply to take advantage of an opportu-
nity for cheap financing. See supra notes 250-56 and accompanying text (discussing political 
consequences and costs of going public). Seasoned issues also carry political consequences. See 
supra note 257. Underwriting fees and transactions costs associated with both seasoned and 
unseasoned issues are high, and during the time it takes to prepare an offering, the issuer faces 
the risk that macroeconomic conditions or the corporation's circumstances will so change that a 
significant revision in the offering price will be required. Second, corporate management will not 
take advantage of the opportunity to raise capital cheaply by selling overpriced stock unless they 
both perceive that the market is overpriced, and expect that the inefficient overpricing will persist 
long enough to take advantage of it. In the case of an initial public offering, prior to the offering 
there is no public market for the corporation's shares. It is difficult indeed for management to 
recognize market overpricing in the absence of a market. Management of a privately held corpo-
ration may believe that the corporation can sell equity at inflated prices if they perceive a "hot" 
bull market in which virtually any form of equity can be sold at a premium price. But such 
market-wide mispricing is far less likely to be the result of inefficiency in incorporating informa-
tion into the market, than of investor psychology that leads prices to incorporate the wrong sort 
of information. See supra note 223 and accompanying text. 
In addition, in the case of both new and seasoned issues, obtaining an underwriter and pre-
paring the registration statement can require weeks or months of work before the issue is brought 
to market. Few of the sources of inefficiency most commonly mentioned (such as the 
nonincorporation of inside information through insider trading or the nondisclosure of soft infor-
mation) seem of a sort which management can rely on to persist for so long a period. See supra 
text accompanying notes 91-92. 
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better off if the corporation simply passes the money along directly in 
the form of dividends.273 If a firm sells overvalued shares, the money 
so gathered from new shareholders should be passed along in the form 
of dividends to the old shareholders. Such a transaction has wealth-
transfer effects but, apart from the transaction costs incurred, no allo-
cational significance. 
Alternatively, self-aggrandizing management may prefer to retain 
control over excess cash rather than passing it along as dividends. 274 
However, management will still invest the money in some fashion that 
brings a positive return, possibly by expanding existing business lines 
or acquiring another, more productive, firm. While such projects may 
produce slightly lower rates of return than shareholders could achieve 
for themselves, they are nevertheless revenue-positive. 
The point is that capital misallocations do not result in the com-
plete loss or destruction of the misallocated funds. If the market inef-
ficiently undervalues a particular firm's stock, investors who have 
bought the stock "too cheaply" may put their unspent money into 
banks or insurance companies which, in tum, lend to the corporation 
through a loan or private placement. Or they may purchase stock in a 
second, overvalued firm, which then uses their funds to "invest" in the 
undervalued firm by acquiring it. Rates of return, like water, seem to 
seek their own level, and if an inefficient stock market fails to allocate 
investment capital to its most productive uses directly, the money 
may arrive there indirectly. We can expect to incur marginal losses in 
the process, in the form of increased transaction costs or slightly lower 
273. This argument is derived from Miller and Modigliani's famous proposition that in a 
perfect capital market, a firm's dividend policy is independent of its capital structure. See gener-
ally R. BREALEY & S. MYERS, supra note 22, at 331-40. It suggests that if corporate manage-
ment acts rationally and in the best ·interests of shareholders, they will invest in corporate 
projects only so long as the rates of return exceed those achievable by shareholders themselves. 
Excess funds are returned as dividends. See M. Fox, supra note 27, at 21, 122-27 (management 
ranks projects by rate of return and should not invest if return falls below shareholders' potential 
outside return); Fox, supra note 5, at 1016 n.36 (noting "theoretical" argument that overpriced 
shares will not affect management's decision to undertake a project and that management will 
return excess funds raised in offering as dividends, but suggesting that "[t]here is little evidence, 
however, that corporations behave this way"). 
274. Fox suggests that such behavior is rational for management that wishes to maximize 
their compensation, perquisites, and authority. Such management will pay dividends only grudg-
ingly, investing corporate funds in projects that produce returns below shareholders' to the ex-
tent this action can be taken without incurring shareholder wrath or a possible takeover bid. M. 
Fox, supra note 27, at 123, 126-27. See infra notes 327-43, 361-68 and accompanying text (man-
agerial signaling and market for control theories). Of course, such losses are primarily the result 
of agency costs resulting from the separation of ownership and control of the corporation, rather 
than the consequence of market inefficiency. See supra note 249 (agency costs). They will be 
incurred whether management collects excess funds from retained earnings or from a new stock 
issue. 
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rates of return. But unless those losses are large, they may not justify 
spending resources and sacrificing other goals to avoid them. 
B. Variations on the Capital-Allocation Theme: The Influence of 
Trading Market Prices on Investor Confidence and 
Demand for New Corporate Issues 
While the classic version of the capital-allocation theory addresses 
the role of stock price in allocating capital among numerous compet-
ing corporations, another variation focuses on the interaction between 
efficient prices and investor willingness to invest in the stock market in 
general. According to the "investor-confidence" theory, inefficient 
pricing erodes investor trust in the market's "integrity," discouraging 
investor participation in the stock market and reducing capital 
formation. 275 
However, investor willingness to participate in trading on the ex-
changes or in the OTC market - that is, one investor's willingness to 
buy an outstanding share from another investor - does nothing di-
rectly to enhance firms' abilities to raise capital. Public confidence in 
the trading markets is allocatively pointless unless it leads to enhanced 
willingness to buy new corporate issues. Like the argument that effi-
cient trading markets help underwriters correctly price corporate is-
sues, the argument that efficient markets enhance investor confidence 
is premised on the assumption of a relationship between corporate is-
sues prices and trading market prices. 
The interaction between a seasoned issue's price and the trading 
market price for identical outstanding stock has already been dis-
cussed. 276 This section focuses on the more subtle connections that 
may exist between IPO prices and trading market prices in general. 
Such relationships might take two forms. First, the trading markets 
may encourage investor confidence in new issues by promising a liquid 
aftermarket in which investors can dispose of their shares. Second, 
trading market prices may influence demand for new issues to the ex-
tent that investors perceive IPOs and outstanding issues to be substi-
tute goods. 
275. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 108 S. Ct. 978, 991-92 (in well-developed market, price 
reflects all available information; investors rely on market price's integrity and would be less 
inclined to invest without it); Note, supra note 101, at 1071 (The SEC should promote informa-
tional efficiency "so that investors can purchase securities with confidence that their market 
prices best reflect their true values."). 
276. See supra notes 212-14 and accompanying text. 
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1. Investor Confidence and the Need for Liquidity 
An investor purchasing shares in an !PO may plan to sell those 
shares at some point in the future. Such an investor looks for liquidity 
as well as long-term performance in an investment, and values new 
issues more highly if they can be sold at short notice without taking 
too much of a loss.277 Resales of new issues (which have become by 
then outstanding issues) generally take place in the trading markets.278 
Stock performance in the trading markets may consequently influence 
investor confidence and willingness to buy new issues. 279 
a. Portfolio theory and investor valuation of stock performance. 
Exploring how pricing inefficiency affects investor perceptions of stock 
performance upon resale in the trading markets requires a theory of 
how investors measure performance. Modern financial theory predicts 
that rational investors judge a stock's performance according to only 
two factors. 280 The first is the expected return on the stock, measured 
by anticipated dividends and appreciation or depreciation in price 
upon resale.281 The second is the stock's expected nondiversifiable or 
"beta" risk. 282 To financial scholars, the concept of "risk" is a special-
ized one referring to variation in return. 283 Stocks which are very vol-
atile (i.e., stocks which experience sharp changes in price or dividends 
over time) are "riskier" than stocks whose prices and earnings are sta-
277. See Poser, supra note 175, at 886 (economic function of trading markets is to create 
liquidity so that new issues can be sold); Wu, supra note 12, at 263 ("The ever-present. possibility 
of disposing of shares rapidly at a 'reasonable price' provides investors with liquidity and thereby 
reduces their investment risk. Because of the secondhand markets where shares can be sold 
readily, savers are generally more willing to invest."). 
278. Shareholders selling large blocks of outstanding stock may sometimes sell through an 
underwriter rather than directly to the trading public. Such "secondary offerings" comprise only 
a small portion of equity offerings. See 1988 SEC STATISTICAL REVIEW, supra note 182, at 6 
(Table A-405, showing, on a preliminary basis, that secondary offerings accounted for approxi-
mately $8.9 billion of $181.15 billion of common stock and other equity offerings in fiscal year 
1987). 
279. See R. WFSr & s. TINI~, THE EcONOMICS OF THE STOCK MARKET 5 (1971) (trading 
market influences the allocation of capital by augmenting the flow of short-term funds to new 
issues through promise of liquidity); Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 91, .at 684 (can sell new 
issue at higher price if value in aftermarket is assured); Wu, supra note 12, at 263 (good secon-
dary market makes investors more willing to invest). 
280. Most financial scholars believe that securities should be evaluated according to the doc-
trine known as the Capital Asset Pricing Model ("CAPM"). See generally R. BREALEY & S. 
MYERS, supra note 22, at 128-58; J. LoRIE & M. HAMILTON, supra note 17, at 113-24, 198-210. 
281. The total income a shareholder receives from stock, including both dividends and ap-
preciation, is referred to as the "return." Return is a function of the firm's earnings. See gener-
ally, J. Lorie & M. Hamilton, supra note 17, at 113-24. In calculating return, income to be 
received in the future must be discounted to reach its "present value." R. Brealey & S. Myers, 
supra note 22, at 10-13. 
282. See generally R. BREALEY & s. MYERS, supra note 22, at 128-36; J. LoRIE & M. HAM-
ILTON, supra note 17, at 211-27. · 
283. See generally R. BREALEY & S. MYERS, supra note 22, at 117-58. 
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ble, even when the average returns of the two are the same.284 Finan-
cial theory assumes that most investors are risk-averse and view risky 
stocks as worth less than stable stocks with the same average re-
turns.285 As a result, investors will not buy riskier stocks unless they 
are paid a risk premium in the form of greater expected returns.286 
Portfolio investors are more concerned about some types of risk 
than others. Some corporations prosper when others fail, and the 
prices of differing stocks are unlikely to change at exactly the same 
time in exactly the same fashion.287 While an investor owning only 
one stock may experience large variations in return,288 an investor 
owning stock in several corporations reduces overall risk because vari-
ations in the returns of the differing companies can offset each 
other.289 However, diversification cannot eliminate risk completely. 
Some economic developments affect all corporations at the same time: 
in a depression, all business tends to suffer.290 The portfolio investor 
evaluating the riskiness of a particular stock therefore distinguishes 
between two kinds of risk. "Diversifiable," "unsystematic," or 
"unique" risk is risk specific to an individual firm which can be diver-
sified away by holding a number of stocks. "Beta," "systematic," and 
"market" risk are all terms referring to that nondiversifiable risk at-
tributable to factors that affect the market as a whole - the kind of 
284. A stock that pays a $10 dividend in year one and no dividend in year two is "riskier" 
than a stock which pays $5 in both years, although their average expected return is the same. 
285. R. BREALEY & s. MYERS, supra note 22, at 12-13, 117-36; J. LoRIE & M. HAMILTON, 
supra note 17, at 171, 200. 
286. See generally R. BREALEY & S. MYERS, supra note 22, at 117-36. Returning to the 
example of note 284 supra, the risk-averse investor choosing between receiving a $5 dividend 
unconditionally or tossing a coin for $10 or nothing will choose the $5. But he might be indiffer-
ent between receiving $5 unconditionally, and tossing a coin for $11 or nothing. 
287. The classic examples are the hypothetical corporations of Warco, a weapons manufac-
turer and Peaceco, a recreational vehicle producer. Warco thrives in times of hostility among 
nations, while Peaceco languishes. After armistice their roles are reversed. See V. BRUDNEY & 
M. CHIRELSTEIN, CORPORATE FINANCE: CASES AND MATERIALS 82-83 (3d ed. 1987). 
288. Stocks are by their nature risky investments, as the fortunes of corporations rise or fall 
from year to year. See R. BREALEY & S. MYERS, supra note 22, at 123-24 (between 1926 and 
1981, the risk of a T-bill portfolio as measured by the standard deviation from the expected 
return was 3.1 %; the standard deviation of even a diversified market portfolio during the same 
period was 21.9%; deviations of individual stocks were on average even higher). 
289. See R. BREALEY & S. MYERS, supra note 22, at 123-26. In the case of Warco and 
Peaceco, see supra note 287, the variations in their return are said to be "negatively" correlated; 
if one goes up, we may expect the other to go down. But this correlation is not required for 
diversification to reduce risk. So long as stocks are not perfectly positively correlated - they do 
not rise or fall by exactly the same amount at exactly the same time - diversification can reduce 
risk. If the returns of the stocks in a portfolio are randomly correlated (in statistical terms, 
independent), risk may be diversified away completely. See R. BREALY & S. MYERS, supra note 
22, at 124-25. 
290. Id. at 125-26; v. BRUDNEY & M. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 287, at 84-85. 
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macroeconomic tides on which all boats rise or fall. 291 
Let us return again to the risk-averse investor seeking to value her 
portfolio. The investor will, of course, consider the expected returns 
of the stocks that constitute the portfolio. But in discounting those 
returns for risk, she will consider only beta, or market, risk. The in-
vestor will not devalue the stock of a speculative corporation with a 
high unique risk because unique risk may be diversified away.292 Fi-
nancial theory consequently predicts that inefficient markets will harm 
the portfolio-holding investor's confidence in the trading market 
(thereby reducing demand for new issues) only if inefficiency reduces 
stocks' expected returns, or increases nondiversifiable risk. Let us con-
sider whether inefficient markets change investors' evaluations of risk 
or return in such a fashion. 
b. The effect of inefficiency on expected average returns. One ver-
sion of the investor confidence argument assumes that investors who 
believe the trading markets do not efficiently reflect new information 
will be less interested in purchasing IPOs because they fear they might 
be forced to sell their stock in the future at a price that is "incorrect" 
in light of available data.293 In Basic Inc. v. Levinson, Justice Black-
mun described this perceived problem as one of market "integrity."294 
Noting that "the market price of shares traded on well-developed mar-
kets reflects all publicly available information," Blackmun concluded 
that the "investor who buys or sells stock at the price set by the mar-
ket does so in reliance on the integrity of that price. "295 After all, 
" '[ w ]ho would knowingly roll the dice in a crooked crap game?' "296 
291. See R. BREALEY & S. MYERS, supra note 22, at 125 nn.12-13 ("unique" and "unsys-
tematic" risk is diversifiable risk; "market" risk is nondiversifiable); V. BRUDNEY & M. CHIREL-
STElN, supra note 287, at 84-85 ("systematic" and "unsystematic" risk). 
292. R. BREALEY & s. MYERS, supra note 22, at 128-35; J. LoRlE & M. HAMILTON, supra 
note 17, at 198-210. Stocks with identical expected returns and risk will carry identical values. 
It may, of course, turn out that one stock does substantially better than the other. But their 
expected returns ex ante are the same. 
293. See supra note 275 and accompanying text. A similar "investor confidence" argument 
is frequently raised in response to proposals to legalize insider trading. It is claimed that public 
knowledge of widespread insider trading will reduce the outside investor's confidence in his abil-
ity to sell his stock at a fair price, which depresses prices in the new issues market and reduces 
capital formation. See Schotland, supra note 131, at 1440-42 (if insider trading is allowed, out-
siders will lose overall to insiders, discouraging outside participation in the stock market and 
harming capital formation); Seligman, supra note 12, at 1115-20 (insider trading increases risks 
of market). But see Carney, supra note 27, at 894 (discounting of securities values due to investor 
knowledge of insider trading should be trivial). 
294. 108 s. Ct. 978, 992 (1988). 
295. 108 S. Ct. at 991-92. Contra 108 S. Ct. at 995-96 (White, J., dissenting) (criticizing 
majority for defining market integrity as investor entitlement to rely on price of stock as reflec-
tion of its true value). 
296. 108 S. Ct. at 995 (quoting Schlanger v. Four-Phase Sys., Inc., 555 F. Supp. 535, 538 
(S.D.N.Y. 1982)). 
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The problem with this view is that in an inefficient trading market 
the odds of selling at an incorrectly low price are no greater than the 
chance of a windfall by selling at an incorrectly high price.297 Ineffi-
cient stock markets (like efficient ones) may well be a crap game, but 
not necessarily a crooked one. If inefficiency is as likely to lead to 
overvaluation as undervaluation, inefficient pricing will not affect in-
vestors' average returns.298 Consequently, inefficiency should not 
erode investor confidence in the market's expected returns.299 
c. The effect of inefficiency on nondiversijiable risk. A second ver-
sion of the investor confidence argument asserts that inefficient pricing 
hurts investor confidence in the trading market because it increases the 
variance of returns by adding the risk of windfall gains and losses to 
preexisting investment risk. 300 The short answer to this proposal is 
that if the "risk" of a mispriced purchase or sale in an inefficient mar-
ket is diversifiable risk - and there seems to be no reason why it 
should not be - portfolio investors will not be concerned with it at 
all. 301 But a more significant flaw in this argument is that it mistakes 
the manner in which shareholders calculate "gains" and "losses." 
The only shareholder whose returns are affected by stock price is 
the shareholder who actually sells his stock.302 This shareholder 
297. See generally Coffee, supra note 5, at 734 (securities prices are fair game even if ineffi-
cient); Fox, supra note 5, at 1011 (market inefficiency is "unbiased"). 
298. When an additional variable has an equal probability of increasing or decreasing a par-
ticular value, the statistical or expected effect on that value is zero. See Coffee, supra note 5, at 
734 (if the market is a "zero-sum game," investors only need fairness from a regulatory disclo-
sure system that ensures unbiased price differentials); Friend & Herman, The SEC Through a 
Glass Darkly, 37 J. Bus. 382, 401 (1964) (Gains to investors from "closer correspondence of 
market and [true] equilibrium prices can easily be exaggerated ...• To the extent that individual 
investors are both buying and selling different stocks at the same time, some of which are rela-
tively inflated and others deflated, [increased efficiency gives] little service."). See also supra 
notes 222-23 and accompanying text. 
299. Investor confidence in average returns may be eroded, however, in a market made more 
"efficient" by insider trading. Insiders move price to the correct position through their trades. 
But until price gets to the "right" point, the insider has a systematic advantage denied others. 
This advantage decreases outside investors' average returns. See infra text accompanying notes 
431-32; Schotland, supra note 131, at 1440-42 (insider trading causes outsiders to "lose" overall 
to insiders). In this instance, a policy that enhances efficiency (e.g., legalizing insider trading) 
decreases investor confidence by eroding expected returns. Again, we must distinguish the pur-
suit of informationally efficient markets from the pursuit of honest markets. 
300. See Lorie, supra note 39, at 819 ("[I]n an efficient market, the relationship of prices to 
values is more stable, thus reducing the variance in prices."). 
301. Even if investors recognized and cared about "windfall" gains or losses due to ineffi-
ciency, the investor who holds a portfolio will be indifferent to such variation as long as it is 
diversifiable. There is no reason to believe that variance due to inefficiency would not be random. 
See supra text accompanying notes 222-23; Fox, supra note 5, at 1010, 1013-14 (if inefficiency 
increases risk, this will bother tlie investor who holds one stock but not the investor with a 
diversified portfolio; inefficiency is an unsystematic risk that is randomly distributed (in statisti· 
cal terms, independent) so inaccuracies due to inefficiency are of little import to investors as 
differing inefficiencies "cancel" each -other out and can be diversified away). 
302. The exception to this rule is the shareholder who is using his stock as collateral for a 
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measures his return on that transaction as the difference between the 
price he paid when he bought the stock, and the price he receives when 
he sells it; he does not measure it by the difference between price re-
ceived and "value" when sold.303 Investors who want to reduce vari-
ance in their portfolio returns will therefore worry less about 
informational inefficiency (which causes price to depart from the price 
that would be set if the market incorporated all available information) 
than about volatility (which causes price to depart from historical 
price). The risk-averse investor finds far more comfort in assurances 
that tomorrow's price will be the same as today's, than in assurances 
that tomorrow's price will speedily reflect information received in the 
meantime. 304 
That point was brought home on October 19, 1987. Investors 
surely found little solace in the belief that the Dow may have "accu-
rately" reflected decreased economic expectations when that index lost 
22% of its value in a single day.305 Subsequent investigations have 
focused on the need to reduce volatility in the markets. 306 Rapid shifts 
in price that cause investors to perceive the markets as risky pose far 
more danger to investor participation in the trading markets than the 
possibility that prices will depart from "true value" because of infor-
mational inefficiency. 
Inefficiency, therefore, should not hurt investor confidence or will-
ingness to invest unless inefficient markets are more volatile markets. 
In fact, there are reasons to believe that inefficient markets are less 
volatile. A market that rapidly incorporates new information will be a 
market in which prices change often and quickly to reflect that infor-
loan. In such a case, an increase or decrease in stock price can lead to similar changes in borrow-
ing capacity because the stock value acts as a signal of the shareholder's wealth to banks. On the 
importance of efficient prices to evaluating shareholder wealth, see infra notes 344-60 and accom-
panying text. 
303. To the short-term shareholder who intends to part with his shares, any concept of "in-
trinsic" value beyond sale price is meaningless. See infra notes 345-50 and accompanying text. 
304. Cf. Banoff, supra note 38, at 181 (efficient market is not risk-free); Levmore, supra note 
32, at 656 (suggesting SEC should sacrifice some market efficiency if this reduces volatility); 
Posner, Law and the Theory of Finance: Some Intersections, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 159, 170 
(1986) (volatile markets harm investors). 
305. Whatever the ultimate cause of the crash, many believe that the October 1987 decline 
leading up to the crash was the result of new information concerning the economy. BRADY 
REPORT, supra note 15, at V-1 to V-3 (survey of m~ket participants found that 77% thought 
fundamental economic changes were primary cause of decline during the week preceding Octo-
ber 19); see Ruder Says Markets Are Still Volatile: Proxmire to Push for Reform Legislation, 20 
Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 795, 796, May 27, 1988 [hereinafter Ruder Says Markets Still Vola-
tile] (Statement of Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan that daily volatility reflects mar-
ket's enhanced ability to obtain information). 
306. See SEC REPORT, supra note 69, at xi-xii (volatility undesirable; reduces investor confi-
dence); BRADY REPORT, supra note 15, at 53 (extreme volatility threatened integrity of market 
on October 19 and 20, 1987). 
674 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 87:613 
mation. 307 On the other hand, a more inefficient market takes longer 
to digest new information, resulting in slower price changes and less 
volatility. In this fashion, policies that allow inefficient markets may 
even enhance investor confidence by reducing variance in stock 
returns. 308 
2. Outstanding Issues and New Issues as Substitute Goods 
The investor-confidence argument outlined above is premised on 
the trading market's role in providing a liquid aftermarket in which 
IPO investors may dispose of their shares. But intuition suggests that 
the prices of outstanding stocks may influence investor demand for 
IPOs even if the investor is uninterested in resale. The economic ex-
planation for this phenomenon centers around the concept of substi-
tute goods. 3o9 
The classic examples of substitute goods are butter and margarine. 
Because consumers can use margarine as a substitute for butter, an 
increase in the price of butter leads to an increase in demand, and 
eventually price, for margarine.310 Like butter and margarine, new 
issues of stock and outstanding issues may be substituted for each 
other by the consumer seeking to defer income. After all, both repre-
sent ownership interests in a corporation and the hope of profit. Ineffi-
cient pricing of stocks in the trading markets may thus lead to changes 
in new issue prices, with allocative repercussions.311 
The strength of any substitution effect depends on the similarity of 
307. See SEC REPORT, supra note 69, at xi-xii (volatility is "a measure of how quickly prices 
react to new information"; in periods of economic uncertainty, increased volatility occurs); 
Schotland, supra note 131, at 1446 (an "informed" (efficient) market is characterized by "sharp 
price shifts when the information changes"); Stigler, supra note 37, at 133 (if we appraise markets 
by their efficiency, we must abandon criteria of constant prices over time; criticizing SEC's fixa-
tion on orderly market and smooth price changes as inconsistent with efficient market). 
308. For example, index futures trading is believed to enhance market efficiency by helping 
to incorporate information into equity prices more quickly, but is also believed to add to market 
volatility. See supra notes 69-93 and accompanying text. Eliminating stock index futures trading 
would make the market less efficient but, by reducing volatility, would increase investor 
confidence. 
309. See generally R. LIPSEY & P. STEINER, supra note 153, at 75-76; R.. MILLER, INTERME-
DIATE MICROECONOMICS: THEORY, ISSUES AND APPLICATIONS 76, 100 (1982). 
310. R. LIPSEY & P. STEINER, supra note 153, at 98. If the costs of the dairy business rise, 
the price of butter will rise as well, and some consumers will change consumption patterns away 
from the consumption of now-pricey butter in favor of (relatively) less expensive margarine. The 
increase in demand for margarine will soon lead to an increase in the price for margarine. So the 
prices of butter and margarine "follow" each other. The relationship also works in reverse: 
increases in the price of margarine increase demand for butter. See R. LIPSEY & P. STEINER, 
supra note 153, at 75-76, 98; R. MILLER, supra note 309, at 94, 100. The extent to which changes 
in the price of one good induce changes in demand for a substitute depend on the "cross-elastici-
ties" of the goods involved. See id. at 101. 
311. If outstanding issues are overpriced, this fact will increase demand for new issues and 
drive up price, which may lead to an inefficient "oversupply" of funds to new issues. See 
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the goods involved and the ease with which the investor can shift from 
one good to its substitute.312 In the absence of empirical data, it is 
impossible to be certain a priori whether, and to what extent, new is-
sues and outstanding stock act as substitute goods. But there are rea-
sons to suspect that on an individual basis the consumer is unlikely to 
regard any particular outstanding issue a!? a substitute for any particu-
lar IPO. New and outstanding stocks differ as investment vehicles. 
IPOs tend to be made by smaller, more speculative ventures and are 
notoriously "risky" compared to outstanding issues. Accordingly, 
they carry higher risk premiums.313 Also, because such companies are 
more likely than established firms to withhold dividends so as to retain 
earnings for growth, they should attract an investment clientele of 
"young accumulators." In contrast, more staid and income-oriented 
investors prefer blue chip issues.314 Finally, many authorities believe 
that underwriters direct underpriced new issues to favored customers, 
so that investing in new issues requires different industry contacts than 
investing in outstanding shares.315 All of these factors suggest that the 
substitution effect of any particular outstanding stock on any particu-
lar IPO will be very weak if it exists at all. Given thousands of out-
standing stocks to choose from, the substitute-seeking investor who 
believes that IBM stock is overpriced will look to AT&T, ITT, and 
other stocks of similar seniority, performance, and structure long 
before he turns to a speculative new issue like Home Shopping 
Levmore, supra note 12, at 156 (positing how suspension of trading in outstanding Texas Gulf 
stock might cause funds to "flow too easily" into new issues). 
312. The more similar two products are in function and use; the more likely they are to be 
"perfect" substitutes. For perfect substitutes, an x % increase in the price of one leads to an 
identical x % increase in the other. See generally R. MILLER, supra note 309, at 99-100 (cross-
elasticities of demand). 
313. See Ibbotson, supra note 206, at 258-61 (new issues show greater risk and volatility 
which declines with seasoning). The Capital Asset Pricing Model, see supra notes 280-92 and 
accompanying text, suggests that outstanding stocks and new issues may be perfect substitutes 
because a stock's risk premium should bear a linear relationship to its "beta" or market risk, and. 
an investment portfolio of high-beta new issues can be replicated by borrowing to hold a larger 
portfolio of outstanding stocks with a normal market beta. Limitations on investors' credit and 
the transaction costs of borrowing, along with different tax treatment of capital gains and divi-
dends, limit the applicability of this aspect of the theory to actual investor behavior. 
314. The OTC Market, which is comprised of relatively young, speculative stocks, is believed 
to attract a different clientele than the organized exchanges. See Banoff, supra note 38, at 172. 
As initial public offerings are even riskier and more speculative than OTC stocks, still greater 
differences in investor tastes may exist. 
315. New issues tend to be underpriced, see supra notes 254-61 and accompanying text, and 
many believe that underwriters "channel" underpriced new issues to preferred clients. See 
Beatty & Ritter, supra note 233, at 215 n.4 (rationing may be "severe"; citing case of IPO inves-
tor who received less than 5% of IPO shares requested); Ibbotson, supra note 206, at 265 n.22 
(evidence that many offerings are "rationed"); Rock, supra note 246, at 192 ("common com-
plaint" that underwriters favor certain customers). 
676 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 87:613 
Network.316 
It might be argued that substitution effects are more likely when 
we compare not individual stocks, but a diversified portfolio of out-
standing issues and a diversified portfolio of IPOs. Investors who per-
ceive inefficiently inflated prices throughout the trading markets may 
be tempted to divest their trading portfolios in order to buy relatively 
inexpensive new issues. That may increase demand for new issues and 
artificially lower the cost of equity capital.317 
However, it seems unlikely that inefficiency in the trading markets 
will lead to mispricing in the new issue market. First, as discussed 
earlier, policies that slow the incorporation of firm-specific informa-
tion into price are unlikely to lead to the uniform inflation or deflation 
of a diversified portfolio.318 Second, in the absence of empirical evi-
dence of consumer tastes we should not assume that, even on a portfo-
lio basis, consumers regard IPOs as the nearest available substitute for 
outstanding issues. The investor driven from the trading market by 
inflated prices may well turn to treasury notes, certificates of deposit, 
or other low-risk investments before he buys stock in the sort of specu-
lative venture that produces most new issues. A bullish market for 
one does not necessarily follow from a bullish market for the other.319 
In summary, the argument that inefficient trading market prices 
will distort demand for new issues is a weak one. It is unconvincing 
316. When Home Shopping Network went public in 1986, its stock price doubled on the first 
day of trading and enjoyed an 800% increase in its first year. Feast was followed by famine when 
the stock dropped from $47 to $4 per share in 1987. Knight, A Medium in Search of a Message? 
Home Shopping Network, Despite Roller Coaster Past, Still a Made-for-TV Drama, The Washing-
ton Post, June 5, 1988, at Hl, col. 2. 
317. The relationship also works in reverse. If entrepreneurial success in the new issues mar-
ket leads to enhanced demand for new issues and a rise in their price, some of this new investor 
interest is likely to be squandered on secondary market purchases that transfer wealth from the 
new shareholder to the old, but do not result in additional funds for investment. See Gupta, 
Small Firms Bite the Bullet and Prepare To Go Public at Post-Crash Lower Prices, Wall St. J., 
May 19, 1988 at 51, col. 1 (quoting mutual fund manager that "[a]s long as new issues are 
underpriced relative to the values available in public [trading] markets, investors will continue to 
be receptive ... but when deals come overpriced, we have plenty of seasoned companies in the 
public market to choose from"). 
318. See supra note 222 and accompanying text. Such marketwide mispricing - if it exists 
at all - is usually attributed to "waves" of irrational investor bullishness or bearishness. The 
possibility of such psychological phenomena only casts further doubt on the wisdom of pursuing 
efficient markets. See infra notes 407-19 and accompanying text. 
319. Support for this view is found in the opinions of analysts who, at various times, have 
regarded the trading market as inflated vis a vis the new issues market, and vice versa. See R. 
JENNINGS & H. MARSH, SECURffiES REGULATION 18-19 (6th ed. 1987) (during 1970s, new 
issues market was stagnant while investors focused on blue chip companies). Investors may 
regard the closest substitute for new issues as not publicly traded outstanding stocks but such 
high-risk derivative instruments as stock-index futures and options. See FEDERAL RESERVE 
STUDY, supra note 75, at 25 (opportunity to invest in risky futures and options may reallocate 
risk capital away from venture capital investments, initial public offerings, or other offerings by 
small firms). 
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because informational inefficiency per se affects neither the overall risk 
nor the overall expected return of stocks in the trading market, and 
because new issues and outstanding issues can be expected to have 
only very weak substitution effects ·on each other outside the context of 
marketwide mispricing. In addition, the same caveats that apply to 
the classic version of the capital allocation theory apply to its investor-
confidence and substitute-good derivatives. Whatever the value of an 
optimal overall willingness to buy newly issued stock, that value is 
seriously diluted if an imperfect IPO underwriting market misprices 
IPOs so that investors do not direct their savings into the right new 
issues.320 Similarly, investors who lack confidence in the stock market 
may shift their savings into other investment vehicles, such as bonds 
or insurance policies,_ that provide capital to corporations more indi-
rectly. 321 Only marginal losses (in the form of transaction costs or 
slightly reduced rates of return) are suffered. Economic analysis again 
suggests that we should question the prevailing wisdom that efficient 
stock market prices are important to the optimal allocation of corpo-
rate capital, whether directly or indirectly. 
C. Stock Prices as Signals 
Whatever the merits of the capital-allocation argument, it can only 
apply to corporations that actually issue stock. 322 If after "going pub-
lic" a company never issues stock again (not an unlikely scenario), 
why should we care whether investors later buy and sell those share~ 
at informationally efficient prices?323 
Some commentators argue that even if trading market prices do 
not influence the flow of investment capital to corporations, those 
prices carry more indirect economic consequences because sharehold-
ers use them as information-carrying "signals" when they allocate 
other resources.324 According to the management quality-signaling 
theory, stock .prices determine who manages the corporation's assets 
320. See supra text accompanying notes 261-67. 
321. If investor "unconfidence" precludes firms from raising funds through equity issues, 
other sources of funding, such as corporate borrowing, remain available. 'Similarly, if investor 
"overconfidence" in the stock market enables firms to raise equity capital too cheaply, these firms 
will not throw away the excess funds but will return them to shareholders in the form of divi-
dends or invest them in other projects ·with a positive return, albeit a slightly lower one. The 
point is simply that, as in the case of individual misallocations of capital, any misallocations due 
to "incorrect" levels of investor confidence in the stock market will produce losses only at the 
margin. See supra notes 267-73 and accompanying text. 
322. See Fox, supra note 5, at 1014, 1023-24 ("[l]f the market consisted only of secondary 
trades of previously issued securities, . . . the market would have no effect on real economii: 
events."). 
323. See supra notes 178-91. 
324. See Barry, supra note 5, at 1316 n.46 (stock prices act as signals to economyJ; Fox, 
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because shareholders rely on stock price to indicate whether incum-
bent management is running the corporation well or poorly.325 A sec-
ond argument, the "wealth-effect" theory, focuses on the importance 
of stock prices to investors calculating their net worth when choosing 
between savings and consumption. 326 
1. Stock Prices as Signals for the Selection and 
Compensation of Management 
If stock prices in an efficient market accurately reflect corporate 
earnings, better managers who extract greater profits from the corpo-
ration will cause stock price to rise. Incompetent or dishonest man-
agement will reduce corporate profits and depress share price.327 In 
this fashion, it is argued, efficient markets signal shareholders how to 
select management. 328 If share price rises, the corporation is doing 
well and management should be retained; if price declines, manage-
ment should be shown the door. 329 A variation on this theme is the 
use of stock or stock options to compensate management, a practice 
which is thought to create incentives for better management perform-
ance by "bonding" management's self-interest with that of the 
shareholders. 330 
The argument that efficient markets should be cultivated in order 
to aid shareholders in evaluating and compensating management illus-
supra note 5, at 1015 (trading markets as "nerve center'' directing the real economy); Levmore, 
supra note 12, at 158 (inaccurate price signals lead to resource misallocations). 
~25. See infra notes 327-43 and accompanying text. 
326. See infra notes 344-59 and accompanying text. 
327. See Fischel, supra note 160, at 1, 5 (management's abilities reflected in stock price); 
Gordon & Kornhauser, supra note 1, at 824 (stock price signals management quality). 
328. See Carlton & Fischel, supra note 5, at 867 (efficient pricing enables shareholders to 
evaluate which corporate managers are successful, so that markets for managerial services func-
tion more effectively); Gordon & Kornhauser, supra note l, at 824 (market price for stock "sig-
nal[s] the relative quality of management" in market for executive services); see also Fox, supra 
note 5, at 1014, 1021-22 (because executive compensation is often affected by stock price, market 
prices have effect on real economic events). 
329. Shareholders influence the selection of management because their votes determine the 
composition of the board of directors, which selects management. R. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 
94, 105-06 (1986). There are substantial impediments to effective shareholder monitoring of 
management. See Coffee, supra note 153, at 1190 (in the face oflittle influence and high monitor-
ing costs, individual shareholders demonstrate rational apathy toward management selection); 
Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 107, at 1170-72 (describing freeriding and coordination 
problems and other impedimeqts to monitoring). If shareholders respond to declining stock 
prices by simply selling their stock, ineffectual management will remain in place. Recognizing 
the limits of shareholder influence in the market for executive services, some argue that declining 
stock prices result in a change in management if the corporation becomes a target of a takeover 
attempt. See infra text accompanying notes 361-90 (market for corporate control). 
330. See Carlton & Fischel, supra note 5, at 869-70 (giving management a stake in firm is 
common scheme to align interests); Coffee, supra note 153, at 1249 n.316 (economists suggest 
stock options align management's and shareholders' interests). 
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trates the weaknesses of any signaling theory.331 Economic actors use 
events as signals when they believe those events contain useful infor-
mation about the underlying condition with which the actor is truly 
concerned. By definition the signal is not as accurate as a direct inves-
tigation into the matter at issue. The usefulness o.f signals springs 
from their accessibility; it may be cheaper and easier to observe the 
signal than the underlying condition itself. Certainly it takes less ef-
fort to follow stock price in the pages of the Wall Street Journal than 
to undertake more direct investigation of managemenf s abilities. 
However, any assertion that we "need" accurate stock signals runs 
the risk of confusing ends and means. The desired end is the optimal 
allocation of real economic resources. Signals are only the means to 
that end. Any event may be used as a sigtial, from sunspots to Labor 
Department unemployment statistics. 332 If economic actors who se-
lect more accurate signals prosper at the expense of those who follow 
less accurate ones, then as a general rule we can leave it to investors to 
select their own preferred signal, choosing among the many available. 
Self-interest will drive investors to use more reliable signals and avoid 
being misled by those that are less trustworthy. There seems little 
sense in devoting resources to the artificial creation of an "official" 
signal of management's competence which is then made accurate. 
The marginal benefits of improving the accuracy of stock prices as 
signals seem likely to outweigh the costs in only very limited circum-
stances. Those circumstances would be (i) if efficient stock prices were 
very reliable signals of management's abilities; (ii) if other sources of 
information concerning management were either unavailable or pro-
hibitively expensive; and (iii) if using stock prices as signals imposed 
no excessive costs. Only in such a case does it seem likely that the end 
of identifying skilled management will effectively be served by devot-
ing resources to ensuring more informationally efficient stock market 
signals. 
However, stock price alone is a very unreliable indicator of man-
agement performance. Stock prices :fluctuate in response to a number 
of variables besides the quality of management. Prevailing interest 
rates, inflation expectations, trade balances, economic legislation, new 
technology, changes in consumer demand and markets, and pending 
litigation - each and every one of these factors changes stock prices 
331. The argument that trading prices aid underwriters pricing new issues is a form of signal-
ing argument. See supra text accompanying notes 215-23. 
332. See P. SAMUELSON, supra note 153, at 256 n.4 ("sunspot theory" for predicting eco-
nomic cycles); see also Garcia, Will It Be Friday the 13th, Part 6? Study Ties Three in Year to 
Recession, Wall St. J., Nov. 13, 1987, at 17, col. 4 (citing studies using Friday the 13th to predict 
stock market decline and economic recession). 
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in a fashion that has nothing to do with management's skill or hon-
esty. 333 Moreover, whatever relationship stock price may bear to 
management's overall quality, it says little indeed about individual 
managers. Judge Easterbrook and Professor Fischel have criticized 
the use of stock options to bond management's interests to sharehold-
ers on this basis, arguing that any one manager's efforts are likely to 
have only a trivial effect on stock prices. 334 
The result is that the shareholder who wishes to select and reward 
executives solely on the basis of price performance may as well read 
tea leaves. Stock price alone carries little information: it is the events 
underlying the change in price which count.335 To the shar-"holder 
trying to decide whether to vote for incumbent management in the 
annual election, a fall in the corporation's stock communicates noth-
ing. News that interest rates have risen - or that the CEO has been 
indicted for fraud - tells much more. 
Not only are stock prices unreliable signals, but more reliable 
sources of information concerning management are available. Federal 
law imposes on publicly held corporations an extensive disclosure re-
gime requiring continuous and exhaustive disclosure of information 
relevant to management's performance. Corporations must periodi-
cally disclose management's salaries, perquisites, and prior business 
experience; the corporation's past and present dividends and earnings; 
assets and liabilities; the nature of, and any changes in, the corpora-
tion's business; and the presence and progress of significant legal pro-
ceedings. 336 SEC-mandated disclosure is supplemented by the work of 
private analysts and the financial press, 337 not to mention the corpora-
tion's, or management's, own voluntary disclosures.338 The result is 
that shareholders have access to a number of sources of information 
they can use to judge management's performance, and to which they 
can tie management compensation. 339 
333. See Coffee, supra note 5, at 723-24 (stock's price performance "substantially dependent" 
on such "exogenous factors"). 
334. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 107, at 1172 n.31 (arguing that stock options 
cannot effectively reduce agency costs). 
335. See also Cox, supra note 67, at 646-47 (arguing that change in stock price alone is too 
"noisy" a signal to "substitute for a clarion corporate announcement" in enhancing efficiency). 
336. See supra note 94. 
337. See Seligman, supra note 12, at 1123 (in 1977, there were over 14,000 professional 
securities analysts). 
338. See, e.g., L. IACOCCA, IACOCCA (1986); T. PICKENS, BOONE (1987). 
339. To the extent that inefficient stock prices reduce whatever "bonding" value stock op-
tions may have, other arrangements can be made to tie salary to earnings, dividends, or other 
financial ratios. See R. CLARK, supra note 329, at 201 (Executive incentive plans include cash 
bonuses, profit-sharing plans, and deferred compensation arrangements.). 
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Finally, efficient stock prices cannot be viewed as a cheap substi-
tute for other forms of information-gathering. The excessive costs as-
sociated with achieving efficient markets will be discussed in some 
detail later. 340 There is a particular moral hazard associated with us-
ing stock prices to evaluate and compensate management. Judging 
management's performance by a stock price signal shifts manage-
ment's self-interest from running the corporation well, to running the 
signal well. Management whose tenure and salary depends on stock 
price performance will be tempted to focus attention on maintaining 
or increasing stock prices, even when these efforts are not in the inter-
est of the corporation or its shareholders. Management will have in-
centive to delay the announcement of bad news;341 to disseminate false 
good news; to avoid investments that are in the business' long run 
interest but depress prices in the short run;342 or to waste corporate 
assets by initiating a stock buy-back plan designed with no other pur-
pose than to drive marginal prices higher.343 Paying too much atten-
tion to stock prices as a means of evaluating and compensating 
management thus frustrates the very end - effective corporate man-
agement - which we originally intended to serve. 
These observations do not imply that shareholders never, or 
should never, consider stock price performance in evaluating and com-
pensating management. But stock price alone carries so little useful 
information that rational actors discount its significance and are un-
likely to be misled by mispricing. Other, and better, information is 
available at less cost and less risk. Under these circumstances there 
seems little point to devoting resources to improving the accuracy of 
stock price as an "official" signal of management quality. 
2. Stock Prices as Signals of Investor Wealth in Deciding Between 
Consumption and Savings 
A second signaling argument offered in support of efficient markets 
deals with the consumer's choice between using present income for 
340. See infra notes 433-57 and accompanying text. 
341. See Langevoort, supra note 31, at 785 (suggesting that management with short-run in-
terest in high stock J?rices will have incentive not to disclose adverse information). 
342. See Schneider, Manko & Kant, supra note 201, at 4-5 (management considering public 
stock price may decide not to invest in research and development that is in corporation's long-
run interest). 
343. Following the October 1987 market decline, a large number of publicly held companies 
announced stock buy-back plans. See Jacobs, Firms' Stock Buy-Back Plans Abound, But Serious-
ness of Intentions Is Unclear, WaJI St. J., Nov. 12, '1987, at 4, col. 2 (600 firms announced buy-
backs). While companies for the most part justified the buy-back on the ground the firm's own 
stock was a bargain, the buy-backs were perceived by some as a "waste" of corporate assets 
intended primarily to reassure shareholders. Id. 
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consumption or for savings. Above minimal income levels, individuals 
do not devote their entire incomes to immediate consumption. 
Rather, they set a certain portion aside in the form of savings to pay 
for consumption in the future. 344 Rational consumers try to save 
enough to produce the optimum balance between present and future 
consumption. To do so they must estimate their future incomes, their 
future consumption needs, their net savings and the return (if any) on 
those savings in the interim. Some observers assert that efficient stock 
prices, by signaling stocks' true values, help investors make optimal 
savings decisions. 345 
The market crash of October 1987 has heightened awareness of the 
"wealth effect" of stock prices on consumers. 346 The October decline 
wiped out over a trillion dollars in investors' assets. 347 More than a 
year later, we still await some sign that the resulting "wealth" reduc-
tion will lead to similar reductions in the economy in general and con-
sumer spending in particular.348 That the October crash has produced 
distant thunder but no lightning suggests that, at least in the short run, 
stock prices may not perform a significant signaling function for con-
sumption and savings decisions. 
To understand the limited importance of efficient markets to inves-
tors evaluating their wealth, it is helpful to analyze the significance of 
market price to three different types of shareholders. The first is the 
short-term shareholder who plans to liquidate her holdings immedi-
ately. It is this investor who is most likely to regard her wealth as 
diminished during a bear market, because for such an investor market 
prices are not signals for value - they are value. 
344. This behavior is referred to as the life-cycle hypothesis. See generally R. LIPSEY & P, 
STEINER, supra note 153, at 570-71, 579. 
345. See Gordon & Kornhauser, supra note 1, at 767-68 (if stock prices are accurate, inves-
tors can correctly choose between present consumption and savings); Levmore, supra note 12, at 
145-46 (citing example of how accurate stock prices benefit shareholder evaluating his future 
income). 
346. See, e.g., BRADY REPORT, supra note 15, at VII-1 (expectation that market crash will 
affect consumer's perceptions of wealth and reduce consumer spending); Pennar, Berger & Far-
rel, That Rumble You Hear is called "Recession'~ Bus. WK., Nov. 2, 1987, at 44-45 (market 
crash risks turning "wealth effect" into "poverty effect"; quoting Professor Franco Modigliani 
that "[t]he stock market controls the wealth ofpe9ple"); Pennar, supra note 17, at 58 (discussing 
the stock crash's impact on the "much-heralded" wealth effect). 
347. See BRADY REPORT, supra note 15, at v (Dow Jones Industrial Average declined one 
third from October 13 to October 19, representing one trillion dollar decline in stock values). 
348. See Pennar, supra note 17, at 58 (crash's impact on consumption has been small, and 
wealth effect "didn't have nearly as powerful an impact as expected"). Prior to October 19, 
economists believed that because of the wealth effect every dollar of decline in stock values would 
produce three to six cents reduction in consumer spending. Some have now revised that estimate 
downward and suggest that a dollar of stock decline reduces consumer spending by only a penny. 
Id. 
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Let us take the case of a law student who inherits 100 shares of a 
copper company. She plans to sell the shares immediately to pay her 
tuition bill. The stock is currently trading at $50 a share but, unbe-
knownst to the student, the copper company has discovered that many 
of its copper mines are unsafe and may have to be closed. The com-
pany does not want to disclose this difficulty until its engineers have 
investigated. If no insider trading occurs, the company's shares will 
remain inefficiently overpriced at $50 until the news is disclosed. 
To the shareholder about to become an ex-shareholder, the con-
cept of intrinsic value is irrelevant. Only realizable value matters. If 
the student plans to sell her shares that .day, even an inefficient market 
price of $50 is an excellent signal for realizable value. In fact, it deter-
mines the value. That the prevailing $50 price may depart from the 
"intrinsic" value of the shares does nothing to decrease its accuracy to 
the short-term shareholder valuing her holdings.349 
The second type of shareholder is the medium-term shareholder 
who plans to hold her stock for some time before selling. Suppose the 
student shareholder wants to determine whether, upon graduation 
three years hence, she will have saved enough to buy a car. Again, she 
will be indifferent to her copper stock's unrealized intrinsic value. It is 
worth whatever she can sell it for in three years, no more and no less. 
In valuing her holdings, her great~t uncertainty springs from future 
changes in stock price: if news of the unsafe mines is announced and 
the price of her stock drops, it is no consolation that the change was 
an efficient one. The medium-term shareholder seeking to use today's 
price as a signal of wealth is more concerned about changes in price -
volatility - than "inaccuracy" due to informational efficiency.350 
The third type of shareholder is the long-term investor. Let us 
assume the student intends to hold her stock indefinitely and live off 
the dividends upon retiring forty years hence. 351 If efficient market 
prices reflect our best estimates of the corporation's future dividends 
and other payouts, efficient prices may aid long-term investors in accu-
rately choosing between savings and consumption. 352 But even in a 
349. Cf. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 108 S. Ct. 978, 996 (1988) (White, J., dissenting in part and 
concurring in part) (questioning whether stocks can have any value apart from market value); 
Seligman, supra note 27, at 837 (to shareholders who must liquidate holdings through appraisal 
remedy, stock has no intrinsic value beyond market price). 
350. Some believe informationally efficient markets are more likely to be more volatile than 
inefficient markets. See supra note 307 and accompanying text. 
351. It is this type of shareholder who measures her wealth in the terms most closely resem-
bling the "intrinsic" value of the shares under the Capital Asset Pricing Model. See supra text 
accompanying notes 280-92. . 
352. Corporate profits may not be distributed as dividends but instead retained and invested 
internally. In that case the long-term shareholder profits not from dividends but from apprecia-
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perfectly efficient market, the relationship between present price and 
future payouts is a weak one, and the further into the future we try to 
predict the weaker the relationship becomes. 353 Whatever uncertainty 
an inefficient trading market creates for the long-term investor, it is 
minor compared to the uncertainty arising from her inability to pre-
dict the future of the economy in general or her corporation in particu-
lar. Future developments - like the discovery of additional copper 
reserves or technical advances that render copper obsolete - cast a far 
darker cloud over valuation attempts than does the possibility that 
news of such developments, when they occur, may be inefficiently in-
corporated into price. As a result, long-term investors may pay rela-
tively little attention to short-term gyrations or inefficiencies in 
price. 354 That possibility does much to explain why consumer spend-
ing has proved so impervious to the crash of October 19, 1987. 
The conclusion to be drawn from these observations is that greater 
market efficiency may not add much to the value of stock prices as 
wealth signals. In addition, the hypothesis that efficient pricing pro-
motes optimal savings is subject to other caveats as well. First, unless 
inefficient markets cause stocks to be mispriced in the same fashion at 
the same time, inaccuracies in stock prices may be diversified away.355 
The investor who holds a portfolio of stocks can assume that, to some 
extent, inaccuracies due to informational inefficiency will cancel each 
other out. 356 
Nor is it certain that changes in stock prices will significantly 
change investor decisions to save or to consume. Suppose the law stu-
dent undervalues her savings because her copper stock is underpriced 
by an inefficient market. Will she then save less, because the (appar-
ently) reduced returns make saving less attractive relative to current 
consumption? Or will she save more, in order to make up the antici-
pated shortfall? 
Finally, it is plausible that some individuals who put money into 
tion in price (realized, of course, only upon resale or other disposal). This possibility does not 
significantly change the analysis. 
353. Historical evidence that stock returns follow a random walk and demonstrate great 
variance suggests that present stock prices are weak indicators of future performance. See supra 
notes 231, 288. Moreover, the shareholder using stock price to gauge future earnings can avoid 
being misled by inefficient pricing to the extent he or she makes use of other, possibly more 
accurate signals. See supra note 324, text accompanying note 332. 
354. See BRADY REPORT, supra note 15, at VII-1 to VII-2 (suggesting that connection be-
tween short-run stock prices and investor's consumption decisions may be remote). 
355. See supra note 301 (inefficiency can be eliminated through diversification); Gordon & 
Kornhauser, supra note l, at 768 n.12 (mispricing of securities only distorts savings decisions of 
portfolio-holding investor if "all other securities" are similarly misvalued). 
356. Financial theory predicts that rational investors will so diversify. See supra notes 280-
92 and accompanying text. 
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the stock market are not deciding to save at all. Some investors may 
play the stock market as a form of recr~ational risk taking, akin to 
gambling at Atlantic City.357 Only 20% of American households di-
rectly own stock, and only 10% hold portfolios with a value over 
$5,000.358 Perhaps more risk-averse investors prefer accumulating as-
sets of known and reasonably reliable value, such as defined-benefit 
pension plans, insurance policies, interest-btaring accounts or bonds, 
and residential real estate, rather than relying on the vagaries of the 
market to defer income to their later years. 359 
Increasing the market's speed in adjusting to information seems 
unlikely to produce optimal savings decisions by individuals. 360 In the 
absence of such benefits, we must sear9h again for a reason to adopt 
efficient markets as a policy goal. 
D. The Role of Stock Market Prices in the Hostile Tender Offer 
Market for Corporate Control 
Some authorities defend efficient trading markets on the theory 
that trading market prices determine who ow~s (and therefore con-
trols) the corporation. The theory of the "market for corporate con-
trol" asserts that in an efficient market, hostile tender offers can direct 
control of the corporation from unprofitable management to more ef-
fective owners. 3c:;1 
357. Investors' subjective motivations in purchasing stock are difficult to test empirically. 
However, some portion of investors may "play the market" as a form of recreational risk taking. 
See Farney, Different Worlds: Main S{reet's View of the Cras!J Is Far from, Wall Street's, Wall. St. 
J., Dec. 30, 1987, at l, col., 6 (quoting pollster Harrison Hickman that "[t]he small investor looks 
at his stock investments as gambling .• : '. He's rolling the dice with part of his money. But his 
'real' savings are somewhere else."). , 
358. Pennar, supra note 17, at 58. Far more investors own stock '-'indirectly" through insur-
ance policies or pension plans than own stock directly. But the value of their "investment" does 
not depend upon the stock market's performance but upon the defined benefits they are entitled 
to under the insurance or pension policy's contractual terms. Only a market decline substantial 
enough to prevent the pension or insurance company from meeting its obligations could render 
such investors' calculations of wealth incorrect. 
359. The vast majority of household "savings" is concentrated not in the stock market but in 
human capital (education and training) and investments in housing, durable goods, and cash. 
Becker, Why A Depression Isn't in the Cards, Bus. WK. Nov. 9, 1987, at 22 (75% of total wealth 
in United States is "human wealth" embodied in education, skills and training; the remaining 
25% "non-human" wealth consists of approximately $13 trillion in corporate capital, housing, 
durable goods and cash, so that $1 trillion stock market losses only reduced total wealth by 2% ). 
360. In addition to affecting savings decisions, market prices for stock may be relevant to the 
evaluation of investor wealth for purposes of securing loans or collecting taxes. See Poser, supra 
note 175, at 886 (trading market prices help to value securities for collateral and tax purposes). 
The same arguments apply in these circumstances as well: in the short run, price (inefficient or 
not) is value and volatile markets are of more concern than inefficient markets. In the long run 
variation due to inefficient prices is likely to be both diversifiable and modest relative to variation 
attributable to future changes in information. See supra text accompanying notes 348-56. 
361. Shareholders who each own only a small share of the corporate enterprise may have 
little incentive or opportunity to police management's performance. _See Easterbrook & Fischel, 
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Like the management quality-signaling argument discussed earlier, 
the market-for-control theory focuses on the impact of management's 
competence on stock prices. In an efficient market, the expected earn-
ings of the corporation are reflected in the trading price of its 
shares.362 When a bidder offers to buy the corporation at a price 
higher than market price, the bidder must believe that under his con-
trol the corporation will have higher earnings than at present.363 
The shareholders offered such a premium are better off if they ac-
cept it, as the bid exceeds the value of their stock under current man-
agement. 364 Society benefits from the increased productivity that 
results when corporations are controlled by those who can make them 
most profitable. 365 Only corrupt and incompetent management loses. 
Therefore, according to the market-for-control theory, we should 
favor changes in control when the bidder is willing to offer more for 
the shares of a corporation than its prevailing market price.366 
A necessary (if often unstated) corollary of this view is that an 
supra note 107, at 1170-71; Fischel, supra note 160, at 9. According to the market-for-control 
theory, hostile tender offers can provide a supplementary disciplining force for corrupt or ineffec-
tive management. See Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 643 (1982) (tender offer mechanism 
provides incentive for good management performance that keeps stock price high); Fischel, supra 
note 160, at 45 (cash tender offer is principal mechanism to transfer control of corporation to 
those who will manage it most profitably); Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Con-
trol, 73 J. PoL. EcoN. 110, 112-13 (1965) (poor management causes stock price to drop so corpo-
ration is vulnerable to takeover). But see Coffee, supra note 153, at 1149, 1153, 1200, 1234-35 
(While some believe that a hostile takeover is the primary disciplinary mechanism for poor man-
agement, a takeover serves only as a remedy of last resort for massive managerial failures. The 
principal disciplinary mechanism may be the employment market for managers.). 
Of course, not all corporate mergers or reorganizations are hostile. But when two businesses 
combine in a friendly merger to take advantage of decreased costs from joint operation or some 
other synergy, that decision produces allocational benefits regardless of the price terms of the 
merger, which affect only the allocation of wealth between the shareholders of the two corpora-
tions. See id, at 1149 n.6, 1168, 1224 (mispriced mergers may not produce inefficiencies but only 
result in wealth transfers with no necessary effect on aggregate wealth); Easterbrook & Fischel, 
supra note 107, at 1169 (friendly mergers have no disciplinary effect on inefficient management). 
Only in the context of a hostile offer can stock price "discipline" management. 
362. See supra note 327 and accompanying text. 
363. Assuming the bidder is rational, in an informationally efficient market he will only pay a 
premium for a corporation if he thinks he can improve its performance and extract more earn-
ings per share. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 107, at 1168. But see Coffee, supra note 
153, at 1170-71 (some believe takeovers occur because markets inefficiently undervalue firms; 
such control transactions pose no allocational benefits); Kraakman, Taking Discounts Seriously: 
The Implications of ''Discounted" Share Prices as an Acquisition Motive, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 891, 
936-37 (1988) (same). 
364. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 107, at 1168, 1173 (In an efficient market, "[t]ender 
offers at a premium •.. must benefit the target's shareholders."). 
365. See Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 643 (1982) (tender offers benefit the efficient 
allocation of corporate resources to highest-valued use). 
366. Easterbrook and Fischel have used this argument as the basis for recommending that 
the management of target corporations be relegated to a passive role in responding to tender 
offers and be prohibited from defensive tactics which might hinder such offers. See Easterbrook 
& Fischel, supra note 107, at 1164. 
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efficient market is a desirable goal of securities policy.367 Inefficiently 
priced stocks will distort the functioning of the market for control. A 
rational bidder might offer to pay a premium for an inefficiently under-
valued firm, even if he does not believe that he can run the business 
better himself; the undervaluation alone is sufficient to make the target 
a bargain purchase. Similarly, efficient trading markets are important 
to ensure that the price of the poorly run firm declines until it attracts 
the attention of a bidder who will manage the company more effec-
tively. Otherwise the overvalued firm can escape the disciplinary force 
of the market for corporate control. 
This version of the market-for-control argument fails to incorpo-
rate modem economic theories which suggest that the marginal price 
of shares in the trading markets does not determ,ine whether a take-
over will occur.368 The successful tender offeror must pay a substan-
tial premium over the prevailing price for shares i..Tl the trading 
market. 369 These premiums reflect the different forces that set prices 
in two different markets: the public markets for trading marginal 
shares, and the tender offer market for corporate control. 370 The re-
sult, in the words of Professor Coffee, is that "stock market efficiency 
is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition in order for the hostile 
takeover to function as an effective instrument of corporate 
accountability."371 
In the public trading markets, price is set at that level at which a 
limited number of shares have changed hands between a willing buyer 
367. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 107, at 1168 n.20 ("If markets for particular 
stocks are not efficient, it is not possible to say that every tender bid at a premium is beneficial to 
shareholders."); Fischel, supra note 160, at 7 (efficient market a "key assumption" to market-for-
corporate-control theory); Fox, supra note 5, at 1020 (the effectiveness of the market for corpo-
rate control depends on the accuracy of stock prices). 
368. See infra notes 372 "and accompanying text. This model departs from earlier theories 
which regarded the demand for stocks as perfectly elastic. See supra note 212. 
369. R. BREALEY & S. MYERS, supra note 22 at 723 (Selling stockholders almost always 
receive a premium over the premerger value of their shares; the average premium is about 20% 
in the case of mergers and 30% in the case of tender offers.); Kraakman, supra note 363, at 892 
(takeover premiums average over 50%); Tender Offer Update: 1988, 22 MERGERS & ACQUISI-
TIONS May-June 1988 at 23, 25 (most tender offers in 1986 and 1987 were accompanied by a 
25% to 50% premium). 
370. See Coffee, supra note 153, at 1154 n.19, 1171 (can postulate two distinct markets for 
stock, one for marginal shares for investment purposes and the other for corporate control); 
Fischel, supra note 160, at 5 (An efficient capital market does not necessarily imply an efficient 
market for corporate control.); Levmore, supra note 32, at 652 (market prices useful for measur-
ing "currency," not control, value of shares); cf. Gordon & Kornhauser, supra note l, at 825 
(Given that investors value stocks according to their return discounted only for nondiversifiable 
risk, whereas acquirors cannot diversify and must discount for diversifiable risk as well, "there is 
no basis for the assertion that prices prevailing in the stock market measure the value of a firm to 
a potential acquiror."). 
371. Coffee, supra note 153, at 1171. 
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and willing seller in that day's trades. But the bidder who wants to 
buy the entire corporation must deal not only with the shareholders 
willing to sell at that day's market price, but with those unwilling to 
do so - the shareholders who, by declining to sell, have revealed their 
opinion that the value of their shares exceeds the valuation of the mar-
ket. Investors' opinions of stock value may differ wildly.372 To buy 
the stock of more optimistic shareholders, the tender offeror must be 
willing to pay a price higher than the prevailing market price at which 
they have already declined to sell. 373 That price is set by the tender 
offer market for corporate control. 
An example may help illustrate this point more fully. Suppose 
that the stock of a target corporation is currently trading at $40 a 
share. A bidder offering $40 a share certainly may purchase a number 
of shares at that price. But at some point the supply of shareholders 
valuing their stock at $40 will dry up. If the number of shareholders 
372. The simplest efficient market model assumes that when new information indicates 
stocks are mispriced, investors recognize this fact and adjust price to reflect the new information. 
See supra note 27 (mechanism of market efficiency). This simple model assumes homogenous 
beliefs: that investors value stocks by their expected risk-discounted return and agree on what 
that return is likely to be, so that when price departs from agreed-upon value this discrepancy is 
quickly recognized and arbitrage trading brings price into line with value again. See Mayshar, 
On Divergence of Opinion and Imperfections in Capital Markets, 13 AM. EcoN. REV. 114 (1983) 
(early work on efficient market theory assumes homogeneous beliefs). The assumption of ho-
mogenous beliefs is at odds with a reality in which investors and analysts disagree strongly about 
the likely fate of a particular corporation or industry. See Shleifer, supra note 212, at 589 (citing 
"strong direct evidence" that investors disagree about stock values). At any particular price, 
some investors will be more interested in - and have greater demand for - a particular stock 
than will others. The consequences of heterogenous beliefs for corporate finance and perform-
ance are considered at length by Professor Fox in his recent book, Finance and Industrial Per-
formance in a Dynamic Economy. See M. Fox, supra note 27. 
373. The possibility that investors differ in their valuations of stock raises the question why 
the optimistic investor who values a stock at more than the market price does not purchase more 
stock until he owns the entire corporation, so that the optimist's estimated value and market 
price coincide. The answer is that individual investors' resources are limited and investors them-
selves risk-averse. Each additional share purchased commits more of the investor's portfolio to a 
single investment, reducing diversification and increasing risk. At some point the profit opportu-
nity he perceives in buying the stock will no longer be enough to compensate him for the in· 
creased risk of concentrating his portfolio, and he will stop buying the stock even though he still 
perceives it to be underpriced. Recent economic models suggest that individual demand curves 
for particular stocks are thus downward-sloping: quantity demanded increases as price falls, and 
falls as price rises. This pattern exists not because investors change their minds about a stock's 
true value depending on the quantity they buy, but because increasing holdings in a single stock 
increases risk. See generally Jarrow, Heterogeneous Expectations, Restrictions on Short Sales, and 
Equilibrium Asset Prices, 35 J. FIN. 1105 (1980); Mayshar, supra note 372; Miller, Risk, Uncer-
tainty, and Divergence of Opinion, 32 J. FIN. 1151 (1977); Shleifer, supra note 212. Total market 
demand is the sum of these individual demand curves. 
A corollary of this view is that if you want to buy an optimistic investor's stock, each share he 
sells increases his diversification and reduces his risk. Optimistic shareholders become more and 
more reluctant to part with their "undervalued" shares and the bidder must continually raise the 
bid price. See Coffee, supra note 153, at 1185 (postulating upward-sloping supply curve for tar-
get's stock); Fischel, supra note 160, at 19 (in free market sellers will value securities differently 
and every increment in price will attract more sellers). 
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willing to part with their shares at the market price is insufficient to 
give the bidder control, the bidder will be forced to offer $41, $42, or 
more before enough shareholders agree to sell.374 It makes no differ-
ence that those few remaining shareholders who value their stock 
more highly than the market have hopelessly inflated opinions of their 
stock's value. While they could reap no profit from those opinions if 
they tried to sell their shares in the market, in a tender offer context 
the bidder must take his sellers as he finds them. 375 
As a result, the total price a bidder must pay to buy 100% of a 
corporation's voting stock is not the product of the number of shares 
outstanding, multiplied by the prevailing marginal market price;376 
rather it is the product of the number of shares outstanding, multiplied 
by the weighted average price necessary to induce all the shareholders 
to part with their shares. This average price is the true "value" of a 
share in the corporation in a control change context. 377 
If we want to encourage wealth".'producing takeovers and discour-
age nonproductive takeovers, we should seek informational efficiency 
not in trading market prices, but in tender offer prices. While efficient 
markets may accurately measure the marginal value of a single share, 
they tell us little of what the price of a successful tender offer would be 
- except that it will likely be greater. 378 How much greater is un-
374. As a practical matter, this sort of stepladder purchase is prohibited by Williams Act's 
best price rule. See infra notes 386-89 and accompanying text. 
375. These observations imply that even efficient market prices may be inaccurate measures 
of value if the market for the stock is sufficiently small that price is set by only a few optimistic 
shareholders. See Miller, supra note 373, at 1153 n.3 ("As the number of investors in each stock 
i& very small in relation to the universe of investors there is little reason to doubt that the stock is 
held by people who have above average estimates of returns and avoided by investors with aver-
age or lower estimates."). Without short selling, the optimist determines price, and "security 
markets may not produce pareto optimal results." See Jarrow, supra note 373, at 1105 (describ-
ing limitations on short sales that restrict the influence of pessimistic opinions on market price). 
376. The same analysis applies, of course, to the bidder seeking to buy not all outstanding 
stock but a block large enough to carry with it de facto control. As a practical matter, hostile 
tender offerors seem to prefer 100% acquisitions. For example, in 1986, 85% of tender offers 
made were "any-or-all" offers seeking to purchase all outstanding shares. In 1985 and 1984, any-
and-all offers comprised 73% and 74% of all tender offers respectively. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. 
COMMN., SEC MONTHLY STATl511CAL REVIEW 8 (Feb. 1987) (Table 3). 
377. See Levmore, supra note 32, at 651-52 (to acquiror, value of corporation best estimated 
not through value of marginal share, but average subjective value of all shareholders). 
378. At most, trading market prices perform a signaling function by suggesting a "floor" for 
the tender offer price. Trading market prices should be viewed as signals (rather than determi-
nants) because the bidder and target management remain free to influence shareholders' subjec-
tive valuations by disclosing still other information. A bidder who thinks the firm is inefficiently 
undervalued and therefore hopes to profit by buying the firm at a discount even though she does 
not expect to run the corporation any more profitably than current management may take mar-
ket price as a signal that the corporation's shareholders are overly pessimistic. A tender offer 
would be correspondingly inexpensive. Incumbent management remains free, however, to at-
tempt to correct any mispricing in the tender offer market by disclosing to shareholders informa-
tion indicating that the intrinsic value of the shares under current management exceeds the price 
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clear.379 Annual median premiums paid to target shareholders have 
ranged from 15% to 50% over market price.380 There is great varia-
tion in premium size, and premiums of 100% or more are not uncom-
mon. 381 If these premiums reflect the difference between the marginal 
valuation of shares in the market and the weighted average valuation 
by the target's shareholders, market price seems a weak indicator in-
deed for the tender offeror deciding whether, and at what price, to 
make a hostile tender offer. 382 
A second flaw in the market-for-control theory is that there are 
offered by the bidder. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 107, at 1168 (if market inefficiently 
undervalues target's stock because information has not been disclosed, target's management can 
respond to hostile offer by disclosing). Such disclosures are encouraged by federal law requiring 
corporate management to respond to a tender offer with a statement of management's position on 
the offer. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-2 (1987). Of course, such disclosures are likely to correct 
inefficiency in the trading market as well. This correction is the by-product, but not the goal, of 
the disclosure. Cf. Bebchuk, The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers, 95 HARV. L. 
REv. 1028, 1033 (1982) (speculative tender offer for firm whose stock is underpriced by the 
market may produce a "social benefit" by correcting the market price). 
379. See Levmore, supra note 32, at 652-53 (relationship between average and marginal price 
unclear; "one can be sure only that an [informationally] efficient market implies reliable marginal 
valuations and not reliable valuations of entire holdings" (emphasis in original)). 
380. See supra note 369. Cf. W.T. GRIMM & Co., MERGERSTAT REVIEW 1986, at 88 (1987) 
[hereinafter GRIMM REPORT] (average annual premiums paid on all acquisitions of publicly 
traded corporations have varied from 25.1% to 49.9% between 1968 and 1986). 
381. See Tender Offer Update: 1988, supra note 369, at 25 (table 4, showing range of tender 
offer bid premiums for 1986 and 1987, from a small number of negative premiums below market 
price to some premiums of 100% or more); see also' GRIMM REPORT, supra note 380, at 89 (table 
indicating distribution of premiums from 1975-1986; during this period anywhere from 2% 
(1984) to approximately 12% (1981) of acquisitions of publicly traded corporations involved 
premiums over 100%). 
382. The idea that takeover premiums reflect the necessity of the bidder's "paying off" more 
optimistic shareholders is contrary to the views of some economists that stocks are perfect substi-
tutes and that demand for stock is perfectly elastic. See supra note 212 and accompanying text; 
Coffee, supra note 153, at 1176-83 (downward-sloping demand for stocks is inconsistent with 
view that demand for stocks is perfectly elastic). Those who adopt this assumption argue that 
takeover premiums are "control" premiums reflecting the increased value of the firm in the con-
trol of better management. See SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING & URBAN AFFAIRS, 
TENDER OFFER DISCLOSURE AND FAIRNESS ACT OF 1987, s. REP. No. 265, IOOth Cong., 1st 
Sess. 16 (1987) (quoting SEC Chairman David Ruder that takeover premiums represent a "con-
trol premium" which a buyer must pay to purchase the right to deal with the corporation as he 
pleases). 
The problem with this view is that it does not explain why the premium - which, according 
to this theory, reflects the increased value of the firm in the hands of the new owner - is always 
paid to the original shareholders. While target shareholders almost always enjoy a premium, 
bidders seem to gain little or nothing from the takeover. R. BREALEY & S. MYERS, supra note 
22, at 725 (stockholders of acquiring firms "on the average seem to break even"); Easterbrook & 
Fischel, supra note 107, at 1188 (most of gain from tender offer premium goes to target share-
holders); see also Dent, supra note 259, at 777, 778-79 (1986) (most studies show acquiring firm's 
stock values decline after acquisition). If the firm is valued at a premium only because of the 
expected benefits of new ownership, why should the bidder share those benefits with current 
stockholders? A rational bidder would offer the lowest price he can get away with - say, a 
dollar over market - and enjoy any profit to be made from the takeover himself. That bidders 
not only do not retain the entire benefit for themselves, but seem to give almost all gain to target 
shareholders, seems more consistent with the target's ability to extract average rather than mar-
ginal value. See also Coffee, supra note 153, at 1185-88 (infinite elasticity hypothesis inconsistent 
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reasons to suspect that prices in the tender offer market are distorted 
for reasons that have nothing to do with the efficiency of trading mar-
ket prices. Poison pills, crown jewel lock-up options, and shark repel-
lents are but a few of the colorfully denominated tactics developed by 
corporate management to fend off hostile overtures. 383 A number of 
state legislatures (includirig Delaware's) also have thrown their weight 
on the side of incumbent management by passing anti-takeover legisla-
tion. 384 Such defenses raise the price of a hostile takeovers above the 
price that would be set in a truly free market for corporate control. 385 
Perhaps the greatest distortion in the tender offer market may be 
traced to the Williams Act itself. The "best price" rule, promulgated 
by the SEC under that Act, requires a tender offeror to pay to all 
shareholders the highest price paid to any one of them. 386 This re-
with reality of large tender offer premiums); Levmore, supra note 32, at 653-54 (really no evi-
dence that stock demand is not inelastic). 
Another theory offered to explain takeover premiums, the "bidder overpayment" theory, sug-
gests the takeovers occur because empire-building management of corporations with large re-
tained earnings are loath to return those earnings to stockholders in the form of dividends and 
instead prefer to use the money for wasteful corporate acquisitions. See supra note 274 and 
accompanying text; L. LoWENSTEIN, supra note 129, at 149-51; Black, Bidder Overpayment in 
Takeovers (preliminary draft, May 1988) (forthcoming in the STANFORD LAW REVIEW). If 
acquiring management views money as no object to the empire-expanding acquisition, it is natu-
ral that takeover gains (currently averaging 50% or more) accrue to targets rather than ac-
quirors. However, if the bidder overpayment hypothesis is accurate, inefficient trading markets 
are the least of obstacles we face in achieving a truly efficient market for corporate control. 
383. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 107, at 1175, 1176 n.38 (referring to defensive 
tactics that raise costs of hostile tender offers; these costs of resistance are "substantial"); Fischel, 
supra note 160, at 30-36 (criticizing defensive tactics that raise costs of tender offers). See gener-
ally R. CLARK, supra note 329, at 571-77 (describing defensive strategies). 
384. Such legislation became more attractive following the Supreme Court's decision in CTS 
Corp. v. Dynamics Corp., 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987). That case held constitutional an Indiana 
takeover statute that stripped voting rights from any shareholder acquiring more than a certain 
percentage of shares, unless those rights were restored by a-vote of other disinterested sharehold-
ers. In the wake of CTS, numerous states have passed similar anti-takeover statutes. See, e.g., 
Del. Antitakeover Law of Feb. 2, 1988, ch. 204, § 203 (CCH) (prohibiting for three years certain 
business combinations with shareholder acquiring 15% or more of corporation, unless board of 
directors or other shareholders approve); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. llOD, §§ 1-8, ch. 110E, §§ 1-7 
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1988) (investor' acquiring certain portion of firm's shares loses voting rights 
unless other shareholders reinstate); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 302A.671-.673 (West Supp. 1988) 
(acquirors of certain percentage of shares lose voting rights unless other shareholders reinstate); 
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 23A.50.010-.50.901 (West Supp. 1988) (prohibiting for five years 
certain business combinations with 10% acquiror). 
385. See Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 643 (1982) (state anti-takeover statutes harm 
efficient allocation of resources by hindering tender offers); Fischel, supra note 160, at 45 (criti-
cizing state takeover offer statutes that raise costs of tender offers). On the bidder's side, of 
course, two-tier offering tactics and the hope of greenmail may lower the cost of a hostile control 
bid, perhaps to the point where nonproductive takeovers - or takeover attempts - are attrac-
tive. Although over-pricing seems more likely than underpricing, there is no way for us to deter-
mine a priori whether hostile takeovers under these market conditions are on aggregate under- or 
over-priced. We can only observe that the likelihood that their prices will coincide with the 
"correct" price - the price that would be set in a market free of such imperfections - is small. 
386. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 14(d)(7), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(7) (1982); 17 C.F.R. 
§ 240.14d-10 (1988). 
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quirement precludes the kind of stepladder purchase described earlier. 
Suppose a bidder identifies the price she must offer to induce the last 
shareholder to tender his shares. The offeror must pay that price not 
only to that last holdout, but to each and every shareholder who ten-
ders. The demands of the rule must be met even if some shareholders 
would have willingly sold for market price or a few cents higher.387 
The price of a tender offer for 100% of a corporation's stock is thus 
increased from the product of the weighted average valuation of the 
shareholders, multiplied by the number of shares outstanding, to the 
product of the highest valuation held by any one shareholder, multi-
plied by the number of shares outstanding.388 This requirement may 
grossly distort pricing in the tender offer market.389 
The significance of these observations is accented by the fact that, 
in contrast to trading market prices, tender offer prices have a very 
important allocative role. It is difficult to imagine a more significant 
allocative decision than who owns and controls the corporation. But, 
as in the case of IPO mispricing, current securities policy pursues effi-
cient pricing where it is relatively unimportant - the trading markets 
- and appears to ignore mispricing in a market with substantial allo-
cative effects - the tender offer market. If we are truly concerned 
about improving allocative efficiency, reforming a tender offer market 
for corporate control now characterized by poison pills, anti-takeover 
statutes, and the best price rule, should be a more pressing priority 
than improving trading market efficiency.390 
E. Conclusion: The Economic Functions of Stock Prices 
We are now in a position to draw some conclusions about the im-
387. The Williams Act does allow a bidder to make a series of tender offers, with each tender 
offer set at a slightly higher price. R. CLARK, supra note 329, at 554. 
388. For ease of presentation it is assumed that the tender offer is for 100% of the voting 
stock of the corporation, as indeed most tender offers are. See supra note 376. The assumption 
that the tender offeror must purchase 100% is extreme in the sense that, while most tender offers 
are "any-and-all" offers, the success of the bid does not hinge on a 100% response. Any propor-
tion sufficient to carry effective control will do. However, the analysis and general result are the 
same even if the tender offeror wants to acquire only a portion of the firm's outstanding stock. 
389. See Fischel, supra note 160, at 19 (criticizing best price rule as greatly increasing prices 
of tender offers). 
390. The argument that efficient trading market prices are necessary for efficient tender offer 
prices appears to share the defects of the argument, discussed earlier, that efficient trading mar-
ket prices are necessary for correct pricing of new issues. Just as trading market prices may have 
little value to the underwriter estimating IPO price, there is reason to suspect that efficient trad-
ing market prices carry little information to the tender offeror, who is more interested in likely 
tender offer price. Moreover, as in the case of the IPO underwriting market, the tender offer 
market for corporate control may be so imperfect that inefficient trading prices are the least of 
the problems we face in achieving allocatively "correct" tender offer pricing. Again, efficient 
markets seem neither necessary nor sufficient for allocative efficiency. 
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portance of efficient stock markets to the optimal allocation of re-
sources in the economy. 
The economic role which commentators most frequently ascribe to 
efficient markets is that of determining which firms can raise capi-
tal. 391 Inefficiently low stock prices are thought to lead to inflated 
costs of equity capital, while inefficiently high prices allow firms to 
raise capital too cheaply. "What casts doubt on this apparently 
straightforward view of corporate financing . . . is the fact that most 
U.S .... corporations do not rely on new stock issues to any significant 
degree."392 The first flaw in the capital-allocation theory is that equity 
issues play a negligible role in corporate finance. 
Let us return to the familiar example of insiders trading in Texas 
Gulf Sulphur stock on the basis of undisclosed information concerning 
the Ontario mineral strike. Unless Texas Gulf Sulphur is in the mid-
dle of an equity issuance - an extremely rare event in a corporation's 
life - insider trading that moves stock prices to the "correct" ·price 
more quickly will not bei:iefit the firm's ability to raise money by sell-
ing stock. In addition, a change in stock price alone, unaccompanied 
by news of the strike, is unlikely to enable Texas Gulf Sulphur to bor-
row at a lower interest rate. 393 It certainly would not affect the princi-
pal source of funds for most firms: retained earnings. 394 
It is not surprising that some authorities have found themselves 
defending the capital-allocation theory by asserting that "[a]lthough 
corporate finance scholars disagree to some extent on how to measure 
a firm's cost of capital, most believe that a firm's share price is relevant 
to the calculation.'?395 A claim that share price is not "irrelevant" is 
hardly the sort of rousing endorsement that induces sacrifices to 
achieve greater informational efficiency.396 
391. See supra notes 159-70 and accompanying text. 
392. BRADY REPORT, supra note 15, at VII-2. 
393. See supra notes 196-204 and accompanying text. 
394. See supra notes 193-95 and accompanying text. 
395. Fox, supra note 5, at 1016. Professor Banoff's assertion after investigating the matter is 
similarly modest. See Banoff, supra note 38, at 170 n.172 (despite the fact that new issues are 
only a small percentage of stock transactions, "many commentators believe the markets remain 
the primary mechanism" for allocating capital). Baumol observes: 
One might almost venture to conclude ... that the market in fact does not allocate much 
of the economy's capital, and, moreover, what capital it does handle is not utilized with any 
peculiar efficiency .•.. 
All in all, one cannot escape the impression that, at best, the [market's] allocative func-
tion is performed rather imperfectly .... 
W. BAUMOL, supra note 25, at 79, 83. 
396. Fox, supra note 5, at 1017 (that corporations raise funds by other means "does not make 
share price irrelevant to a firm's cost of capital"). Fox's recent work has focused on the possibil-
ity that many corporations may avoid equity financing and that managers may consequently view 
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A second flaw in the capital-allocation theory is its failure to recog-
nize that the trading markets are discrete from the corporate issues 
market. Enhanced efficiency is normally sought in the exchange and 
OTC markets for outstanding shares. But when corporations do raise 
capital by selling equity, they sell it in the underwriting market.397 If 
insider trading moves Texas Gulf Sulphur stock to a more "correct" 
price, it may help underwriters more accurately to price a seasoned 
distribution by the company. But the significance of Texas Gulf 
Sulphur's trading market prices on underwriters pricing other firms' 
issues (whether by providing pricing signals, enhancing investor confi-
dence, or by influencing their value as substitute goods) seems very 
limited. Moreover, even a perfectly efficient trading market may not 
prevent persistent mispricing and underpricing of initial public offer-
ings. IPO mispricing resulting from imperfections in the underwriting 
market seems more likely to cause· significant capital misallocations 
than outstanding stock mispricing caused by inefficient trading 
markets. 
Once we recognize that the trading and corporate issues markets 
are two different markets, it is apparent that the case of seasoned is-
sues (which account for only 30% of public stock issues) provides the 
strongest argument for adopting trading market efficiency as a policy 
goal. 398 But if efficient trading markets only improve capital alloca-
tion in the seasoned issue context, we may restrict our pursuit of effi-
ciency to those few corporations that do issue seasoned stock, during 
those time periods when the issue is being priced and distributed.399 
We need not worry about pricing efficiency for all stocks, at all times. 
Finally, the ease with which capital can be reallocated suggests 
that if inefficient trading market prices do occasionally distort sea-
soned issues prices, the economic losses that result are likely to be 
marginal. 400 If Texas Gulf Sulphur receives too little in proceeds from 
a seasoned issue, it can seek additional financing elsewhere; if it re-
ceives too much, it will return the excess funds as dividends or profita-
the costs of raising capital through internal finance, equity, and debt as disconnected from each 
other. See M. Fox, supra note 27, at 118, 270-82 (firms strongly prefer internal to external 
finance, and debt to equity: consequently there is no single cost of capital). 
397. See supra notes 206-11 and accompanying text. 
398. See supra note 183. 
399. Trading market inefficiency will not distort seasoned issues prices unless the inefficiency 
persists for a sufficiently long period of time to affect underwriter-issuer negotiations. In other 
words, the market must incorporate information so slowly and imperfectly that mispricing per-
sists for weeks or even months. See supra note 272. Many policies designed to enhance efficiency 
only speed the incorporation of information by hours or days, and so would not be likely to 
improve seasoned issue pricing. See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text. 
400. See supra notes 268-73 and accompanying text. 
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bly reinvest them in some other project. Because capital is a liquid 
commodity, losses from initial misallocations may be confined to un-
necessary transaction costs or slightly reduced rates of return. 
These observations undermine the prevailing view that capital allo- · 
cation is the stock market's most important function and that efficient 
stock pricing is crucial to its fulfillment. Closer examination suggests 
that the trading market's role in allocating capital is limited and some-
what superficial. If efficient stock markets are not essential to the 
proper allocation of capital, the single greatest economic benefit attrib-
uted to efficient stock markets is illusory. 
In addition, there are reasons to doubt that stock market prices 
significantly influence the allocation of resources in other, more indi-
rect ways. The management quality-signaling argument demonstrates 
the weakness of any argument promoting efficient stock prices as sig-
nals: rational investors evaluating the abilities of corporate manage-
ment are free to investigate a variety of sources of information 
concerning management's competence, and will not hire and fire on 
stock price alone.401 In the case of wealth signaling, investors who 
intend to sell immediately find that, inefficient or not, today's market 
price is an excellent signal for realizable value. In the short-term and 
medium-term, investor estimates of wealth are damaged more by vola-
tile prices than inefficient ones. For the long-term investor, ineffi-
ciency in current prices may well add some uncertainty to savings 
estimates, but such estimates are uncertain even in perfectly efficient 
markets.402 
Finally, efficient market prices are neither necessary nor sufficient 
for an efficient tender offer market. Like the corporate issues market, 
the tender offer market is a separate market with its own (in many 
ways, flawed) pricing mechanism.403 
The securities culture views market efficiency as an important reg-
ulatory goal because stock prices are believed to allocate resources, 
and the stock market itself thought to function as "a Nerve Center for 
the Real Economy."404 But the conclusion of economic analysis is 
that the primary function of the trading markets is the simple redistri-
bution of wealth among investors.405 Closer examination of the inter- . 
action between stock prices and allocative decisions suggests that more 
efficient trading markets may bring little economic benefit. 
401. See supra notes 327-43 and accompanying text. 
402. See supra notes 344-60 and accompanying text. 
403. See supra notes 361-90 and accompanying text. 
404. Fox, supra note 12, at 1015. See supra notes 152, 156 and accompanying text. 
405. See supra notes 172-74 and accompanying text. 
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There seems good reason to suspect that government policies 
designed to produce more efficient stock prices will not significantly 
improve real investment decisions. But the question of whether en-
hancing market efficiency is a sensible goal of securities policy is only 
partly answered by suggesting that the stock market allocates re-
sources, at best, in a weak and imperfect fashion. If markets that rap-
idly incorporate information carry any benefits, allocative or 
otherwise, improving market efficiency is a worthwhile goal so long as 
the marginal costs of promoting efficiency do not exceed those 
benefits. 
Particular efficiency-enhancing policies (such as allowing index fu-
tures trading or requirihg disclosure of merger negotiations) carry 
unique costs and benefits that must receive close scrutiny elsewhere.406 
However, the larger question of whether pricing efficiency should be 
an objective of securities policy raises several common cost-benefit is-
sues apart from the question of the market's allocative function. 
Those common issues ai:e examined here, albeit briefly. For only if the 
benefits of improving market efficiency outweigh the costs, can we 
then conclude that the pursuit of more efficient trading markets is 
worth the candle. 
A. Incorrect Prices in an Efficient Market 
As noted eariier, the allocative benefits associated with efficient 
pricing depend on two key assumptions: that efficient markets accu-
rately price stocks and that stock prices influence resource allocation. 
Thus far, we have focused on the second premise while giving informa-
tional efficiency the benefit of the doubt and assuming that efficient 
markets do accurately price stocks according to their "fundamental 
values."407 In other words, we have assumed that stock prices reflect 
our best estimates of expected earnings, discounted for nondiversifi-
able risk.408 That assumption is an essential one, for "the utility of 
406. For example, program trading is believed to add undesirable market volatility, see supra 
note 79 and accompanying text, while requiring disclosure of merger negotiations may dissuade 
potential bidders from coming forward, see supra note 107 and accompanying text. 
407. Professor Wang has adopted the phrase "fund.amental-valuation efficiency" to describe 
a stock market in which prices reflect all available information concerning rational estimations of 
the present value of expected future dividends and other payouts from a stock. He uses the term 
"information-arbitrage efficiency" to describe a market in which prices reflect all public informa-
tion, rational or irrational. See Wang, supra note 13, at 344 (citing Tobin, On the Efficiency of 
the Financial System, 153 LLOYD'S BANK REV. 1 (July 1984)). 
408. The Capital Asset Pricing Model predicts that rational investors will value stock ac-
cording to these two factors. See supra notes 280-92 and accompanying text. 
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market efficiency centers on the notion that, in an efficient market, the 
market price for shares will reflect their actual value" as determined 
by expected future earnings.409 
But what if efficient markets don't price securities this rationally? 
A number of commentators have addressed the problem of how the 
market sets stock prices and have concluded that it is possible to have . 
a market that is informationally efficient, and yet have stock prices 
unrelated to their values as financial instruments.410 That possibility 
erodes still further the purported allocative benefits of efficient pricing. 
A market that is efficient but still inaccurate has little to recommend 
it, even if- especially if- stock market prices influence allocational 
decisions. 
The idea that investors value securities other than by discounted 
future earnings is difficult to swallow. It implies that investors are 
irrational or at least perceive their fellow investors as irrational. 
Surely it is irrational for someone to pay $40 for a "hot" stock whose 
likely earnings, coldly calculated, are exactly the same as those of a 
$20 stock. Nevertheless, the possibility that investors may not ration-
ally value stock is one that has the support of an impressive list of 
authorities.411 They argue that the price investors are willing to pay 
for individual stocks is determined not by financial fundamentals but 
by their perceptions of how other investors value the stock - that is, 
expected price changes in the near future. 412 They find evidence for 
the claim that stock markets are irrational in speculative "bubbles," 
409. Levmore, supra note 32, at 651; see W. BAUMOL, supra note 5, at 6-7 (to allocate capital 
effectively, efficient markets should value stocks based on capitalized value of expected future 
earnings); see Gordon & Kornhauser, supra note 1, at 825-27 (comparing "allocative" and "spec-
ulative" efficient markets). 
410. See, e.g., M. Fox, supra note 271 at 57-59; Wang, supra note 13, at 344-349; Wu, supra 
note 12, at 266-67. See also authorities cited infra note 411 (market sets irrational prices). 
411. M. Fox, supra note 27, at 58 (belief that market may price securities irrationally "is 
perfectly respectable within the economics profession"). See, e.g., Gulf & W. Indus. v. Great At!. 
& Pac. Tea Co., 356 F. Supp. 1066, 1071 (S.D.N.Y.), affd., 476 F.2d 687 (2d Cir. 1973) (stock 
prices affected by the "whims and caprice of the crowd"}; W. BAUMOL, supra note 25, at 51 
(stock prices may be based on "traders' fortuitous hunches and perhaps little else"); J. KEYNES, 
THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST AND MONEY 153-57 (1936) (stock prices 
"the outcome of the mass psychology"); H. KRIPKE, supra note 14, at 80-82 (irrationality of the 
market); B. MALKIEL, A RANDOM WALK DOWN WALL STREET 22-25 (4th ed. 1985) ("castle-
in-the-air" theory that stock prices have nothing to do with intrinsic values). 
412. The point was perhaps best illustrated by Keynes in his famous "beauty contest" 
analogy: 
Professional investment may be likened to those newspaper competitions in which the com-
petitors have to pick out the six prettiest faces from a hundred photogr:aphs, the prize being 
awarded to the competitor whose choice most nearly corresponds to the average preferenees 
of the competitors as a whole; so that each competitor has to pick, not those faces which he 
himself finds prettiest, but those which he thinks likeliest to catch the fancy of the other 
competitors, all of whom are looking at the problem from the same point of view. 
J. KEYNES, supra note 411, at 156. 
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perhaps the best-known of which are the 1929, and now 1987, market 
crashes.413 In such a bubble, prices rise to levels unsupported by po-
tential earnings and then drop in a short time to a fraction of their 
former value.414 Some also see evidence of irrationality in market 
"overvolatility" (dramatic price changes unexplained by significant 
new information concerning stock values),415 or in instances where fi-
nancial instruments trade at identical prices although one is clearly 
superior to the other.416 
We cannot prove that investors rationally value securities by their 
expected future earnings.417 A change in stock price clearly indicates 
that the past price was "incorrect." But we cannot determine whether 
this change occurred because the prior price was irrational or because, 
while the past price was correct at the time, subsequent new informa-
tion has changed rational estimates of future earnings.418 Only if effi-
cient markets quickly incorporate the right sorts of information can 
efficient pricing bring economic benefits. Prices that are a timely index 
of psychological phenomena contribute nothing to the quest for the 
more efficient allocation of resources.419 
B. Efficient Markets and Investor Protection 
The consensus that securities policy should work to make the stock 
market more efficient is based primarily on the perception that eco-
nomic benefits follow when proper stock pricing improves the alloca-
413. See J. GALBRAITH, THE GREAT CRAsH 95 (1955) (economic factors do not fully ex-
plain 1929 collapse); Gordon & Kornhauser, supra note 1, at 828 (assumption that efficient mar· 
kets price securities according to rational estimates of financial returns "surprising" in light of 
stock price bubbles); cf BRADY REPORT, supra note 15, at 11·1 (fundamental factors do not 
explain precipitous October 19 drop). 
414. See generally B. MALKIEL, supra note 411, at 28-45 (describing speculative bubbles 
from Tulip Bulb craze of 1630s to'l929 stock crash). 
415. See Shiller, Do Stock Prices Move Too Much to Be Justified by Subsequent Changes in 
Dividends?, 71 AM. EcoN. REv. 421, 433-34 (1981) (stock price volatility appears to be 5 to 13 
times too high to be attributed to the market's receiving new information about expected future 
dividends, if future dividends can be expected to be no more volatile than corporate dividends 
have been in the past). 
416. See Wang, supra note 13, at 402 (evidence that convertible preferred stock trades at 
same price as common). 
417. See Gordon & Kornhauser, supra note 1, at 782, 827 (impossible to test rationality of 
stock pricing); Roll, A Critique of the Asset Pricing Theory's Tests, 4 J. FIN. EcoN. 129 (1977) 
(CAPM is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to test). Evidence that price changes are random 
and that stock markets quickly incorporate information tells us nothing about the quality of the 
information being incorporated. 
418. See Gordon & Kornhauser, supra note 1, at 771-72. 
419. See Gordon & Kornhauser, supra note 1, at 764 (legal rush to embrace efficient markets 
unwise if efficient markets don't value stocks rationally); Levmore, supra note 32, at 647, 648 
n.13 (market may incorporate all information, but if information is limited or incorrect "an 
efficient, well-formed market ... is not necessarily 'correct' or useful to players and policymak-
ers"); Wu, supra note 12, at 267 (prices that are index of psychology have no allocational use). 
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tion of real resources.420 However, some observers favor 
informational efficiency as serving the more traditional goal of "inves-
tor protection" as well.421 They argue that if prices in an efficient mar-
ket are equivalent to the stock's true value, no investor can be the 
victim of an "unfair" trade. 422 (Of course, no investor can buy a bar-
gain, either. But if you can't beat the market, at least the market can't 
beat you.) 
The first problem with the view that efficient markets should be 
promoted because they guarantee that stock prices reflect true value is 
that such a guarantee is inconsistent with Congress' intent in passing 
the 1933 and 1934 Acts.423 In enacting those statutes, Congress re-
jected any regulation of the merits or worth of securities in favor of a 
disclosure system allowing investors to make their own decisions.424 
As Justice White has noted, "'[t]his system is not furthered by [pro-
tecting] those who refuse to look out for themselves.' "425 Any policy 
that seems to achieve "correct" pricing of securities through market 
efficiency protects the uninformed by eliminating the informed inves-
tor's opportunity for profit.426 Under such policies, investors are not 
only given a "level playing field":427 the outcome of the game is prede-
420. See supra notes 152-57 and accompanying text. 
421. See Securities Act of 1933, §§ 3(c), lO(c), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77c(c), 77j(c) (1982) (SEC may 
exempt securities from registration and regulate contents of prospectuses as necessary for the 
protection of investors); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 14(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1982) 
(SEC may regulate proxies as necessary for the protection of investors). 
422. See Benston, supra note 133, at 151-52 ("[T]he stock market could be considered 'fair' if 
the prices of securities at any point in time are unbiased estimators of their intrinsic val-
ues .•.. "); Carney, supra note 27, at 895 (insider trading enhances investor confidence by reas-
suring investors that market is efficient); Note, supra note 101, at 1069 ("[i]n an efficient market, 
where prices are by definition 'fair,' it is impossible for investors to be cheated"). 
423. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 108 S. Ct. 978, 996-98 (1988) (White, J., dissenting in part 
and concurring in part) (criticizing fraud-on-the-market theory as inconsistent with congres-
sional policy to encourage investors to look out for themselves). 
424. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 91, at 669 (securities laws focus on disclosure, not 
substantive regulation of investments); Jarrell, The Economic Effects of Federal Regulation of the 
Market for New Security Issues, 24 J. L. & EcoN. 613, 621-22 (1981) (SEC's legislated purpose to 
protect investors from insufficient and misleading information, not from risky securities). See 
generally Schoenbaum, supra note 36, at 575 (describing congressional debate between merits 
review and disclosure in 1933 Act). 
425. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 108 S. Ct. at·997 (White, J., dissenting in part and concurring in 
part) (quoting dissent of Randall, J., in Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462, 483 (5th Cir. 1981) (en 
bane), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1102 (1983)). 
426. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 108 S. Ct. at 996-98 (White, J., dissenting in part and con-
curring in part) (fraud-on-the-market theory, by allowing investors to sue when market price 
differs from "value," undesirably protects investors who chose to remain uninformed); Ver-
recchia, Consensus Beliefs, Information Acquisition, and Market Information Efficiency, 10 AM. 
EcoN. REv. 874 (1980) (correct prices protect less-informed investors from better-informed 
investors). 
427. "Fairness" in securities policy is often described as ensuring "a level playing field" on 
which no particular group such as corporate insiders enjoys a systematic advantage unavailable 
to the public investor. See, e.g., Dynamics Corp. v. CTS Corp., 637 F. Supp. 406, 419 (N.D. Ill.) 
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termined a tie. 428 
The second problem with the idea that efficient markets allow wid-
ows and orphans to buy and sell stock without care is that its Edenic 
appeal does not hold up to scrutiny. The investor who sells for $4 the 
Home Shopping Network stock he bought at $40 finds scant consola-
tion in knowing that the declining market price has continuously rep-
resented the "true" value of the shares. Investors do not care about 
intriD.sic value vis-a-vis price. They care about price bought, and price 
sold.429 
For the same reasons that inefficient markets do not erode investor 
confidence, efficient markets pose no particular benefit to investors. 
Rational investors care only about realizable return and nondiversifi-
able risk in their investments.430 So long as inefficiency does not in-
crease market volatility and does not reduce average returns because 
the investor "will just as often find himself buying or selling a security 
that is 'overvalued' as 'undervalued,' " inefficient markets will not 
harm investors because they neither degrade return nor increase 
risk.431 
Once again, it is important to distinguish policies that permit ineffi-
ciency from policies that permit fraud. Fraud in its various forms 
reduces investors' average returns. For every winner in the market 
there must be a loser, and if the perpetrators of fraud consistently win, 
(Williams Act designed to establish "level playing field" in which neither target management nor 
bidder enjoys advantage), ajfd., 794 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1986), revd., 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987); SEC 
v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 852 (2d Cir. 1968) (congressional intent that members 
of the investing public should be subject to same risks, including "the risk that one's evaluative 
capacity ... may exceed another's"; insider trading violates that intent because insiders "are not 
trading on an equal footing with the outside investors"), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 967 (1969); 
Levmore, supra note 12, at 122 (fairness "when insiders and outsiders are in equal positions"), 
However, even on a level playing field, one side must win and one side lose. The point is that the 
rules are the same for all, and the investor willing to put in the analysis needed to identify 
undervalued stocks has as good a shot as any other investor at profiting from his analysis. 
428. There are also practical problems with any such warranty. The market will remain 
efficient only if we preserve enough inefficiency to maintain profit incentives for analysts and 
professional traders to invest time and other valuable resources in the collection, analysis, and 
creation of information concerning stock values. See supra note 29 (need an equilibrium of dise-
quilibrium). Another problem arises if informationally efficient prices do not rationally reflect 
stock values. Prices may not reflect average expectations of future earnings because of investor 
irrationality, see supra note 419 and accompanying text, or because of restrictions on short sales, 
see supra note 375. In such a case, the attempt to further informational efficiency on behalf of 
uninformed investors is tantamount to an entitlement to prices that may be grossly over-inflated 
by the optimism of a minority of investors or by mass psychological phenomena. Finally, some 
sources of inefficiency may serve other desirable goals, such as the inefficiency that results when 
Texas Gulf Sulphur withholds information concerning a new mineral strike. Such silence en-
sures that private corporate information inures to the benefit of the corporation. For all of these 
reasons, any attempt to guarantee that the "price is right" seems questionable. 
429. See supra notes 302-08 and accompanying text. 
430. See supra notes 280-92 and accompanying text. 
431. Benston, supra note 133, at 152; see supra notes 293-321 and accompanying text. 
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then public investors must consistently lose. But the issues of fraud 
and efficiency are not the same. While some frauds (such as false dis-
closure) may lead to inefficient mispricing, other forms of fraud (such 
as insider trading) may actually enhance efficiency.432 While fraud 
harms average returns, pricing inefficiency per se does not, so long as 
the investor has an eq~al chance of ~aining or losing. 
The flip side of these observations is that efficient markets cannot 
protect investors. "Accurate" prices do not allow widows and or-
phans to buy stock without care. Only stable - or increasing -
prices do. Controlling fraud which erodes investor returns, and 
controlling volatility, which adds risk, are the keys to "investor 
protection." 
C. The Costs of Informational Efficiency 
Efficient stock markets require two ingredients: effective distribu-
tion of massive amounts of information, and a trading system which 
can incorporate that information int<:? stock price.433 Neither comes 
cheaply. 
Fully informed stock prices require that market participants not 
only take account of general economic conditions, but also seek out all 
available information relevant to the fortunes of the thousands of cor-
porations whose stocks are publicly held and traded.434 Creating, ob-
taining, and analyzing such information r_equires extensive private 
investment. For example, the corporate costs of SEC-mandated dis-
closure are estimated to be one billion dollars annually,435 and the 
costs of additional voluntary corporate disclosure are estimated at 
more than twice that amount. 436 Those figures, large as they are, do 
not include the additional costs of private information-seeking initia-
tives by investors, financial analysts, and the press. 
432. See supra notes 39-48, 203 and accompanying text. 
433. Because an efficient market by definition reflects all available information, see supra 
notes 27-28, at least some traders (and possibly a great many)_ must be aware of the information 
or it will not be incorporated into price. See generally Gilson & Kraakman, supra note l, at 557-
59, 565-67 (distribution necessary for market to incorporate information)., Of course, if little or 
no information is "available," it is possible to imagine a market that is·conipletely efficient yet 
imposes almost no information search costs on traders becalise there is ali:nost no information to 
search. See Levmore, supra note 32, at 647-49 (efficient market as "black box"). But the reality 
is that we enjoy an information-rich (some might say, information-laden) society. It seems safe 
to assume that whatever one's definition of "available" information, see supra note 28, stock 
traders must take account of a very large amount information in setting efficient stock prices. 
434. See Seligman, supra note 186, at 708 (6,355 co=on stocks traded on NYSE, AMEX, 
and NASDAQ). 
435. s. PHILLIPS & J. ZECHER, supra note 253, at 51. 
436. S. PHILLIPS & J. ZECHER, supra note 253, at 49, 50 (Table 3.3) (1975 costs ofvqluntary 
disclosure estimated at $2.3 billion). 
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The continuous incorporation of information into stock price also 
requires liquid markets that produce continuous prices.437 Maintain-
ing markets for new and outstanding stock (not to mention markets 
for derivative instruments like stock options and futures) involves the 
work of investment bankers, brokers, dealers, exchange specialists, 
market makers, and investment managers who must be paid and pro-
vided with offices and support. In 1986, there were over 400,000 indi-
viduals employed in the securities industry.438 In that same year, the 
417 NYSE-member firms qualified to do public business, alone, made 
fifty billion dollars in gross income.439 Individual investors also con-
tribute time and effort to securities trading, although perhaps with less 
compensation. 
The private costs of maintaining an efficient stock market clearly 
are substantial. Government disclosure and market regulation add 
public administrative costs as well.44-0 Whether the public expendi-
tures associated with the present disclosure and market regulation 
scheme on the whole produce commensurate benefits is a question be-
yond the scope of this article.441 But government initiatives designed 
solely to enhance pricing efficiency, especially when these efforts in-
volve encouraging the development of larger and more varied markets, 
pose a special danger. Such intervention not only adds public admin-
istrative expense, but may encourage private expenditures that far out-
weigh any resulting allocative benefit.442 
Private expenditures by market participants trying to identify and 
trade in mispriced stocks may be a social waste akin to that incurred 
when the public spends money handicapping and betting on horse 
races. 443 If real resource allocation is unaffected by either contest, be-
437. Stock prices cannot accurately reflect all available information unless stock transactions 
are happening with sufficient frequency that price estimates can be based on current rather than 
stale transactions. 
438. NEW YORK STOCK EXCH., NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE FACT BOOK 63 (1987) 
[hereinafter 1987 NYSE FACTBOOK] (citing 1986 Labor Department statistics). 
439. 1987 NYSE FACTBOOK, supra note 438, at 4, 61. 
440. The SEC's appropriated budget for 1987 was $115 million; the Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission's was $30 million. U.S. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET, BUDGET 
OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT: FISCAL YEAR 1989 I-Z88, 1-ZlO (appendix) (1988). 
441. See supra note 151 on benefits of federal disclosure and antifraud policies. 
442. Information, like other goods, should be produced only to that point where the effort 
and resources spent to get it produce equivalent benefits. Coffee, supra note S, at 724 (ideally 
social resources would be devoted to stock information only so long as social costs do not exceed 
social benefits}. See generally Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. POL. EcoN. 213 
(1961). . 
443. See Coffee, supra note 5, at 733 (If a trading market does not allocate capital, one can 
view pursuit of information as social waste.). The classic presentation of the theory that there 
will be a wasteful private overinvestment in information in a world of pure exchange is found in 
Professor Hirshleifer's work on the value of predictive information. See Hirshleifer, The Private 
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ing able to predict the outcomes of races or ~tock trading provides no 
conceivable social benefit. Nevertheless, because accurate prediction 
of either a horse race or the day's trading on the NYSE can be a 
source of great wealth to the individual investor or bettor (offset, of 
course, by some other investor's or bettor's loss), personal incentives 
to ferret out information persist. The tension between "the private 
profitability and the social uselessness" of predictive information re-
sults in an "overinvestment" in information and trading.444 
The point may be demonstrated by example. Suppose that it costs 
$75 to run a horse race which produces a social benefit - identifying 
the fastest horse - with a value of $25.445 Suppose also that there are 
three gamblers, each of whom believes a different horse is fastest. 
Each has $100 to spend. In the absence of betting, no gambler would 
be willing to pay for the race. But if betting is permitted, the three 
gamblers will each contribute $25 to the running of the race. That is 
because each believes he can bet his remaining $75 in the parimutuel 
pool and win back $225 - for a profit of $125. 
The first lesson of the example is that maximizing society's wealth 
by properly allocating capital or other resources is of little interest to 
the bettor or the investor. In the case described above, it makes no 
diff~rence to the gamblers that they are spending $75 to achieve a so-
cial benefit valued at $25. Their motive is not social gain but the hope 
of personal profit from selecting the horse most likely to win. Simi-
larly, investors in the stock market are not concerned with rewarding 
well-run corp,orations by allocating capital to them, but with trying to 
outguess the market. As a result, we lack any assurance that the 
amount of resources investors will spend on gathering information will 
bear any resemblance to the amount that would be optimal from a 
social point of view. 
The second lesson of the example is that excessive private invest-
ment in stock market information is exacerbated if investors, like bet-
tors, have differing beliefs about which stock or horse is the best bet.446 
Each gambler contributed $25 to runlling the race and bet his remain-
ing $75 in the parimutuel pool because he hoped to win back $225. Of 
course, two of the three must be wrong in their belief that their chosen 
horse will win. The result is that the gamblers have spent a total of 
and Social Value of Information and the Reward to Inventive Activity, 61 AM. EcoN. REv. 561 
(1971). 
444. See Hirsbleifer, supra note 443, at 565-67. 
445. While the specifics of this example are my own, I am indebted to Professor Hirshleifer 
for the notion of a horseracing analogy. See id. at 569. 
446. See supra note 372 (on heterogenous beliefs). 
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$300 on an activity (the race) that not only fails to produce sufficient 
social benefit, but produces total individual benefits ($225 to the win-
ning gambler) less than its cost. But so long as bettors differ in their 
opinions of horses, and so long as everyone on Wall Street believes 
that he or she is brighter or luckier than the rest, all will spend time 
and energy creating, collecting, and analyzing information that not 
only is socially useless, but costs more to collect than a~y possible sum 
of resulting private benefits.447 
Private expenditures on stock information and trading may al-
ready outweigh any resulting private or public benefit. Trading in out-
standing shares is a zero-sum game: any investor's gain must be 
balanced by another's loss.448 The costs of gathering information and 
the transaction costs of trading are deadweight losses that ensure that 
·individual investors will lose, on average, in the stock market just as 
gamblers lose, on average, in a casino. 
These individual losses may be worthwhile if the stock market con-
tributes a social benefit from the improved allocation of capital and 
other resources. But the fact that information-gathering and trading 
expenditures associated with trading in outstanding stock (which does 
not directly allocate capital to corporations) grossly outweigh expendi-
tures on corporate issues (which do) suggests otherwise.449 While cor-
porations issued over seventeen billion dollars in common stock in 
1985, over one trillion dollars in outstanding shares were traded.450 
That trading activity cost more than eight billion dollars in broker's 
commissions paid to NYSE-member firms alone. Professor Lowen-
stein has estimated that the costs of trading in outstanding shares 
about equal the total amount of capital raised by new stock issues in 
the first place.451 
447. See Hirshleifer, supra note 443, at 569 (in a world of differing opinions "conflict of 
beliefs may enormously compound the speculative factor that, even from the point of view of a 
single individual, tends to promote excessive investment in information-generating activity"). 
448. See supra note 173. This balance is maintained even if stock prices appreciate steadily 
over time, because one investor can only enjoy that appreciation by retaining ownership in the 
stock and so denying any other potential investor the opportunity to benefit from that 
appreciation. 
449. Continuous disclosure by publicly held corporations comprises the bulk of federally 
mandated disclosure. Schulte, supra note 151, at 547. Of the $38.7 billion in gross income en-
joyed by NYSE-member firms, only $4.2 billion was from underwriting new issues, with the 
remainder attributable to broker's commissions, investment advice fees, and trading profits in 
securities and commodities. 1986 NYSE FACTBOOK, supra note 176, at 60. 
450. The dollar value of trading in outstanding shares outweighs corporate issues by a factor 
. of 30 to 1, see supra note 177 and accompanying text. Outstanding stocks show tremendous 
"turnover,'' changing hands on average every other year. See BRADY REPORT, supra note 15, at 
11-12 (annual stock turnover has increased in last decade from 21% to 64%); L. LoWENSTEIN, 
supra note 129, at 63-68 (describing and criticizing stock market turnover). 
451. L. LoWENSTEIN, supra note 129, at 80 (approximately $25 to $30 billion in new com-
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The problem of overinvestment in stock information and trading 
recommends that lawmakers hesitate before adopting policies designed 
solely to enhance pricing efficiency. Some policies that benefit pricing 
efficiency may help reduce private costs. The present mandatory dis-
closure scheme makes certain corporate information available readily 
and cheaply, and may prevent investors and analysts from devoting 
excessive time, effort, and money to information-hunting.452 In other 
words, mandatory disclosure can be defended not because it is impor-
tant for investors to have such information, but because it is important 
to stop their wasting resources trying to get it. 
But some policies enhance efficiency by creating new opportunities 
for trading. An example is trading in stock index futures and other 
derivative instruments. If investors who trade outstanding issues are 
merely gambling on the fates of corporations, then stock futures spec-
ulators are gambling on the gamblers.453 Nevertheless, the speculative 
profits to be made from futures trading, combined with differing opin-
ions of the likely future direction of the market, create incentives for 
private market participants to spend large amolints of money ,analyz-
ing and trading in index futures. Since their introduction in 1982, 
trading in stock index futures has grown "spectacularly.''~54 Financial 
futures have come to account for more than half of all commodity 
futures contracts traded' on U.S. exchanges,455 and the value of the 
stocks underlying the futures contracts traded daily on the Chicago 
Mercantile Exchange is now twice that of stocks traded on, the 
NYSE.456 
Index futures trading illustrates how government policies that en-
hance efficiency by encouraging new markets, extending the trading 
hours of existing ones, or allowing trading in new types of financial 
instruments; may induce private waste just as building a new racetrack 
does.457 If informational efficiency were costless, even a minute in-
crease in allocational efficiency would make markets that more rapidly 
mon stocks issued annually; trading costs of secondary market also approximate $25 to $30 
billion annually). 
452. See Coffee, supra note 5, at 734 (defending mandatory disclosure system as discouraging 
excessive private information-seeking). 
453. See supra note 173. 
454. SEC REPORT, supra note 69, at 3-1. 
455. See U.S. DEPT. OF CoMMERCE, STATISrICAL AllsTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1988 
at 487 (1988) (Table 812). 
456. See BRADY REPORT, supra note 15, at 5. 
457. Cf. Proxmire Introduces Bill to Create Interagency Group for Market Crises, 20 Sec. Reg. 
& L. Rep. (BNA) at 484, 485 (Apr. 1, 1988) (reporting that NYSE, Philadelphia and Midwest 
Stock Exchanges are considering seeking SEC approval to create specialists' posts to trade bas-
kets of stock). 
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reflect information a worthwhile policy goal. But there is no such 
thing as a free lunch. In the case of informational efficiency, the meal 
may be seriously overpriced. 
D. Conclusion 
To the traditional securities regulation goal of "fair and honest 
markets" we have added another: efficient markets. But before we 
adopt legal rules designed to promote the rapid incorporation of infor-
mation into stock prices, we should question whether the costs of im-
proved efficiency are balanced by proportionate benefits. The growing 
consensus that more efficient markets are an important regulatory goal 
is premised on the belief that pricing efficiency leads to allocative effi-
ciency. That consensus has shallow roots indeed, for trading market 
prices are only remotely connected to the socially optimal allocation of 
real resources. 
The weak link between efficient public stock markets and alloca-
tional efficiency has many implications. The insider trading debate 
provides a convenient example. Many believe that allowing corporate 
insiders to trade with their own shareholders on the basis on confiden-
tial nonpublic information garnered from the corporation allows insid-
ers an unfair advantage.458 Yet scholars continue to urge that insider 
trading be legalized to reap the perceived economic benefits of more 
"correct" stock pricing.459 If the pricing efficiency improvements as-
sociated with insider trading are unaccompanied by any improvement 
in allocational efficiency, perhaps the perennial debate over legalizing 
insider trading can be laid to rest. 
458. See Levmore, supra note 12, at 118 (traditional disclose or abstain rule "rests primarily 
on fairness grounds"); Phillips & Zutz, The Insider Trading Doctrine: A Need for Legislative 
Repair, 13 HOFSTRA L. REV. 65 (1984) (insider trading doctrine premised on fairness and equal 
opportunity); see, e.g., REPORT ON ITSA, supra note 3, at 2 (insider trading undermines fair and 
honest stock market); ABA Report, supra note 6, at 227 (insider trading violates notions of fair 
play). 
459. See supra notes 42, 48 and accompanying text; Levmore, supra note 12, at 118 (free 
market view favoring insider trading "rests on efficiency considerations and the role of the stock 
market as an allocator of capital"). Professor Manne has described the efficiency benefits of 
allowing insider trading as "one of the strongest" arguments favoring legalization. Manne, Law 
Professors, supra note 39, at 565. The second benefit that has been claimed for insider trading is 
that it provides a reward for corporate insiders who create valuable information that may affect 
stock price. See id. at 578-81 (insider trading as entrepreneurial reward); Manne, In Defense of 
Insider Trading, 44 HARV. Bus. REv. 113, (Nov./Dec. 1966) (Insider trading is the "only effec-
tive compensation scheme for entrepreneurial services in large corporations."). This view has 
been persuasively undermined by those who point out that insider trading creates incentives to 
create bad news as well as good, allows insiders to trade on the information created by other 
individuals within the corporation, is not necessary as other bonding mechanisms (such a stock 
options) can tie insider incentives to stock prices, creates incentives to delay the disclosure of 
information, and in general is an "untidy and senseless" reward system. Levmore, supra note 12, 
at 149-50; see Schotland, supra note 131, at 1430-38, 1452-56. 
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Similar arguments apply in the case of index futures trading. In-
dex futures move information into the equity markets only minutes or 
hours before it would otherwise arrive, an efficiency improvement of 
doubtful proportions.460 The capital allocation benefits of index fu-
tures trading are further diminished because the indexes involve blue 
chip stocks of corporations that have not issued common stock for 
decades and are unlikely to do so in the future.461 In contrast to the 
uncertain allocative benefits of index futures trading, there are sub-
stantial costs. Many authorities believe that trading in stock index fu-
tures exaggerates market volatility and increases the risk of market 
"meltdown." The opportunity for such trading may also encourage 
wasteful private expenditures by traders seeking speculative profits. 
Finally, the failure of portfolio insurance techniques on October 19, 
1987, has shadowed the value of index futures as a hedging device. If 
enhanced pricing efficiency remains as the primary "benefit" attrib-
uted to futures trading, perhaps index futures should simply be 
prohibited. 462 
'l;'he cases of insider trading and index futures trading illustrate 
how, in many circumstances, the current preoccupation with nurtur-
ing efficient stock market pricing seems unwarranted. It is at least 
misdirected. A second conclusion suggested by economic analysis is 
that if we are truly concerned with enhancing allocative efficiency 
through securities policy, we may well be looking in the wrong place. 
Prices reflecting all relevant information produce the greatest benefit 
not in the public trading markets, but in two discrete, nonpublic secur-
ities markets examined here: the market for underwriting new issues 
of stock, and the tender offer market for corporate control.463 
460. See supra note 92 and accompanying text; JOINT STUDY OF TRADING IN FUTURES, 
supra note 6, at 1-11, 11-24 to 11-26 ("[P]rice discovery" and "price basing" benefits of derivative 
trading in stocks "probably has not led to a significant improvement" in pricing because "highly 
developed, competitive and sophisticated" markets for the underlying securities already exist.). 
461. See M. Fox, supra note 27, at 143 (corporations that dominate industrial sector issued 
stock 50 to 100 years ago and avoid equity issues); BRADY REPORT, supra note 15, at 5, VI-18 
(describing most-commonly-traded S & P 500 future based on index of 500 stocks, 475 of which . 
are NYSE-listed industrials). 
462. See Markey Announces Bipartisan Probe into Causes of Collapse of Stock Market, 19 Sec. 
Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 42, at 1604 (Oct. 23, 1987) (following crash, Chairman of House 
Energy and Commerce Telecommunications and Finance Subcommittee announced bipartisan 
investigation into causes of decline, focusing closely on program trading and whether financial 
markets "would simply be better off without stock index futures"). The possible lack of any 
efficiency or hedging benefits from stock index futures trading, see supra note 93 (reasons to 
question hedging benefit), calls into question the value of derivative financial instruments gener-
ally. In this light, see Sporkin, A Call for a New Special Study of the Securities and Financial 
Markets, 46 MD. L. REV. 915, 920 (1987) ("[w]hether [derivative products] serve investor inter-
ests in any meaningful way has not been determined"). 
463. The initial public offering market is largely restricted to a small number of investment 
banking firms that have the capital and expertise to purchase an entire issue and then retail it 
I 
708 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 87:613 
In contrast to trading market prices, corporate issues prices in the 
underwriting market directly affect the allocation of capital among 
corporations.464 · Tender offer prices also have allocational conse-
quences to the extent they help determine who owns or controls the 
corporation. The irony of the contemporary regulatory framework, 
however, is that federal and state law (along with market imperfec-
tions) distort the new issue and tender offer markets in ways that make 
correct prices in those markets unlikely. In the case of the underwrit-
ing market, the requirement that new issues be sold at a fixed price 
combines with the nature of the relationship between underwriters and 
issuers to produce a pattern of mispricing and underpricing. In the 
tender offer market, a plethora of anti-takeover defenses and state stat-
utes raise the costs of tender offers so that distorted pricing seems inev-
itable. The Williams Act's best price rule also raises tender offer 
prices by ensuring that the price of corporate control is determined not 
by market forces of supply or demand, but by the premium demanded 
by the last shareholder whose stock must be purchased to gain effec-
tive control, no matter how wildly inflated that might be. 
The current regulatory scheme, in sum, seeks to encourage infor-
mational efficiency in the exchange and OTC markets where outstand-
ing securities are traded while ignoring (and in some cases worsening) 
mispricing in the markets for underwriting new issues and for tender 
offers. If the ultimate goal is the efficient allocation of resources in the 
real economy, this strategy is precisely backwards. 
These observations are not intended to belittle the role of economic 
analysis in questions of legal policy generally or securities policy in 
particular. Indeed, there are few areas in which economic analysis is 
more appropriate. But any issue as complex as the relationship be-
tween public securities markets and the allocation of resources in the 
real economy deserves thorough and critical analysis. Before investing 
scarce resources and sacrificing other goals like investor protection or 
fair and honest markets to market efficiency, we should require 
stronger evidence that improving efficiency brings commensurate ben-
efits. More shortsighted or superficial treatment can lead to conclu-
sions that are costly from any perspective, including an economic one. 
successfully to the public. Moreover, corporations generally do not select underwriters by openly 
inviting bids but instead rely on private negotiations with a few firms. Smith, Investment Bank· 
ing and the Capital Acquisition Process, 15 J. FIN. EcoN. 3 (1986) (95% of underwriting con-
tracts negotiated). The tender offer market may be regarded as nonpublic because the parties to 
the deal include only the bidding entity and the existing shareholders of the target. 
464. At least to the extent that new issues prices determine the firm's access to capital, a 
matter as to which there is some doubt. See supra text accompanying notes 178-204. 
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